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PAGE 01 BRUSSE 07513 01 OF 03 071526Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EB-01
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	JUSE-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SB-00	SCT-03	SNP-00
	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/054W	

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 FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8143
 INFO ALLEU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 07513

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C AND EUR/NE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PREF, BE, FR, RW
 SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAWSON'S JUNE 7 MEETING IN BRUSSELS
 WITH FAUSTIN TWAGIRAMUNGU

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
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PAGE 02 BRUSSE 07513 01 OF 03 071526Z

SUMMARY

2. AMBASSADOR RAWSON MET JUNE 7 IN BRUSSELS WITH FAUSTIN TWAGIRAMUNGU, PM-DESIGNATE UNDER THE RWANDAN ARUSHA ACCORDS. TWAGIRAMUNGU SAID HE HOPED TO TRAVEL TO KIGALI THE WEEK OF JULY 11 TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RPF ON MODALITIES FOR ESTABLISHING A NEW GOVERNMENT OF RECONCILIATION. TWAGIRAMUNGU IDENTIFIED THE EVENTUAL ROLE

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OF MRND MEMBERS, INTEGRATION OF THE TWO ARMIES, AND BROAD ACCEPTANCE IN RWANDA OF RPF PROPOSALS AS THE MAIN ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED. TWAGIRAMUNGU SAID THE ARUSHA ACCORDS HAD TO BE GIVEN A CHANCE TO BE IMPLEMENTED.

3. IN RESPONSE TO AMB. RAWSON'S REMINDER THAT THE USG WANTED A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE BEFORE A GOVERNMENT WERE FORMED, TWAGIRAMUNGU SAID THE RPF WOULD BE ANNOUNCING AN UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE. HE ASKED THAT WE TRY TO CONVINCED THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ARMY TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE.

1.4(D)

[REDACTED] ACKNOWLEDGED HE HAD FEW CONTACTS WITH THE UN, AND ASKED FOR NAMES OF UN OFFICIALS WITH WHOM HE SHOULD MEET. TWAGIRAMUNGU URGED THE US TO USE ITS "WORLD LEADERSHIP" ROLE TO GET CANADIANS, AUSTRALIANS, DUTCH, AND OTHER WESTERN NATIONS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SETTING UP OF UNAMIR II. [REDACTED]

1.4(D)

TWAGIRAMUNGU EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE POSSIBILITY OF FLYING INTO KIGALI ON A UN FLIGHT ORIGINATING IN NAIROBI.

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PAGE 03 BRUSSE 07513 01 OF 03 071526Z
END SUMMARY.

4. EMBASSY BRUSSELS MADE AN APPOINTMENT FOR AMBASSADOR RAWSON TO MEET WITH FAUSTIN TWAGIRAMUNGU BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN BRUSSELS THAT TWAGIRAMUNGU HAD BEEN ASKED BY THE RPF TO HEAD A NEW GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. AMBASSADOR RAWSON KEPT THE APPOINTMENT TO GAIN INFORMATION ABOUT TWAGIRAMUNGU'S PLANS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN KIGALI. HE MET WITH TWAGIRAMUNGU AT EMBASSY BRUSSELS MORNING JUNE 7.

5. PM DESIGNATE TWAGIRAMUNGU EXPLAINED HE HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY THE RPF ON JULY 6 ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF HEADING A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. HE DID NOT WANT TO SERVE UNDER RPF AEGIS BUT TO UNDERTAKE HIS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ALL RWANDANS OF ALL PARTIES UNDER THE ARUSHA ACCORDS. NO DATE HAD YET BEEN FIXED FOR HIS DEPARTURE BUT TWAGIRAMUNGU EXPECTED TO LEAVE FOR RWANDA SOMETIME DURING THE WEEK OF JULY 11. DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RPF WOULD HAVE TO COMMENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE MODALITIES FOR ESTABLISHING A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT.

6. TWAGIRAMUNGU IDENTIFIED THREE PROBLEMS THAT HAD TO BE RESOLVED. THE FIRST WAS HOW TO DEAL WITH THE MRND. UNDER THE ARUSHA ACCORDS, FIVE POLITICAL PARTIES WERE TO BE

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REPRESENTED IN THE GOVERNMENT. THE MRND, ONE OF THE FIVE, HAD NEVER ISSUED ANY STATEMENTS DENOUNCING THE MASSACRES NOR HAD IT EVER DISSOCIATED ITSELF FROM THE MILITIAS, WHICH WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE MASSACRES. THEREFORE, AS AN INSTITUTION, THE MRND COULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. NONETHELESS, NOT ALL MRND MEMBERS WERE TAINTED. SOME PROMINENT FIGURES
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PAGE 04 BRUSSE 07513 01 OF 03 071526Z
SUCH AS NSANZIMANA AND THE SON OF FORMER MINISTER OF DEFENSE GASANA HAD HAD NO INVOLVEMENT IN THE KILLINGS. IF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION WERE TO BE FORMED, SOME WAY HAD TO BE FOUND TO INCLUDE THESE PEOPLE.

7. A SECOND PROBLEM WAS THE QUESTION OF INTEGRATING THE TWO ARMIES. UNDER THE ACCORDS, PROPORTIONS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED GIVING THE RWANDAN ARMY SIXTY PERCENT AND THE RPF FORTY PERCENT OF THE SLOTS. [REDACTED]

1.4(D)

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PAGE 01 BRUSSE 07513 02 OF 03 071527Z
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CONFIDENTIAL

1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRUSSE 07513 02 OF 03 071527Z

8. FINALLY, THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT COULD NOT MEAN TOTALLY ACCEPTING THE RPF'S DICTATES. ANY PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE COUNTRY. TWAGIRAMUNGU SAID HE INTENDED TO FULFILL HIS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ARUSHA ACCORDS.

9. IN RESPONSE TO AMB. RAWSON'S QUESTION WHETHER TWAGIRAMUNGU HAD FOUND CONSENSUS ON A GENERAL APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, TWAGIRAMUNGU ANSWERED THAT ALL HIS INTERLOCUTORS SO FAR AGREED THE ARUSHA ACCORDS SHOULD "HAVE THE CHANCE" OF BEING IMPLEMENTED. THE PROVISIONS FOR POWER SHARING, INTEGRATION OF THE TWO ARMIES, AND EVENTUAL PREPARATIONS FOR A RETURN TO A RULE OF LAW WERE THE BEST MEANS TO REACH CONFLICT RESOLUTION. THE PROBLEM, HE SAID, WAS THAT RWANDANS HAD A DIFFICULT TIME MAKING DECISIONS.

10. AMB. RAWSON SAID THE DEPARTMENT STILL CONSIDERED THE ACCORDS PROVIDED A USEFUL FRAMEWORK AND SPIRIT FOR REBUILDING RWANDA. THE ARUSHA DOCUMENT WAS NOT PERFECT BUT IT WAS THE BASIS FOR MOVING ALONG. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO THE USG THAT THE GOVERNMENT THAT IS FORMED BE THE RESULT OF A NEW DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. OUR

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POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED: WE WANTED AN END TO THE MASSACRES, THE IMPOSITION OF A CEASEFIRE, AND THE BEGINNING OF DISCUSSIONS. WE BELIEVED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE A CEASEFIRE ON THE GROUND BEFORE PROCEEDING TO DISCUSSIONS. OTHERWISE, ONE RISKED HAVING A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT ON EACH SIDE OF BATTLE LINES.

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PAGE 03 BRUSSE 07513 02 OF 03 071527Z

11. TWAGIRAMUNGU NOTED OUR PREFERENCE FOR THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND SAID HE BELIEVED THE RPF MIGHT BE READY TO DECLARE AN UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE. HE ASKED THAT WE SUPPORT SUCH A DECLARATION, IF IT WERE MADE. HE ALSO REQUESTED THAT WE ASK THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ARMY TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE. AMB. RAWSON ASSURED TWAGIRAMUNGU THAT WE SUPPORTED CALLS FOR A CEASEFIRE. THE DEPARTMENT ALSO CONTINUED TO SEE A ROLE FOR THE UN IN RWANDA ONCE THE FRENCH TROOPS LEFT. UNAMIR WOULD BE NEEDED TO PROTECT THREATENED CIVILIANS AND HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS AS WELL AS MONITOR THE PEACE PROCESS. FURTHERMORE, THE WORK OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS RAPPOREUR WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO DETERMINE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE KILLINGS.

12. TWAGIRAMUNGU SAID HE HAD FEW CONTACTS WITH UN OFFICIALS.

1.4(D)

TWAGIRAMUNGU ASKED FOR ADVICE ON WHOM HE SHOULD TALK TO AT THE UN. AMBASSADOR RAWSON NOTED THAT THE NEW REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, AMBASSADOR KHAN, WAS A GOOD STARTING POINT.

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PAGE 04 BRUSSE 07513 02 OF 03 071527Z

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13. TWAGIRAMUNGU WRAPPED UP HIS PRESENTATION BY MAKING AN APPEAL FOR USG LEADERSHIP. HE SAID HE HAD THE IMPRESSION RWANDA WAS BEING NEGLECTED, ESPECIALLY WHEN IT CAME TO SETTING UP UNAMIR II.

1.4(D)

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THE USG SHOULD TALK TO THE CANADIANS,
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1.4(D)

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PAGE 02 BRUSSE 07513 03 OF 03 071527Z
AUSTRALIANS, DUTCH, ETC., TO GET THEM TO CONTRIBUTE
LOGISTICAL AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
FURTHERMORE, UNAMIR II MUST BECOME A CHAPTER 7 OPERATION.

14. AMB. RAWSON EXPLAINED HE HAD COME TO BRUSSELS TO
DISCUSS RWANDA WITH THE EU PARTNERS. HE WOULD BE PUSHING
THEM TO SUPPORT UNAMIR. WE WERE PROVIDING 50 APC'S, AS
WELL AS MATERIEL FOR THE GHANAIAN BATTALION. THE EXPANDED
UNAMIR WOULD NOT BE EXCLUSIVELY AFRICAN THOUGH AFRICANS
SHOULD HAVE A DOMINANT ROLE. WE HOPED IT WOULD BE
EQUIPPED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

15. AMB. RAWSON RECOMMENDED THAT TWAGIRAMUNGU TRAVEL TO
KIGALI VIA NAIROBI AND SEEK TO GET A UN FLIGHT THERE
RATHER THAN COME TO KIGALI THROUGH KAMPALA. PM
TWAGIRAMUNGU SAID HE HAD ALREADY CHECKED VARIOUS ROUTES.
IT WAS DIFFICULT TO TRAVEL TO KIGALI AND HE WANTED TO
AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS COMING TO RWANDA
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER. HE EXPRESSED
INTEREST IN FLYING IN WITH THE UN, IF POSSIBLE.

16. BUJUMBURA MINIMIZED CONSIDERED.

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