

*AmBano* *pe*

FM UKMIS NEW YORK  
TO DESKBY 140730Z FCO  
TELNO 1340  
OF 140450Z APRIL 94  
INFO DESKBY 140730Z PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALA  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DAR ES SALAAM, ADDIS ABAB  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA  
INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS, ACTOR

PART ONE OF TWO (54) (57)

MY TELNO 1306 AND YOUR TELNO 543: RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. Secretary General writes to Council President informing him of Belgian intention to withdraw from UNAMIR and concluding that without Belgians, force must be withdrawn.
2. Secretariat brief Council members on latest developments. Continued fighting. UNAMIR unable to fulfill mandate but Force Commander mediating between the parties. Earlier attempts to promote a dialogue fail, but latest information is that meeting between RPF and Rwandan Government will take place on 14 April.
3. Council members express regret that Secretary-General's letter fails to offer substantive recommendations on future of UNAMIR. Also regret the line taken on Belgian plan to withdraw. NAM present draft resolution calling for expansion of UNAMIR with a different mandate. Other Council members favour a much reduced UN presence. Instructions requested.

DETAIL

4. The Secretary-General wrote to the President of the Security Council on 13 April, informing Council members that, in the light of the Belgian decision to withdraw its contingent, UNAMIR was untenable and that the Force Commander had been asked to prepare recommendations for the possible withdrawal of the force. Text of letter in MIFT. (59)
5. As foreshadowed in first TUR, the NAM caucus had a series of meetings on the afternoon of 13 April to introduce their

UNR 057/80	

60

draft resolution on UNAMIR (text in second IFT). I expressed scepticism to the NAM at the idea of a reinforced UNAMIR. I also said that any text should maintain balance in its references to the parties (as drafted, unsurprisingly given the Rwandan Ambassador's presence in the NAM caucus, it tilts against the RPF). It was also important to engage neighbouring states in a positive way, rather than rebuking them. I also had a brief exchange with Riza (ASG, DPKO) and De Soto (Secretary-General's Special Political Adviser) and explained how unsatisfactory we had found the Secretary-General's letter, which did not offer any substantive views on the way forward but simply tried to blame the Belgians.

6. I subsequently went over the ground with the Belgian Permanent Representative who expressed concern at the way the Secretary-General had presented the situation. I explained the line I intended to take in informal consultations. He welcomed this and gave me an advance copy of a letter he had sent to the President of the Security Council (text by fax to AD(E)). This notes the rapidly deteriorating situation in Rwanda which had led to the Franco-Belgian evacuation operation, now almost complete. It says that UNAMIR is unable to carry out its mandate. The presence of the Belgian contingent within UNAMIR exposes the contingent to unacceptable risks and constitutes a threat to the operation of UNAMIR as a whole given the ~~anti-Belgian campaign being conducted by one of the Rwandan factions.~~ It says that the Belgian Government believes the activity of UNAMIR troops should be suspended until the conditions necessary to take forward the peace process were restored. Until then, the only justification for a UN presence in Rwanda is humanitarian. I told Notredaeme that the idea that UNAMIR's mandate might be suspended seemed to me one that might prove attractive in the Council.

7. Informal consultations of the Council began with another briefing from Riza on latest developments. The truce for the evacuation of foreign nationals was all that was holding in Kigali. The Belgian task force expected to complete the evacuation on 14 April. There was no cease-fire. The RPF had not accepted a Rwandan army offer of a cease-fire since other Rwandan army commanders were still fighting. There was no dialogue between the parties, although UNAMIR was trying to pass messages between them. There was still fighting in the streets. Although the RPF controlled much of the city, it was

still meeting resistance. The deteriorating situation in Kigali appeared to be exacerbated by the presence of Belgian forces both within and outside UNAMIR. It was the Force Commander's assessment that the presence of the Belgian contingent was a danger to the rest of UNAMIR. However, the Force Commander had also said that if the Belgian contingent withdrew, he would not be able to ensure the safety of UNAMIR or secure the airport. Riza said that both the RPF and the Rwandan Government had asked the Force Commander to continue his intermediary role as long as possible.

8. Riza said that in the current circumstances UNAMIR was not capable of performing the tasks under its mandate. For the moment it was securing the safety of its own civilian personnel, other UN agency staff, and was helping the evacuation process by escorting convoys to Burundi and to the airport. It was also providing what support it could in Kigali to Rwandan civilian, as well as trying to bring about a cease-fire and facilitate communications between both side. The UNOMUR observers were still carrying out patrolling duties according to their mandate. They had no reports of passage of arms across the border. Given the link between UNOMUR and UNAMIR, if UNAMIR were to be withdrawn there would be little reason to keep UNOMUR in place. Riza said that he had received no communication from any other troop contributor apart from Belgium indicating a desire to withdraw. Keating confirmed this in a brief report on his contacts with the troop contributors. All were concerned about the safety of their personnel, but they were also concerned about the political situation in Rwanda and cautious about a premature UN withdrawal.

9. Gambari (Nigeria) introduced the NAM draft resolution. He characterised this as an invitation to dialogue with other Council members. It was designed to address concerns that the Security Council's deliberations should extend more widely than concern for foreign nations and UN staff. The NAM had concluded that there were three options. The first was to declare that the situation in Rwanda was a complete breakdown of law and order and that there was a need for a peace enforcement mechanism under Chapter VII of the Charter. They had dismissed this option. Even if it were judged desirable, there were neither the political will nor the resources available to move into peace enforcement. The other extreme

was for the UN to pack up and leave. This option had also been rejected. No troop contributors except Belgium had expressed a desire to leave and the Belgian contingent had specific problems and might even be a destabilising factor. It was the wrong signal to withdraw. Neither party wanted it and the potential for damaging the UN's credibility by such an action was considerable. The third option, which the NAM caucus supported, was for the UN to continue to have a presence in Rwanda, devoted to encouraging a cease-fire and helping the Secretary-General's Special Representative to continue his efforts as a facilitator with the aim of relaunching the Arusha peace process. It should also have a mandate to protect civilians. It would be relatively easy to implement this third option. UNAMIR were there on the ground. They needed a different mandate to reflect the new situation and an appropriate force level. The key was to achieve a cease-fire. If the international community had the resolve, UNAMIR together with neighbouring countries and the OAU should be able to bring a cease-fire about. Even if the RPF were to take Kigali, it would be a pyrrhic victory. There could be no long-term solution to the problems in Rwanda without a broad based transitional Government of national reconciliation.

HANNAY

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

118

MAIN 106

.EAST AFRICA

AD(E)

AD(S)

APD

CCD

CFSP UNIT

CONSULAR D

EAFD/ODA

ECD(E)

ERD

HRPD

INFO D//BRIEFWRITERS

NTCD

PUSD

RAD

RFD

UND

PS

PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD

PS/BARONESS CHALKER

PS/PUS

LEGAL ADVISERS  
NENAD/[REDACTED]  
NEWS D

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

ADDITIONAL 12

ASSESSMENTS/MR [REDACTED]  
MODUK//DI(ROW) [REDACTED]  
MODUK//SEC(O)(C) [REDACTED]  
PS/NO 10  
[REDACTED]

HOME OFF//B3 DIV MR GALE  
HMT//MR MORTIMER  
DTI//MR B HOPSON XAAA3  
DTI//MR P BIRD

NNNN

[REDACTED]  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK  
TO DESKBY 140730Z FCO  
TELNO 1340  
OF 140450Z APRIL 94  
INFO DESKBY 140730Z PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALA  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DAR ES SALAAM, ADDIS ABABA  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA  
INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS, ACTOR

FINAL PART OF TWO

10. Merimee (France) commented briefly on the Secretary-General's letter. There was every reason in the world for the Belgian contingent to leave. Just as the RPF suspected the French forces of ulterior motives, so some factions in the Rwandan Government suspected the Belgians. This fact was a handicap for UNAMIR as the force commander had admitted. It made perfect sense for the Belgians to withdraw but France could not agree that UNAMIR would cease to exist because the Belgians left. There was no cause and effect. As far as the NAM draft was concerned, he agreed it was the basis for discussion. OP5 went rather further than France could support and might need to be amended. But he agreed that total withdrawal of UNAMIR was not an option. The UN presence was a stabilising factor and we should not forget the possible spill-over into Burundi if the situation in Rwanda was allowed to deteriorate still further. The key was to exert political pressure, particularly on the RPF who seemed to be rejecting a cease-fire. They should be made to realise that any military victory would be only provisional. He welcomed the suggestion that the OAU be involved. This would be important both within the country and with respect to the Governments of neighbouring countries, for example Uganda. Uganda did have influence on the RPF. The international community should persuade them to put pressure on the RPF to agree to a cease-fire.

11. Albright (US) said that it would be difficult to keep UNAMIR in place. It was unfortunate that the Secretary-General had singled out the Belgians in the way he had. The US were concerned at the way the NAM resolution had been drafted. It seemed to imply that UNAMIR would be given a heavy enforcement responsibility. This went beyond what it was possible for

UNAMIR to do. The Council needed to find an option which neither pulled the plug on the whole operation nor engaged peace-keepers in a task they could not carry out. She thought a skeletal operation to show the will of the international community would be the best option. It would be possible to come back to it when the situation allowed. We should not abandon the Rwandan people but we should also learn from the lessons of past operations.

12. I said that this was a very difficult issue. There was no completely satisfactory solution. We had been very disappointed by the Secretary-General's letter. It was not an adequate response to the questions which had been put by the Council. Neither was it an adequate basis for the Council to move forward. It was not appropriate to blame the Belgians for the inability of UNAMIR to carry out its mandate. It could not carry out its mandate because of the conditions on the ground, not because of any decisions regarding the Belgian contingent. It was also wrong to suggest that, if the Belgian Government reconsidered their decision, all problems would be solved. The conditions were simply not there for UNAMIR to fulfil its mandate. We needed to know urgently from the Force Commander what was feasible and what could be done. This was very urgent, given that the availability of transport for any possible evacuation was time-limited.

13. I agreed that the UN should remain active in political terms. Peace would not come to Rwanda without a Government of national unity and reconciliation. There needed to be a cease-fire and a return to the Arusha peace process. The OAU would play a valuable role. I also hoped that neighbouring states would engage again. But the Council should be asking neighbouring states to cooperate with the OAU and the UN to bring about an end to the crisis, not accusing them of doing other things. I also drew attention to the need to take a realistic view of what the UN could do. I understood why there had been talk of protecting civilians. But even a vastly increased and better equipped UNAMIR would find such a broad mandate difficult to fulfil. We should be guided by Secretariat recommendations. If they said something could not be done, there was not much point putting it in a resolution. The humanitarian effort definitely needed to continue. We should also think about what sort of small force was needed to support the SRSG and help him get the Arusha process back on

track. Neither of the two extremes - enforcement or complete withdrawal - seemed acceptable.

14. In the discussion that followed, all Council members joined in rejecting both complete withdrawal and moves to peace-enforcement. There was however a division on whether the UN presence which remained should be the SRSG, political and humanitarian staff, and a small military presence to protect them, or an expanded force which would play an active role in protecting Rwandan civilians. I, the Americans, the New Zealanders, the Spanish, the Russians, the Argentinians and the Brazilians inclined to the former solution while the Non-Aligned and to a lesser extent the French tended to the latter. (Riza usefully pointed up the difficulty of any long term UN effort to protect groups of Rwandan citizens.) All were agreed, however, that the Council could not make meaningful decisions on the mandate in the absence of substantive recommendations from the Secretary-General based on assessments from the field of the options for a continued UN presence, if any.

15. Before the end of the meeting, Riza announced that he had just heard from Kigali that Rwandan army representatives had conveyed to UNAMIR their wish to meet the RPF and start substantive political negotiations. The RPF had set a number of conditions for this, including that the first meeting should be an informal one which might be followed by substantive negotiations. The Rwandan army representatives had reacted favourably to the RPF response and a meeting was scheduled to take place in UNAMIR headquarters on 14 April. He said that he would make every effort to bring substantive options to the Council on 14 April, although with the Secretary-General in Madrid it might not be possible to give more than an oral briefing. It was agreed that a working group would meet at 141500Z to look at the body of the NAM text apart from the operative paragraphs on UNAMIR's mandate. This would have to await discussion at informal consultations at 151830Z at which it was hoped the Secretary-General's recommendations would be presented.

COMMENT

16. Instructions on the NAM draft and any further points you may wish us to make should reach us please deskby 141330Z.



HANNAY

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

118

MAIN 106

.EAST AFRICA  
AD(E)  
AD(S)  
APD  
CCD  
CFSP UNIT  
CONSULAR D  
EAFD/ODA  
ECD(E)  
ERD  
HRPD  
INFO D//BRIEFWRITERS  
LEGAL ADVISERS  
NENAD//  
NEWS D

NTCD  
PUSD  
RAD  
RFD  
UND  
PS  
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD  
PS/BARONESS CHALKER  
PS/PUS

ADDITIONAL 12

ASSESSMENTS//  
MODUK//DI(ROW)  
MODUK//SEC(O)(C)  
PS/NO 10  
BANKE//

HOME OFF//B3 DIV  
HMT//  
DTI// XAAA3  
DTI//

NNNN