

NAME: MORCHER MATTHEW
ID No 5193
RANK CPL
COY E
PLATOON 1

0091049

CASE NO: TETR-98-41-T
EXHIBIT NO: P 248
DATE ADMITTED: 8-6-2004
TENDERED BY: PROSECUTOR
NAME OF WITNESS: M. NKOLO

STATEMENT

ON MONDAY 4TH APRIL 1994, FIVE OF US WERE DETAILED ON DUTY AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S RESIDENCE BY OUR OFFICER, COMMANDING CAPTAIN ADDY TO PROVIDE NIERNAL SECURITY WITH IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S HOUSE.

THEN ON THE 6TH OF APRIL 1994, around 8:30 P.M, WE MONITORED ON OUR RADIO THAT THE PRESIDENT IS RETURNING FROM A CONFERENCE WITH IN 15 MINUTES TIME. AFTER THAT STATEMENT, OVER THE RADIO THAT WE SAW A PLANE HOVERING ABOUT IN THE AIR. JUST WITH IN THAT PERIOD, WE HEARD OF TWO BOMB BLASTS AND SERIES OF SMALL ARMS FIRING.

DURING THE FIRING, WE WERE DEPLOYED TO OUR FIRING POINTS. MEANWHILE THE JENDERMARINES WHO WERE THE WOMAN PERS. ONAL GUARDS ALSO TOOK POSITIONS.

THE NEXT DAY BEING ~~ON~~ THE 7TH OF APRIL 1994, AROUND 4:30 AM TO 5:00 AM, THE BELGIUM ALSO CAME IN WITH FOUR ESCOF

2 TWO OF THE OTHERS WERE DRIVEN INSIDE THE YARD. THE GUARD COMMANDER APPROACHED THEM FOR THEIR MISSION AND THEY ANSWERED THAT THEY ARE COMING TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER.

AFTER THAT, THEY KNOCKED AT THE DOOR BUT THE WOMAN DID NOT ANSWER. MEANWHILE FIRING WAS COMING TOWARDS THE HOUSE AND SO THE BELGIUMS ALSO TOOK COVER.

WHILE'S WE WERE AT OUR FIRING POINTS, WE SAW SOME OF THE BODY GUARDS CUTTING THE BARB WIRE.

FEW MINUTES LATER WE SAW THE WOMAN AND THE FAMILIES PASSING THROUGH THAT PAVEMENT TOGETHER WITH ~~THE~~ THE GENDERMARINE AROUND 0630 HOURS TO 0700 HOURS.

WE WERE THEN LEFT WITH THE BELGIUM SOLDIERS ABOUT 0715 HOURS, WE WERE SURRENDERED BY THE GOVERNMENT FORCES AND ORDERED ^{US} TO PUT OUR ARMS DOWN AT GUN POINT. WE WERE THEN DOUBLED ~~TO~~ TO A WAITING VEHICLE AND DROVE US TO THEIR CAMP. AT THE CAMP, I SAW ONE TOGOLES UN OBSERVER OFFICER. I WAS FORCED OUT FROM THE CAR AND FORCED TO SIT DOWN.

THE SOLDIERS AT THE CAMP RUSHED ON US AND STARTED BEATEN US FROM ALL ANGLES, SOME RIFLES, STICKS, IRON BARS AND STONES.

THIS MADE ME TO SUSTAIN SERIOUS INJURY IN MY RIBS AND A SWOLLEN RIGHT EYE. THERE THE UN OBSERVER ASKED US TO ENTER INTO THE GUARD RESTING ROOM.

DURING THE CAUSE OF THE ASSAULT, FOUR OF ~~BELGIUMS~~ COLLAPSED WHILE THE REST OF US

K0097050

(3)
WERE PUSHED ~~PUSHED~~ INTO THE ROOM. FEW MINUTES
LATER, SOME OF THE SOLDIERS FORCED THE DOOR
OPENED AND ONE BELGIUM SOLDIER WAS FIRED AT CLOSE
RANGE. MEANWHILE, THE UN OBSERVER WAS ALSO BEATEN
AND FORCED TO LEAVE THE SCENE.

WE THE GHANAIAN SOLDIERS WERE LATER SEPERATED
FROM THE BELGIUMS AND SENT TO ANOTHER PLACE,
WHILE'S MOVING, I HEARD RAPID FIRING INSIDE THE ROOM
WE WERE ESCORTED TO ANOTHER PLACE TOGETHER
WITH THE UN OBSERVER.

OUR ESCORT LATER INFORMED THE UN OBSERVER
THAT THE FORCE COMMANDER IS IN THE CAMP.
THE OBSERVER APPROACHED THE FORCE COMMANDER
AND BRIEFED HIM WHAT HAS HAPPENED,
THE FORCE COMMANDER CALLED US AND ASKED
ONE OFFICER TO PROVIDE VEHICLE AND TO CONVEY
US TO UNAMIR HQ.

DURING ALL THESE ASSAULTS THE SOLDIERS TOOK
AWAY MY PERSONAL WEAPONS, BELONGINGS AND THE
MARS THE BELGIUM BROUGHT INCLUDING ARMAMENTS.

10091051

SIGN.
Paul,
17/4/94

MISSING ITEMS DURING THE CRISIS.

1. G3 BUTT NO 19 WITH 20 ROUNDS OF 7.62mm
SERIAL NO 21739
FILLED SPARE MAGAZINE WITH 20 ROUNDS
4. SLEEPING BAG
5. TORCH LIGHT
6. MESS TIN
7. ONE SANDALS
8. ONE KIWI POLISH
9. ONE BRUSH (
10. BLADE STOCK
11. ONE PACKET BLADE
12. ~~BATHING PACK~~
13. ONE BLANKET
14. TWO PAIRS OG DRESS.
15. ONE TOWEL
16. ONE SPONGE
17. GHANA SHOULDER STRAP / LIM SHOLDER STRAP.
18. ONE UNIT LANTARD
19. TWO UNDERWEARS.
20. SOCKS ONE
21. RAIN COAT
22. WATER BOTTLE. ~~ONE~~
23. ONE MAXAM TOOTH PASTE
24. ONE TOOTH BRUSH
25. FOUR BOTTLES

K0091052

~~Signed~~ SIGNED

Hand.
17/4/94

NAME: KNES1 JOE

ID No: B 5034

RANK: CPL

COY: ECHO

PLT: I

(1)

10091053

STATEMENT

On Monday 4th April 1994 five of us were detailed on duty at the Prime Ministers Residence by our O.C., Captain Helby to provide internal security within the prime Minister's house.

Then on the 6th April 1994 around 8.30 we monitored in our Radio that the Presic was returning from a Conference within a fifteen minutes time, and after that statement over the radio, we saw a plane hovering about in the air, just within that period ~~the~~ heard of two bomb blasts and saw of small arms firing. During the firing we were deployed to our firing points, Meanwhile the Gendarmarines who were ~~the prime~~ her personal guards also in positions.

The next day being the 7th April I around 4.30 am to 5.00 am the Belgians (im) with ~~four~~ escort cars. Two of the cars were parked outside and two were driven inside the yard.

The Guard Commander approached them.

D for their mission and they answered that they
are coming to see the Prime Minister. After
that they knocked at the woman's door
but the woman did not answer.

Meanwhile firing was coming toward
the house and so the Belgians also took
cover. While ~~was~~ ~~was~~ at ~~my~~ firing post
~~we~~ saw some of body guards cutting
the barb wires. Few minutes later ~~we~~
saw the woman and the families passing
through that pavement together with
the Gendarmes around 6.30 am to 7.

We were then left behind with the
Belgian Soldiers. About 7.15 am ^{the House was} ~~we~~
surrounded by the Government forces and
ordered us to put our arms down at a gun
vehicle and drove us to a waiting

At the Camp, we saw their Camp.
UN Observer Officer. When one Togo-ese
we were ordered to sit down. The soldier
at the Camp rushed on us and started
beating us from all angles, some with
rifles, sticks, iron bars and stones. This
made me sustained injuries in my right
arm. There the UN Observer asked us to
enter their guards resting room.

During the course of the assault four of
the Belgians collapsed while the rest.

K0091054

3) us pushed into the resting room. Few minutes later some Soldiers forced the door opened and one Belgium was shot at a closed range. Meanwhile the UN observer was also beaten and forced him to leave the area. We the Ghanaians were later separated from the Belgians and sent us to another place. While moving ~~we~~ I heard rapid firing in the room. Then we were escorted to a place together with the UN observer. One escort informed the Observer that the Force Commander has come to the Camp.

The Observer approached the F.C. and brief him what has happened. The Force Commander called us and asked one Gentleman Officer to provide a vehicle to convey us to the UNAMIR HQ.

During all these crisis, the Soldiers took away our personal weapons and ~~be~~ personal belongings as well as the Belgians and their armaments.

MISSING ITEMS DURING THE CRISIS

- ① G. S. RIFLE NO 32383 BATT NO 180 WITH 20
- ② SLEEPING BAG

K0091055

(4)

- ③ BLANKET
- ④ BEDSHEET
- ⑤ OC DRESS 2 PAIRS
- ⑥ MESS TINS 2
- ⑦ CANVAS ^{BOOT} 1 PAIR
- ⑧ RAIN ~~SUIT~~ ~~COAT~~
- ⑨ OVERCOAT JACKET
- ⑩ TOWEL x SPONCH
- ⑪ TORCH LIGHT
- ⑫ PARK WITH PERSONAL BELONGINGS
- ⑬ PAIRS WITH 3 ID CARDS x \$2,000.00 ~~x~~
- ⑭ BLACK WAISTBAG WITH DOCUMENT x 64 UNF REGT UNIT C
- ⑮ TRACKSUIT x UNAMIR YELLOW T SHIRT
- ⑯ SMALL PARK WITH 6 PANTS, BRUSH x POLISH
- ⑰ UNIT LANYARD
- ⑱ PUNCHO
- ⑳ BLACK SANDALS
- ㉑ BELT
- ㉒ SOCKS 1 PAIR
- ㉓ UN BADGE 2
- ㉔ SPONCH DISH AND MIXED SOAPS

10091056

Signed
[Signature]

17/4/94

29/6/94
Major Racine, Kigali

K0091057

INCIDENT AT ST-ANDRE COLLEGE
FATHER BLANCHARD ORPHANAGE

On the 8 June 1994, I went to the Kigali prefecture to meet the Sous Prefect who is handling the case of the town orphanages. We had previously discussed the subject the day before with him and also the Prefect of Kigali. Our intention was to visit the different orphanages in order to do an evaluation of their needs, with particular attention to the medical needs. A representative of Pharmaciens sans frontiere was with us at the time of the incident.

We left the prefecture at about 1345 hours to begin our visit according to the itinerary we had planned the day before. This called for an initial visit to the Gisimba orphanage in the Nyamirambo area followed by the orphanage of Father Blanchard at the St-Andre College. The sous prefect of Kigali was leading our convoy through the road blocks of which there were about fifteen manned by armed civilians. Most of them were carrying automatic rifles, grenades and machetes. The first visit at the Gisimba orphanage went very well and we proceeded after a twenty minutes visit to College St-Andre.

At our arrival the area was deserted and we parked our vehicles in the small parking area. At first glance the orphanage appeared deserted. Then Father Otto, a german priest, came to meet us and brought us inside. Once inside we realize that the place had many displaced persons and orphans inside to the extent that it was difficult to move easily. We then met Father Blanchard who immediatly told us that the lives of everyone in the location were in danger. We had the opportunity to talk with him for about five minutes during which time he reported to us that he did not know the number of people in that location because a lot of them had moved in recently in particular, members of the Carmelite order and of the Josephite order. This last group had escaped from a massacre the day before which Father Blanchard said resulted in the deaths of six priests and about seventy five people. At this time our attention was drawn by a report from the prefect's escort, a uniformed guard wearing a yellow beret.

The information concerned a crowd of about 20 to 30 armed civilians/militia outside the orphanage. Capt Nakoura who was accompanying me on the visit suggested to me that we should investigate. We went outside with the sous prefet, the Milobs team and Father Otto. I told the other members of the group, PSF as well as a journalist, to accompany us. The PSF team stayed behind for a short while and after leaving the orphanage Father Otto locked the door as is normal practice there.

Capt Nakoura introduced himself to one of the armed civilians followed by the sous prefet and myself. At the same moment we noticed that the remainder of the group were taking up fire positions around us some using the bushes as cover.

At the same time some of the armed civilians/militia moved behind us in the direction of the locked door to the orphanage. We were still negotiating with the armed persons asking them the

reason for the hostility. Suddenly we heard shots being fired to our rear. We turned and saw that about two or three of the armed persons were firing into the building through the window.

When I looked back the sous prefet and Capt Nakoura had moved behind the armed civilians we were talking to behind the hedgerow such that I couldn't see them initially. I then asked where the sous prefet went and was told the location and I moved to join the sous prefet and Capt Nakoura.

We met with what appeared to be the person in charge. We explained to him the purpose of our visit and after several minutes of trying to get through to him we were told that one of our group had been injured. We told this person that we were going back inside to get our wounded man and proceeded to do so. We got him inside of the vehicle with the assistance of a Josephite priest, the PSF and Father Blanchard, a total of four people carrying the wounded man while Capt Narouka continued negotiating our departure.

Our two vehicles moved to the main road followed by the sous prefet's vehicle and we hit the first roadblock which was adjacent to the parking area which by this time allowed some of the people to move to the area of the roadblock. The guards on the roadblock would not permit us to go through even after explaining that we had a wounded person on board. At that moment a car pulled out on our left and an RGF major that we had not seen in the area got out and told the people on the roadblock to let us pass. The militia argued for about a minute or so until finally the major opened the roadblock himself while still arguing with the militia. The remainder of the route to the ICRC was traversed without incident.

In speaking afterwards with Capt Nakoura he reported what his discussions with the militia determined. He indicated the following:

- a. When the militia saw me leaving the orphanage they noticed that I was Canadian and they were asking if I was General Dallaire. He explained that I wasn't but they then said that I must be one of his gang. There was an obvious anti Canadian feeling expressed by the group in the opinion of Capt Nakoura. He was so concerned about this fact that on the return trip he suggested that all Canadians should remove their flags from their uniforms.
- b. They indicated that the hostility was due to the fact that they thought we had come to evacuate the people in the orphanage.
- c. He noticed also that they were in a particularly hostile mood and some appeared to be heavily under the influence of alcohol.

After delivering the wounded individual to the ICRC, I went back to the Prefecture's office to report the incident and

KOC97058

express my concern about the security of the people that were still at the orphanage.

The prefect indicated that it is normal that the population in the area is hyped up because it is a very intense combat area at this time. Although we had set this up the day before, he mentioned that the problem occurred because he had not been informed of our detailed plan so that he could warn all the various sub leaders/sector commanders of our coming.

I then asked him if he could do anything to protect the people or evacuate them and he indicated that he couldn't but that UNAMIR should come up with a plan.

Upon return to HQ I spoke with LCol Moigny and LCol Rwabalinda and explained to them what happened. I asked LCol Rwabalinda what he could do. He said that he would try to have troops that are already in the area protect the building where the people are located. He also expressed that it would be difficult because there are a lot of troops involved in the fight in the area of Nyarimambu. He suggested that if we want to evacuate them that it would have to be done in one lift. He did not expect that we would be able to get in touch with the civilian authorities which include the prefect of Kigali and other authorities that may be involved before 0900 hrs tomorrow.

K0091059

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: DFC

From: Acting CHO

Date: 15 June 1994

Subject: SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT AT SAINTE FAMILLE/SAINT PAUL 14 JUN 94

K0091060

1. As you are aware it appears now that some forty children were slaughtered at St Paul yesterday and that the transfer of displaced persons the day previous may have been a contributing factor. The following is a synopsis of the overall operation as arranged by CHO prior to his departure and also a list of the problems HAC encountered in resuming the operation on 13 Jun 94:

- a. Under our initial agreement the Prefet insisted that the transfer of displaced persons be conducted simultaneously between the Amahoro Stadium and the Milles Collines. Once these two institutions were emptied of displaced persons then the operation would continue between two other institutions those being the King Faycal and the Sainte Famille.
- b. Colonel Yaache, on several occasions tried to explain to the representatives of the prefet's office the near impossibility of completing the evacuation of the Amahoro and the Milles Collines simultaneously.
- c. It was finally agreed that the operation would proceed with the Sainte Famille and the Amahoro Stadium but that there would be a simultaneous transfer of people from Sainte Famille to both the RGF and the RPF side as well as the transfer of people from the Amahoro Stadium. To this effect five trucks were dedicated to lifting people from the Amahoro while two trucks were dedicated to lifting people to the RGF side from Sainte Famille and three trucks dedicated to lifting people from the Sainte Famille to the RPF side. In summary then fully seven trucks were dedicated to lifting displaced persons to the Government side and three trucks were dedicated to lifting persons to the RPF side. This agreement was reached between HAC and Colonel Hagarimana, Lt Col Rwabalinda and a representative of the prefet office at the Diplomat Hotel on 31 May. It should be noted that the prefet representative continued to demand for simultaneous transfer and the completion of two camps at a time but appeared to accept the arrangement as agreed by the military, the gendarmerie and the HAC.
- d. On the third of June the operation was conducted as described at para d. The operation was halted after one try due to firing by RPF on the convoy. On 4 Jun, the FC received a letter dated 31 May from the Prefet

of Kigali's office indicating that they disagreed with the decision made at the Hotel Diplomat the same day.

- W0091061
- e. * The letter further stated that 1015 persons moved from the Amahoro while 700 moved from the Milles Collines and they felt these numbers were biased in favour of the RPF. The actual numbers moved were 1106 from Amahoro and 779 from Milles Collines.
 - f. The operation remained halted until a confirmation was received from the RPF not to fire on the convoy and that the drop off point for the RGF was not on the front lines between the RGF and the RPF as appeared to be the case based on a meeting the FC had with the Chief of Staff. The RGF reaffirmed the security of there drop off point and on 13 Jun 94 HAC was told to recommence the operation with a view to assisting the cease fire talks.
 - g. * On 13 Jun it was planned by HAC to resume the operation with the Milles Collines as this location had filled up again. This was based on the Prefet of Kigali's letter of the 31st and the requirement to give the priest at Sainte Famille enough time to prepare. When this option was proposed to the Gendarmerie they insisted on Sainte Famille as it was in more danger.
 - i. On 13 Jun five trucks moved to the Amahoro and five trucks moved to the Sainte Famille as per the agreement reached at the Diplomat Hotel and based on the concerns of the Gendarmerie. At the Amahoro Stadium nobody boarded the trucks. At the Sainte Famille nobody boarded trucks for the Government controlled area.
 - j. I then dispatched the trucks to the King Faycal in an attempt to fill them with persons. At the same time loading was continuing at the Sainte Famille exclusively for the RPF side. I checked quickly with the King Faycal and learned that there were 30 persons in each truck and decided to proceed with the operation rather than debus the people at the Sainte famille in view of the militia and cancel the operation. Meanwhile the priest at Sainte Famille had added additional people and some family members not on the list.
 - k. The exchange proceeded without incident.
 - l. The next day 14 Jun 94, I was informed that access to Sainte Famille was blocked and F9A2 informed me from the Diplomat that the Gendarmerie had suspended the operation pending internal discussions and discussions with the Prefet office.
 - m. * That same day a serious incident occurred at the Sainte Famille which resulted at final report in the

abduction and slaughter of 40 children.

WOC91062

- n. UNMOs have told me that in their informal talks with some militia the cause may have been the disproportionate numbers involved in the transfer.
- o. Finally this morning I received from the Prefet of Kigali a letter dated the 14 of Jun 94 which states that in their opinion the evacuation at Sainte Famille was unilateral as opposed to bilateral as no trucks were moving to the RGF side. In addition, he continues to complain that we are moving people from other areas than the Milles Collines and the Amahoro and that the lists are not being prepared with care.
- n. Finally, I was informed by F9A that the Prefet has been away for some time and he feels he may not be aware that a transfer has already taken place at Sainte Famille.

2. In my opinion, this operation while saving some lives is endangering others. We have considerable confusion within the leadership of various factions within the RGF sector and consequently every thing must proceed "exactly" as everyone on their side understands it must go. On the other hand we have the RPF which demand that the operation be conducted as quickly as possible and without any requirement for any detailed records as demanded by the RGF and prefecture. Also, I feel that we must impress upon the RPF the sensitivity of the operation and the fact that their people cannot be used as an exercise to push a cease fire.

* Note that priest indicated to HAC that 40- fighting aged youths were taken away as the evacuees had taunted the militia when leaving and had made comments on the radio about returning to fight for the RPF.

San Famille - 24 hrs - 36 hrs later estimated
 170 people killed incl the 2 European Ladies
 evad'd in Europe

Fr. Blanchard
 Fr. Ols
 injured widely

In Dec the Spc. W.
 still about 4,000 in D. Famille - lots of around buildings...
 raid by RPF 400-500 left last night.

UN-RESTRICTED

#0091063

@

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

MILOB GROUP HEADQUARTERS

TO: FC ✓
DFC
COO


FROM: CMO

DATE: 17 JUN 94.

SUBJ: INVESTIGATION REPORT OF THE NYAMIRAMBO KILLINGS

1. Attached please find subject above.
2. For your info and nec action.

②
 See case
 Plus give to
 Human rights
 commission AMW.
 H
 FC
 12/6



(I.D. TIKOCA)

COLONEL

CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER

0091064



UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

KIGALI MILOB SECTOR HEADQUARTERS

From: Kigali Milob Sector
To: Milob Gp HQ

16 Jun 94

INCREP NO 6 - INVESTIGATION REPORT ON NYAMIRAMBO KILLINGS

Ref:

A: Your ltr no MILOB/A /6431.0 dt 12 Jun 94.

1. In compliance to your directive vide ref A, Team Ldr of Team 12 of this Sector was detailed to carryout investigation into the alleged killings in NYAMIRAMBO area. The Team interviewed one Father OTTO MAYER of Nyamirambo Catholic Church. According to the Father on 16 June 94 at about 1530 hrs a group of Militias went to the Church with two big trucks. At that time about 260 displaced persons were taking refuge in the premises of the Church. Among them 90% were of TUTSI origin. Father Mayer sensing danger, went to the RGF personnel who were located nearby for help but they declined to help. Then he went to some Gendarmerie for help. The Gendarmerie despatched a Capt with 7 persons.

2. The Militias were trying to segregate some people when the Gendarmerie arrived. The Capt had some arguments with the Militias but in the end they forced to leave. It is alleged that the RGF personnel gave their tacit approval to the Militias that is why they did not want to confront them. *Who left, the Gendarmerie?*

3. Subsequently the Militias were able to take away 170 persons. It was reported by Father Mayer that they were taken to a place where a big hole was dug and they were killed and buried in the hole. This was also reported to the Team by JELARDEN - a woman whose husband is now in Burundi (please ref to our INCREP NO 5). Three of her children were killed in the early days of the war.

4. JELARDEN also reported that on 14 Jun 94 at about 1430 hrs another 87 persons were killed and buried in holes in NYAMIRAMBO area. Some of those were not yet dead when they were buried and she could hear their cries for help. She informed that NYAMIRAMBO area is now fully under the control of the Militias and they do not listen to anyone and that they do not listen to anyone.

5. She also reported that even now every day about 2 or 3 families are being killed in NYAMIRAMBO area.

UN RESTRICTED

6. JELARDEN's brother called MENOURE, who had escaped to Hotel Mille Collines earlier, gave a sketch of the area of NYAMIRAMBO where the holes were dug about one and half months earlier. And now the people were being killed and buried in those holes. The sketch in original is att to this report please.

7. MENOURE and JELARDIN gave a list of Militias, which is given below, who they said were involved in the killings. The * marked ones are said to be the most dangerous.

- 0091065
- a. EURESTE. *
 - b. ZUZU. *
 - c. NYIRAMANA. * - he visited Hotel Mille Collines.
 - d. ANGGLMG.
 - e. KIGINGI. *
 - f. NYAHINJA.
 - g. SIMBA. *
 - h. FIDELE.*
 - j. YUSSUF.
 - k. EMMANUEH.
 - l. MACUHO. *
 - m. ZUBERI.*
 - n. MUGABO.
 - p. MASTIRO.
 - q. MAVENGE.
 - r. KAYANGE.*
 - s. MUGESERA.
 - t. KARIM.
 - u. MUNYANTORE.*
 - v. KARANGWA. *
 - w. CYOTSI.
 - x. CEKERI.*
 - y. MAMABIZI.*
 - z. JOSEPH.
 - aa. NDAYITABI.*
 - bb. KITONZI.*
 - cc. RAMAZANI.
 - dd. KAREKEZI.*
 - ee. THOMAS.*
 - ff. KIDONDI.
 - gg. NDANDA.*
 - hh. RIBERT.

8. It was learnt that the Militias have got news that there is going to be a ceasefire soon, as such they want to kill as many TUTSIs as they can before the ceasefire.

9. Recommendation. It is recommended that to avoid any further massacres in the area, UNAMIR should send a force in the area. It is also recommended that some force be stationed in Hotel Mille Collines also.

[Signature]
MUSTAFIZER RAHMAN
LT COL
SSMO

2

UN RESTRICTED

Recd. from [unclear]

[unclear] & [unclear]

[unclear] to [unclear]

Amount [unclear]

per [unclear]

[unclear]

15/9/74

10091067