

After many hours of discussion, the SC adopted resolution 918 (1994) which expanded UNAMIR's mandate during the night from 16 to 17 May.

During these discussions, the SC had to cope with the US position which crystallized after Monday afternoon's consultations of the StaDep and Pentagon delegations at the UN Secretariat. The US expressed their strong apprehension over the possible failure of the operation since neither of the parties to the conflict had so far expressed a clear agreement with it or their readiness to cease fire. Dispatching a large contingent would according to the US augment the danger of UNAMIR being drawn into a bloody conflict, as was the case in Somalia. The US promised to cover 1/3 of the operations budget. Possible victims would decrease the chances of the Congress approving the budget and a failure of the operation would negatively influence other UN PKOs as well.

The US therefore forced a change in the draft which had been approved on Friday. The first phase of the operation (the immediate redeployment of 150 UNAMIR observers who are still in Nairobi, and beefing up the Ghana battalion to 850 men to protect the Kigali airport and create a neutral zone around it) was clearly separated from other phases of the operation. Sending a contingent of up to 5,500 men is now conditioned by the SG submitting a report and having it subsequently approved by the SC.

The procedure was vehemently criticized by the NAM who declared that this will lead to an unnecessary delay and will raise doubts about the will of the SC to actually deploy the entire contingent. Other countries also voiced their misgivings – NZ, France and Spain. The US arguments concerned their share of responsibility for the operation and the fact that anyway, units are not ready for immediate deployment. Observers will first monitor the situation throughout Rwanda. The SG will submit his report ASAP, in which he will specify how he wishes to organize the operation, the attitude of the parties to cooperate with UNAMIR, the procedure in talks on a cease-fire, the availability of resources and the anticipated duration of the mandate. On basis of this report, the SC will again consider the operation and adopt necessary decisions.

Consequently, the discussion of the concept of the operation was postponed as well: whether zones along the borders as the US had proposed, or from the airport in all directions, including border zones, as the SG had recommended. It is expected that these questions will come again to the forefront during deliberations of the anticipated SG's report.

Just before the formal voting, the Rwanda delegation (headed by the minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation) announced that it intends to vote against Part B of the draft which deals with the arms embargo. If Part B were not voted on separately, Rwanda would vote against the resolution as a whole. It argued that an arms embargo would benefit the RPF which is supported by Uganda. Rwanda suggested imposing an embargo on Uganda which no one took seriously.

In view of the fact that the draft didn't enjoy a consensus on all of its parts, it had to be submitted not by the SC president but by several co-sponsors. CZ joined the co-sponsors, together with France, RF, Spain, UK and the US. In an unusual procedural maneuver Part B and the rest of the draft were voted on separately. Rwanda voted against Part B. The resolution was then approved as a whole.

Amb Kovanda's statement in English which several media had requested, is attached.