In this article, Patrice Sartre, then Colonel, commanding the North Turquoise group in Kibuye, recognizes " the cruel Bevue of Bisesero em>". He says, " One of the difficulties of the theater level of the Turquoise operation will undoubtedly be the attitude of the element of the special forces. At the episode of Bisesero, while the general commander the Turquoise operation understood the tragic situation in these hills and reported it to the EMA, it is the point of view of the special forces of the operation which had prevailed and leads to a too late reaction. This anti-Tutsi prejudice will give the entire operation an offset aggressive image of the UN mandate ".
General Patrice Sartre confesses here that it is by a deliberate decision that the French soldiers of the Special Operations Command (COS) did not come on June 27, 1994 to rescue the Tutsi survivors in Bisesero, who were hunted down as wild beasts for three months by the Rwandan government killers. This decision was taken at the level of the Élysée Palace with which, he said, the special forces were in direct contact. It is therefore confirmed that the date of June 29 appearing on the telegram given to justice, in which Lieutenant-Colonel Duval gave an account of his meeting with the Tutsi on June 27, was probably falsified.
Logically, this admission should relaunch the investigation of legal complaints by Rwandan survivors against the French army for complicity in genocide, while the judge had decided to stop his investigation into Bisesero. If Patrice Sartre exonerates General Lafourcade, commander of Operation Turquoise, the same is not true of General Jacques Rosier, commander of the COS detachment, of the Chief of Staff of the french army, Admiral Jacques Lanxade (who spoke of " tutsi maquis " in the Conseil Restreint on June 29) and of the particular chief of staff at the Presidency of the Republic, General Christian Quesnot.