

115/23/37

Your file: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

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FROM:	NEW YORK	C04652/NYK	21-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC:	BEIJING	BONN	Routine
	BRUSSELS	CANBERRA	Routine
	GENEVA	HARARE	Routine
	LONDON	MADRID	Routine
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MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3)
(DSP1, CEO, EAB)

P/S MFA
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your U52265.

Summary

- French have amended draft resolution to secure support/acquiescence of enough Council members to adopt the resolution and will push it to a vote as a French text tomorrow, 22 June
- France objects to our request for a report from the Force Commander and for consultations with troop contributors
- Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Brazil continue to have serious reservations and Missions are recommending abstentions to their capitals
- Humanitarian NGOs are targeting us with calls and faxes urging that we oppose the resolution
- Secretariat, UNAMIR Force Commander, non-Council members, and OAU continue to have grave reservations about the French initiative and privately commend the stand we have taken
- The RPF remain implacably opposed to the initiative, have withdrawn consent for UNAMIR's presence and insist that UNAMIR withdraw to avoid getting caught up in French-RPF

fighting

- Secretariat report that French initiative is already having negative impact on contributions for expanded UNAMIR (though Canadian Cabinet agreed today to deployment of 300 person signals detachment to UNAMIR)
- We recommend that New Zealand withhold support from the French resolution

Action

Voting instructions

Report

Informal consultations this afternoon were devoted to further consideration of the French resolution. Merimee circulated a revised text which incorporated a number of amendments following various consultations the French had had with the US, Brazil, Spain, the Czech Rep, and the NAM Caucus. Despite these changes, the only enthusiastic support came from the Russians who, as Moscow has commented, clearly see value in the initiative for their own purposes.

2 Spain and the UK played their part as loyal Europeans and helped the French out with drafting suggestions, and the US indicated support, subject to establishing clearly in the text that financial responsibility for the venture lies with the participating states and any others that choose to help them. The Argentines, who had told us beforehand they were uncomfortable with their overnight instructions to support the text, secured, at our suggestion, clarifying words at the end of what is now PPF that the French force shall not be an interpositional force between the parties.

3 We spoke early in the discussion to repeat our basic reservations with the proposal which would require UNAMIR to operate alongside a separately constituted and differently empowered force, and urged the French to reconsider the option of putting their troops under blue helmets and giving UNAMIR Chapter VII authority. We also said that before the Council took a decision it should have a detailed report from the Force Commander on the likely implications for UNAMIR of the introduction of the French force and that there should be consultations with actual and potential troop contributors to UNAMIR.

4 In response, Merimee said that while France would have preferred to have been able to participate in a UN-commanded operation, circumstances made that impossible: the RPF's attitude towards France meant that French participation in UNAMIR would have compromised the neutrality of the UN Force. Moreover, the French force had a different and dangerous task to fulfill and needed the protection offered by a unified national command. He dismissed the request for

a report from Dallaire by noting that the SecGen would not have supported the idea if he had been concerned for the safety of his personnel.

5 The Chinese said they remained concerned about the attitude of the parties and that of the OAU. When Merimee offered satisfaction on neither, Brazil repeated the request, but to no greater effect. (Despite their lobbying efforts, the French have made little headway with the RPF or the OAU - see below). Nigeria (Ayewah) made a convoluted intervention, the upshot of which seemed to be that the latest French draft, while an improvement, exacerbated their concerns, and that the resolution could have a negative impact on those countries that had already signalled their willingness to contribute to UNAMIR. They urged the French to make haste slowly.

6 No other Council member spoke in the general discussion. A member of the Pakistani delegation made a point of telling us privately that he fully agreed with everything we said and was very concerned at the implications of the resolution for Russian intervention in Georgia, Tajikistan and even Afghanistan. Although the French had had some success in persuading Marker to maintain silence, on the basis that any Pakistani profile could complicate the task of the Khan (the former head of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry and newly-appointed Special Representative for Rwanda), the delegation were going to recommend an abstention. He also noted that they had had strong representations from the Malaysians and the Sri Lankans urging opposition to the proposal.

7 At French urging, the President took the Council through a paragraph by paragraph review of the text. Merimee said he would be happy to consider all proposals but, turning to us, said he could not accommodate suggestions that were counter to the thrust of the French initiative. We agreed to this procedure on the understanding that the text would remain a French draft and that there could be no question of the text being turned into a Presidential text or of any delegation being committed to the outcome. A number of further changes were made to the text, though none were of much significance. The French said that will put the text under their name in blue tonight (see accompanying fax) for a vote tomorrow. Merimee pressed very hard for adoption in the morning, but was resisted by the Nigerians and the Pakistanis who said their instructions may not arrive until later in the day.

8 There is manifest concern among the NGO community at the French initiative. We received phone calls this morning from Britain from Oxfam UK and from Africa Rights urging us to maintain our opposition to the proposal and telling us that their concerns are widely held among NGOs operating in Rwanda, including, they said, Medecines sans frontieres (France). This afternoon, we were the subject of a fax

attack from humanitarian NGOs and Rwandans living in America pleading with us to oppose the proposal. They are deeply concerned at the implications that the French force, coupled with RPF opposition to it, will have on the humanitarian relief situation and on the morale of Rwandans in general. Africa Rights, which has just had one of their principles return from a lengthy visit to the country insisted that the introduction of a French force would be of major concern to ordinary Hutu as well as to the Tutsi.

9 It has also been plain from various conversations we have had today with the Secretariat and with non-Council members that the widely-held apprehensions about the motivation for the French initiative and its implications for UNAMIR and the wider UN continue. None of the Secretariat we spoke to on the political and military sides bothered to hide their profound disagreement with their CEO's judgment.

10 Speculation as to the bona fides of the French initiative is rife. One interesting piece of information we learned from the Secretariat this afternoon is that the RPF claims that French military advisers have remained in the country and have been training some of the Hutu militias are correct. Some are out in the countryside but some are in Kigali. It was interesting therefore that the French told us that one reason for the urgency was that they consider that Kigali could fall to the RPF at any time.

11 ~~The Canadians confirmed that Dallaire is firmly opposed to the French force and has said so publicly, and that as a consequence the French seem to have started a campaign for his removal.~~ In the informals themselves, ASG Riza, when asked for the views of the Force Commander noted that Dallaire was bound by the SecGen's decision and had been instructed to implement the necessary coordination with the French force. However, he went on to note that Dallaire had advised that there would be no problems with the French force if the RPF were to change their position to support the French initiative. But if they remained opposed, there could be very serious complications for UNAMIR, whose headquarters are located in an RPF-held sector of Kigali and which is dependent on resupply either through the RPF-held airport or through the RPF-held territory to the North-east.

11 Riza noted that there had already been some signs of a hardening of RPF attitudes; the APCs coming from Somalia had been held up for three days on the border. As if to underscore his own reservations, when the French declined to answer China on the OAU position Riza took the initiative to show us and the Nigerians the OAU communique where it is stated clearly that ~~the OAU believes any intervention must be within the framework of UNAMIR.~~

12 The RPF opposition to the French force remains obdurate. Today, they have taken the next step and have advised that if the Council approves the French force it should also

authorize the withdrawal, perhaps temporarily, of UNAMIR since they are concerned that their personnel will not be able to distinguish clearly between UNAMIR and French personnel. Text of RPF letter is in accompanying fax. Even allowing for the element of bluff, the threat to UNAMIR is unmistakable. The Secretariat have told us that they are already evacuating out the Senegalese and Congolese members of UNAMIR and at this afternoon's consultations Riza confirmed that ~~Dallaire is drawing up contingency plans for total withdrawal of the force.~~ Meanwhile, flights into Kigali are subject to individual approval by the RPF who have taken steps to render the airport unusable to any attempt by the French to land there.

13 Non-Council members such as the Canadians, the Australians, the Ghanaians and the Zimbabweans have told us of their reservations about the French proposal. The Australians consider that that proposal could well delay a decision by Canberra on Australian participation in UNAMIR. The Nigerians told us that a number of the Africans who had committed themselves to participate in the expanded force are now reconsidering. Even the Ghanaians, the remainder of whose mechanised battalion were to be deployed on Friday, 24 June, is now reconsidering. This confirms the Secretariat's worst fears about the SecGen's decision to endorse the French initiative. (On the positive side, however, the Canadians tell us that their Cabinet gave formal approval this morning to a 300 strong signals detachment to join UNAMIR. A reconnaissance team is already on the way to Rwanda.)

Voting positions

14 A vote on the resolution tomorrow is almost a certainty. Our guess is that the French can count on 10 positive votes. China, Pakistan, Nigeria are recommending to their capitals that they abstain. The Brazilians are considering doing the same.

Recommendation

15 We recommend that ~~New Zealand not support the resolution.~~ The evidence continues to mount that this is a badly conceived operation with questionable motivation. The NGO community is opposed and recognises that it is unlikely to save lives. It is inconsistent with the principles we have consistently espoused regarding the deployment of UN forces. Even if it is able to do some immediate good, it threatens to leave the UN with a bigger mess to clean up afterwards.

16 Accordingly, we recommend that ~~at a minimum New Zealand should abstain and that we should be prepared to do so even if we are on our own.~~ For better or worse, we have become identified as the conscience of the Council on Rwanda. It would do us little credit with other Council members, the wider UN membership or with NGOs were we to compromise our

principles and go along with a consensus on such a bad product. In our judgment, a tough EOY would not of itself be convincing.

End Message