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Tribunal Pénal International pour le Rwanda**

Trial Chamber I

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Prosecution Witness #34 - Hutsebault**

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“KIBAT Chronique 06 AVR – 19 AVR 1994”

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KIBAT

CALENDER OF EVENTS

6 April – 19 April 1994

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KIBAT - GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Flawinne, 20 September 1995.

This narrative, which is directed mainly to KIBAT members, seeks to situate in time and space the numerous activities carried out by the Kigali Battalion on 6 April 1994, at the beginning of the evening, when the attack occurred, until 19 April, the day on which the last KIBAT man left. The events that occurred in Rwanda at that time, particularly, the outset of the genocide and operations of the Para-Commando Brigade [SILVER BACK], will be raised only as the KIBAT staff had perceived them.

The narrative reviews only clearly identified facts, without any comments, opinion, nor even an analysis. This is not a literary work. Rather, it is a military piece of work, which has been abridged through the use of abbreviations. Undoubtedly, reading it is a little daunting. But at least the reader can rest assured that it deals only with verified facts (however, errors of facts can always occur), without any intention to prove one hypothesis or another. It is up to the reader to make his own opinion.

Nevertheless, the reader must be aware that the picture of the situation, which is formed after reading this narrative, is one hundred times more complete than the picture we had at the time of the acts, even at my own level. Each one in his corner lived certain events without knowledge of what his neighbour experienced. Only some of those events got to the Battalion Command Post in the form of radio messages. Despite the staff's professionalism, those messages, which, obligatorily, had to be quite concise, never reflected only part of the reality. Sometimes, a lot of very important details appeared only after the return to Belgium, as the staff was questioned in a more detailed manner.

This summary was accomplished thanks to support from Roman, the Staff Headquarters Commissioned Colonel, Commander of the Para-Commando Brigade, who accepted to leave Captain Schepkens with two commandos between his return from Kigali (he was KIBAT liaison officer at the Staff HQ Sector) and his departure for Senior Officers training courses at the IRSD. In three months, Capt. Schepkens consulted different campaign notebooks and various notes. He collected many testimonies and collated all that information in the first working document. That work would never have been accomplished by a member of the Battalion absorbed by his normal duties.

After his departure, it became necessary to allow his work to be read by different officers from the Battalion's Staff Headquarters, company commanders and a certain number of persons in the various campaigns. To conclude, read over, format, prepare the annexes, ... etc and that is when the Battalion's activities resumed in a sustained manner. That explains why this document has come out late.

However, the work is not exhaustive. Certain actions, of a little individual character, have not been mentioned. There was no time to do so. But any additional testimony is always welcome and may be added either to a future edition or as an addendum to the original document, which will be entrusted to the Museum of Commandos.

(Signed)

Staff HQ Commissioned Lieutenant-Colonel, J. Dewez
Commander of the Second KIBAT II Commandos Battalion.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Before relating these events, it seems to us appropriate to recall the context within which KIBAT, the Belgian UNAMIR battalion, worked. Recalling a few basic data is, in fact, vital for understanding certain events.

1. UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda)
MINUAR (Mission des Nations Unies d'Assistance au Rwanda)
 - (a) Following the Arusha Peace Accords signed in August 1993 by the TWO parties, namely the Government of Rwanda and the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front), a peace process for which the parties had requested United Nations assistance, had to start.
Within that context, the United Nations and the two parties requested Belgium to provide a battalion of 800 troops based in Kigali and to join the Staff Headquarters of the UN Force. As Belgium could only provide a maximum of 450 troops for its total participation, another country, (Bangladesh) was requested to provide Kigali with the remaining troops.
 - (b) UNAMIR organization.
 - (1) UNAMIR is divided into a civil branch and a military branch.
Mr. Booh-Booh (Cameroon) is the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) and manages the whole set-up.
 - (2) The military branch (the Force) is under the command of General Dallaire (Canada).
 - (a) The Staff Headquarters of the Force is established in Kigali at the AMAHORO hotel. It commands two main sectors: the Kigali Weapon Secure Area (KWSA), the area around Kigali, and the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to the North of the country as well as other less important sectors.
 - (b) The KWSA Sector is under the command of Col. Bem Marcha (Belgium). Stationed there are the Belgian KIBAT battalion (KIGALI BATTALION), the Bangladesh RUTBAT Battalion (Rutongo Battalion and a Tunisian company. RUTBAT's mission was similar to KIBAT's, but more restricted, among other things, due to the lack of vehicles. The Tunisian company guarded the CND (*Centre National de Développement* [National development Centre], i.e., the Parliament), where an RPF battalion of about 1,000 men was stationed in accordance with the Arusha Accords (this RPF battalion had been escorted from the RPF zone in Northern Rwanda up to Kigali by KIBAT I (1 Para) during the December 1993 Clean Corridor Operation). A Ghanaian company (BYUBAT GOLF of BYUMBA BATTALION) was transferred from the DMZ to the KWSA towards the end of March to provide static protection to certain authorities and, as well as, reduce the

burden of the TWO battalions in order to enable them to strengthen their patrol missions.

(c) Mission of the KIBAT battalion

UNAMIR overall mission is to establish and maintain a secure environment vital to the establishment and functioning of the Broad-based Transitional Government (BBTG). To do this, KIBAT must:

- (1) Carry out its operations within its Area of Responsibility (AOR), i.e. essentially in the South of the KWSA, the city centre, the airport and its vicinity.
- (2) Monitor and verify all weapons and military equipment in its AOR.
- (3) Control the weapons by establishing checkpoints, cordoning-off, searches on orders and patrols in the area of operation.
- (4) Be ready to ensure the security of certain members and installations of the transitional Government.
- (5) Be ready to assist the UN Civil Police (UNCIPOL) in monitoring and curbing criminal activities in its AOR.
- (6) Be ready to secure the evacuation of UNAMIR, the UN and diplomatic staff and expatriates.
- (7) Be ready to secure the movements of the RPF leadership from the DMZ to the KWSA.

Practically, every day, some of those missions are rather entrusted to UN observers answerable to the Staff HQ Sector or even to the Rwandan Gendamerie.

(d) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

- (1) Within the UNAMIR peacekeeping mission, barring cases of self-defence, the use of force is allowed only in certain cases and subject to authorization from higher levels. In all the cases, an attempt towards oral reconciliation must be exhausted before any use of weapons, which remains the last resort, and only minimum necessary force may be used.
Step by step firing is authorized only in self-defence. The use of automatic weapons is subject to authorization from the Sector Command for MINIMI and from Force Command for MAG.
- (2) During the preparation, it was constantly recalled that the objective in Rwanda was peacekeeping and not peacemaking as

it was in Somalia. Fundamentally, the attitude must be different, **WITHOUT** aggressiveness. Emphasis must be placed on collaboration with the Rwandan Gendarmerie, the only authority qualified to take measures regarding public order. It was considered neutral by the various parties to the Arusha Accords. The Rwandan gendarmes had to accompany most missions to the field since they alone had the right to stop and question people.

- (3) A series of standing security measures were in force. Those measures concerned the security of the staff and equipment (Phases of alert: see Annex B).
- (4) Specific but complicated instructions are issued in English by the UN and determine the rules of engagement. They had been explained to the staff during the preparation in Belgium. A brief aide-mémoire (see Annex C) had been distributed to all the staff during the first days of April. These ROE reflect SIX rules subdivided into different phases.
- (5) Taking into account these restrictions and the overall operational context, LAW and mortar ammunition supplies were, on the orders of the Force Staff HQ, kept at the logistics base. The supply of Mi.50 and grenades was kept in reserve in the companies, with part of the supply being light ammunitions. Gunmen had 120 shots per FNC and TWO small boxes per automatic weapon (i.e. 500 shots for MAG and 460 for MINIMI).
- (6) Use of MAG machine guns
 Since MAG machine guns can only be used subject to authorization from the Force Command each MAG gunman had received, in addition, an FNC gun for self-defence. Orders had been issued to the effect that during movements and controls, the machine guns should not be pointed towards passers-by but rather their barrels must be pointed into the air. To place the machine gun in the vehicle, a special carriage must be used. Since Para 1 had returned to Belgium with its own, carriages were ordered for PI Mortar, which had none organically. In the meantime, the groups had to give some of theirs to the PI, and the protectors were being manufactured in a local factory. The PI only arrived some ten days ago and just a few jeeps had been equipped. The others had to be equipped in the days that followed.

(e) Attitude of the population

Before the attack, the attitude of the population varied according to the places.

Certain Rwandans were sympathetic and were prepared for contacts. The majority was neutral and responded to greetings while a minority showed some antipathy towards the Belgians.

2. KIBAT composition and set-up

(a) Organization

KIBAT is composed of TEN elements:

- (1) Staff Headquarters with, among others, officers dealing with staff issues (S1), operations (S3) and the battalion's logistics (CLog).
- (2) The Logistics Base provides all support in matters of various fresh supplies and equipment.
- (3) The AIRFIELD Group (12th company), composed of TWO squads and ONE section on CVRT (small armoured car), is stationed mainly at the airport.
- (4) The SOUTH Group, composed of TWO PI, is stationed in the area to the SOUTH of the town.
- (5) The CITY Group, composed of TWO PI, is stationed at the city centre.
- (6) The PI Mortar, transformed, for the PI mission, into PI on a jeep, provides escort.
- (7) The PI Transmission, in charge of the Battalion's radio liaisons.
- (8) The helicopter detachment with TWO Helis Alouette II.
- (9) The medical detachment composed of the Battalion's First Aid Post and the Ejectable Surgical Unit (ESU).
- (10) The legal detachment composed of the UN Deputy Prosecutor and UN Registrar and TWO gendarmes.

(b) List of names

See Annex A.

(c) Camps (see diagram in Annex E)

Code	Description	Unit	Strength
AGUSTA	Private house	Helicopter detachment	9 pers.
BEVERLY HILLS	Ecole Technique Officielle ETO DON BOSCO	SOUTH Group Battalion Aid Post, ESU	90 pers.
CAILLOU	Private house	ESU quarters	06 pers.
CAPUCCINO	Hangar & a house belonging to RWANDEX company IVECO company workshop	Logistics Base	41 pers.
CHINATOWN	Private house	PC CITY Group	15 pers.
DOLCE VILLA	Private house	Battalion Staff HQ section Legal detachment	18 pers.
FRANCISCUS	Ecole ATS DON BOSCO Ateliers Techniques Salésiens	AIRFIELD Group (1/2PC +1 PI) Padre, mine-clearing experts	50 pers.
MIRADOR	Private house	UN PI CITY Group	36 pers.
PEGASUS	Private house	Battalion Staff HQ	21 pers.
RAMADAN	Private house	UN PI CITY Group	36 pers.
TOP GUN	Around previous watch-tower of airport	AIRFIELD Group (1/2 PC +1 PI)	40 pers.
VIKING	Private house	PI Mortar	25 pers.
VIPERE	Warehouse to West of new watch-tower	CVRT Five vehicles	5 pers.
VITAMINE	Private house	Medical detachment Section	5 pers.

This organization was adopted from the previous Battalion. The dispersed camps had been imposed at the same time by the Force Command and the availability of quarters. A project to build bungalows at the airfield (KIGALODGE project) had been presented since the month of February following acknowledgement by S6 and should in the end make it possible to group the entire AIRFIELD Group, the Heli Det. and the ESU at the airfield.

(d) Breakdown per unit

(1) Battalion Staff HQ.

- (a) PEGASUS: Comt, S1/Srt, S2/S3, PS (Personnel Section)
- (b) DOLCE VILLA: LO, Offr CDG (Conseiller en Droit de la Guerre), Clog
- (c) FRANCISCUS: SCI (Socio-Cultural Information), Padre.

(2) Logistics Base

- (a) Warehouse Section: CAPPUCINO
- (b) MT Section: IVECO (in front of RWANDEX)
- (c) Quarters: hangar and RWANDEX villa
- (d) A cook at PEGASSUS, DOLCE VILLA and VIKING

(3) AIRFIELD Group (12th Company)

- (a) ½ PC Group (Comd) & PI A with TOP GUN
- (b) ½ PC Group (2nd Comd) & PI B to FRANSISCUS

Remark: The Para Cdo Bn is organized on the basis of peace into TWO companies with THREE PI. In addition, the extent of the KIBAT quarters and the portioning of the town into gendarmerie brigades required that the Bn should have THREE elements. For "political"

reasons, the EMG could not however accept that KIBAT should compose of THREE- Companies, for officially Belgium was providing the UN with a Bn of TWO Companies with THREE PI, and not THREE Companies. To overcome this problem of semantics, Lt. Col. Bem Dewez had decided to use the term "group" instead of Company. It was necessary to make certain adaptations in the official TO in order to have the Personnel and Vehicles of the third Group/Company PC

- (4) Gp SUD (14 coy)
The entire SOUTH group is at BERVERLY HILLS.
- (5) Gp CITY (16 COY).
 - (a) PC Gp at CHINATOWN.
 - (b) PI A at RAMADAN.
 - (c) PL B at MIRADOR.
- (6) Pl Mor (Pl "Recce" on jeep)
Entire PL at VIKING.
- (7) The EOD team (Explosive Ordnance Disposal- bomb disposal experts)
Based at FRANCISUS
- (8) The medical detachment.
 - (a) The first-aid post Bn at BEVERLY HILLS.
 - (b) One team at VITAMINE to support Gp CITY.
 - (c) The ACP (*irugicale Parachutable* - Parachutable Surgical Unit) at BEVERLY HILLS, the staff was residing at CAILLOU.
- (9) Light aviation detachment
 - (a) Helis was at the airport, staff was residing at AGUSTA.
- (10) Legal detachment.
Composed of four members, the legal detachment was stationed at DOLCE VILLA. Though administratively it was responsible to the Bn, the *Det Judiciare* was independent and intervened either of his own initiative or on request at the location of various disputes.
- (11) LDSG (Long distance Signal Group).
Responsible to the QG secteur and not the Bn. The three members of the LDSG team resided at DOLCE VILLA and took turns to render 24-hour service at the QG secteur.
- (12) Misc. staff
 - (a) Two members of KIGALODGE (construction of permanent structure project at the airport) arrived a few days ago and are staying at the DOLCE VILLA.
 - (b) The C-130 crew on stand by at the airport was staying at Milles Collines. The C-130 was responsible to the Secteur comd.
 - (c) The Staff, who were not with the UN, were partly supervised by though not with KIBAT. They did not wear the blue beret.

3. Radio contacts

a. Radio contacts were established in the following manner:

- (1) One Bn network regrouped all elements under direct Bn control
- (2) Three group network which at the Bn usually regrouped not only Pl but also various sections.
- (3) The main camps also had a permanent station so they could leave radios on command vehicles. The THREE PC Gp had a twin station which enabled them to maintain the Bn network and the Gp network. CAPPUCINO, VIKING, FRANCISUS, MIRADOR and RAMADAN had only station. The first TWO at the Bn network, the others at their respective *Groupe* network.
- (4) The KIBAT Ln Offr at the QG secteur was with the Bn network but most communications with K9 was done by Tf civil.
- (5) At the UN, contacts were done by MOTOROLA or by telephone. KIBAT PC had a permanent MOTOROLA at PEGASUS. RELAX also had a MOTOROLA because it had a UN Veh. The Det Hel, Det Medical also received a MOTOROLA for they were to be able to directly contact the UN for medical evacuations.

b. Main call signs

These coded names were used for radio communications to ease recognition of speakers; they were also used in this document instead of full names. ALL the signs are contained in Ann D. The main signs in alphabetical order are as follows:

A6 (ALPHA 6)	Comd Gp AIRFIELD	Capt VANDRIESSCHE
A7 (ALPHA 7)	Comd 2d Gp AIRFIELD	Lt VERMEULEN
B6 (BRAVO 6)	Groupe SUD	Lt. LEMAIRE
B7 (BRAVO 7)	Comd 2d Gp SUD	Lt. LECOMTE
C6 (CHARLIE 6)	Comd Gp CITY	Capt MARCHAL
C7 (CHARLIE 7)	Comd 2d Gp CITY	Lt. THEUNISSEN
D6 (DELTA 6)	Comd Log base	Capt. TEFNIN
D7 (DELTA 7)	Comd 2D Log Base	Lt. BELLIERE
H6 (HOTEL 6)	Comd ACP	Med Maj DAUBRESSE
K3 (KILO 3)	Offr Ops QG secteur	Maj BEM PROVINCIAEL
K9 (KILO 9)	Comd, QG secteur	Col BEM MARCHAL
M6 (MIKE 6)	Comd Det Med	Med Maj THIRY
OSCAR	PC Bn	
RELAX	ISC	Adj. CANTINE
S1 (SIERRA 1)	Offr Personnel Bn	Capt MESPREUVE
S14	Offr Ln Bn, QG secteur	Capt SCHEPKENS
S2 (SIERRA 2)	Bn Intelligence Offr	Lt. DECUYPER
S3 (SIERRA 3)	Offr Operations Bn	Capt. CHOFRAY
S6 (SIERRA 6)	Comd Bn	Lt. Col DEWEZ

S7 (SIERRA 7)
 V6 (VICTOR 6)
 Y6 (YANKEE 6)
 Y7 (YANKEE 7)

Comd 2d Bn
 Chef Sec CVRT
 Chef, PI Mor
 Adj PI Mor

Maj TIMSONNET
 Lt VAN CAUWENBERGHE
 Lt LOTIN
 1 sgt Maj LECONTE

BASE A, BASE B, BASE C etc, permanent radio at the camp

4. Activities of the various groups

a. Background

In the implementation of its mission, the BN imposed various routine tasks.

Each group comd draws up a weekly programme splitting staff into operations staff and off-duty, maintenance, administrative and teaching (physical education or shooting) staff. Day to day duties were assigned to operations staff.

This "cruising speed" programme was suspended for special Bn missions when a lot of staff was assigned to the field.

b. Succinct description of routine activities

(1) The guarding of the camp

Camp Security required, on the average, one section per camp a day.

Additionally, from his own camp, the Gp SUD provided one section to guard TWO PC BN camp (PEGASUS and DOLCE VILLA).

The small camps were guarded by the staff who resided therein.

(2) Town patrols

UN presence in town was assured by day and night patrols. These patrols were effected either on foot or in vehicles; sometimes, they were joint patrols. The strength of the patrol was ONE section and the duration was, on the average, TWO hrs (including preparation and debriefing). The Gp Comd fixed the duration and itinerary or patrol areas. A Rwandan *gendarme* accompanied each patrol. Besides making their presence felt, the purpose of the patrol was to establish contact with the people in order, on the one hand, to win their confidence and on the other, to gather as much information as possible. Some patrols were specially designed to mingle with the people. Such patrols stopped at drinking places, drank coca cola (soft drinks) and could therefore easily establish contact with the people. (which earned them the name coca-cola patrol).

(3) Roadblocks

On the orders of the Bn and in collaboration with the *gendarmerie*, the Gp were to organize roadblocks. The mechanism for the roadblocks was installed by ONE section over a TWO hour duration at locations decided upon by the Gp Comd. Vehicles and persons were checked by Rwandan *gendarmes* only. The Belgian staff were in charge of organization of security near the roadblocks.

(4) Patrol in the SOUTH of KWSA

Once a day, the Gp SUD organized a patrol to Unimog with one sec on the main roads bordering the SOUTH, WEST AND EAST of KWSA. All Gp sections had reconnoitered the big highways.

At the same time that these patrols were being carried out at Ug, intensive THREE day foot patrols were to assure UN presence in the areas farthest from the SOUTH of KWSA and to establish contacts with the people. It was decided that ALL Gp would carry out the patrols in turns with TWO sections and that the first patrol would be headed by a PI chief. The patrol staff would bivouac on the way to reconnoitered locations. For preparation and coordination reasons, the first patrols commenced on 6 April.

(5) Escorts

Escorts were to accompany and protect specific personalities as they moved around within and outside KWSA. The strength of the escort (generally TWO jeeps) could change depending on the size of the convoy or persons being protected. EVERYDAY, the PI Mor provided THREE escorts and every group, one escort. If one escort was not used, it was given one hour's notice to promptly respond to a request from QG secteur.

(6) Checkpoint outside the House of Assembly (*CND -Centre National pour le Developpement*)

Every other week, KIBAT provided TWO CVRT at the EAST entrance to the Rwandan parliament building. Regarding other weeks, that task was carried out by RUTBAT. It was a symbolic task because the actual checking was done by the Tunisian coy who guarded the inside of the House of Assembly, and by the RPF.

(7) Protection of the airport

During the day, TWO sections of the Gp AIRFIELD ensured UN presence on the roof of the airport and were on permanent patrol duty inside the airport.

(8) Guards at the residence of personalities

In addition to escorts, KIBAT had to supply guards to the residences of some personalities. At the end of March, most of these guards were taken back by the BYUBAT GOLF Company. KIBAT kept TWO guards from 6 p.m. to 8. a.m.: Mr. Ngango (PSD chairman Social Democratic Party- Hutu opposition) and Boniface Ngulinzira (future GTBE Minister of Foreign Affairs).

(9) SAFETY patrol

Every evening from 6 p.m., ONE sec checked on the conduct of KIBAT staff on mission. That Sec visited the various authorized locations, checked the conduct of the men of the Bn. They also ensured that the Staff on mission left the various establishments on time in order to arrive before the official time that the curfew began (11p.m.)

(10) RUTONGO mission

ONE protection Sec was sent to the RUTONGO parish about 10 km north of Kigali following a request from the nuns at the parish to assure security of a food depot. The mission commenced in the night of 4 to 5 April and was to last for a few days. The first guard change occurred on 6 April at 7 p.m. Though it was in the RUTBAT neighbourhood, the QG secteur had requested that the mission be carried out by KIBAT for the nuns were Belgians.

(11) House of Assembly (CND) Night surveillance Mission

The purpose of this mission was to guard the SOUTH fence of the House of Assembly using night vision equipment to detect any possible RPF sortie and thereby confirm or refute allegations by the government. The first mission took place on 6 April and was to be repeated in a timely manner.

(12) Missions

Missions (ONE a week) in well identified restaurants were authorized from 6 p.m. to 11 p.m. The list of mission staff as to be recorded at the PC BN everyday.

KIBAT - 6 April 1994**DEVELOPMENTS ON 6 APRIL**5. **KIBAT Situation**

The evening President HABYARIMANA's aircraft was shot down, the Bn was performing its routine missions, by ensuring the maximum United Nations presence. Furthermore, about thirty men went on a patrol. The President's aircraft was shot down by missiles around 8. 30 p.m. Some confusion ensued, which lasted a good hour. Some sources talked of missiles having brought down a plane and others talked of an explosion in the ammunition depot in KANOMBE Camp (situated in the eastern end of the airport).

a. **Sections on mission.**

- (1) A part of A13 was keeping guard at the CND. That Sec was accompanied by A7 and went to the airport after the plane crash. They entered the airport through the SOUTH entrance.
- (2) A12 was in Rutongo parish and A22, which had just gone off duty, had just returned from there.
- (3) B25 patrolled the EASTERN part of town and returned to BEVERLY HILLS at 10 p.m.
- (4) C13 and C21 under the Cmd of C16 were in Butamwa (10 Km south of Kigali) as part of a thorough patrol in the south of the KWSA.
- (5) TWO teams of three men of the SOUTH Gp were guarding the home of Mr. NGANGO (Cpls MATTENS, TIMPERMAN and VAN HEE) and the home of Mr. NGULINZIRA (Corporal MAREE, Pvt HERMAN and LHOIR).
- (6) A23 executed a SAFETY patrol mission.

b. **Entry into the airport.**

- (1) Around 8.45 p.m.20, shortly after the President's aircraft was shot down with a missile, RELAX left RWANDEX to meet the C-130 aircraft arriving from BELGIUM. He was traveling in a UN pick-up truck and the radio communications centre in RWANDEX warned him that there were problems around the airport. Some very agitated Rwandan gendarmes stopped him at the main gate, the NORTH entrance. Ahead of him, there was already a minibus belonging to CTM (ADC LECRAT and Mr. DUQUESNOIS of the Embassy).

- (2) Shortly afterwards, a KIBAT Ford Transit with FOUR men of the Log Base and some LDSG (Capt. MADALIJS, Sgt NELLIS and ISgt. VERMEIREN, Chief Corporal VANDAM) was stopped in like manner. Y5 left BEVERLY HILLS, where he had consulted a doctor, and went to the airport to fill his tank. He tried to pass through the NORTH entrance and was also stopped at the gate. Later, CHIEF CORPORAL DINJART, Cpls Eric GILSOUL and Pascal GILSOUL and Cpt. SPAGNOLI (FOUR of them in a Jeep ambulance!) were also stopped and joined the group. A civilian vehicle with Messrs. GREINDL and ANDRE is also blocked and they too join the group.
- (3) From the road leading to KIGALI, one could reach the main gate (North entrance) either through the parking lot or through the road opposite the gate. Access to the parking lot was open at night while the junction between the road opposite the gate and the main road was barred with a roadblock mounted by the presidential guards in the course of the evening. The presidential guards manning that roadblock opened fire on the Jeep driven by Lt. DEMEYERE and a UN MAN truck driven by CHIEF CORPORAL JANSSEN, who were coming to the airport to pick up members of the Engineering corps arriving by the C-130 (KIGALODGE Project). Behind them, Dr. Major THIRY was also stopped in his Jeep. They were arrested and searched, and had their arms and car keys confiscated. They were held captive, sitting on the road. Lt. DEMEYERE of Rwandan origin understood their conversation in the local language. The Rwandan civilians were also held captive like the Belgians, but try to turn the Rwandan soldiers against the Belgian soldiers. After some heated words, RELAX managed to get them join the group at the gate.
- (4) At 9.50 p.m., RELAX reports the situation at the airport entrance. He indicates that two GPs had been confiscated. At 10.27 p.m., he transmits the names of the staff assembled at the entrance to the airport.

c. Miscellaneous

- (1) Two members of the Log Base, CHIEF CORPORAL PIERRE (with his wife and son) and Cpl MORICONI, were at the home of Warrant Officer DEFRAIGNE at CTM village (near the CND).
- (2) H6, the Surgeon (Dr. Major DAUBRESSE) and the anesthetist (Dr. CDT VAN DEENEN) were in KANOMBE camp in the home of Dr. Lt. Col PASUCH, the Belgian doctor in CTM.
- (3) Roughly twenty-five men were in KIGALI NIGHT and some others were out in various restaurants in the town. The Battalion Command Post had the list of the personnel given permission to go out and the places where they were

6. The downing of the aircraft

- a. At 8.30 p.m., A6 alerted OSCAR that his official in the observation post in the old control tower had seen some missiles launched from the eastern side of the airport.
Meanwhile, the firemen at the airport were driving eastwards along the runway. Around 8.34 p.m., H6 (who was in KANOMBE) reported tracer shots and heavy artillery in the vicinity.
- b. At 8.37 p.m., the Belgian C-130 arriving from BELGIUM, which ought to have landed around 8.30 p.m., requested necessary instructions because it had just 15 minutes to spare if it had to fly back to NAIROBI. Given the confused situation, S6 orders it to proceed to NAIROBI.
- c. At 8.43 p.m., Sector HQ ordered investigation of the alleged explosion in an ammunition depot KANOMBE. That request added to the confusion and cast doubts on the information about the aircraft that had been shot down.
- d. Shortly afterwards, VITAMINE, who had contacts with the wife of the pilot of the President's aircraft, warned that the aircraft ought to have landed around 8.30 p.m. At the same time, A BASE transmitted to OSCAR that some Rwandan civilians in the control tower had confirmed to him that the President's aircraft was shot down. He emitted a distress signal and was not heard of again. At that juncture, there were still some doubts about what had happened to the plane. There were two possibilities: either the aircraft had been shot down or it had gone to another airport. The Rwandans manifest their presence at the airport by an ever-increasing movement of troops. At 10.45 p.m., the Sector HQ requested KIBAT, to keep UNE Sector ready to reconnoitre the scene of the crash.
At 11 p.m., Radio Rwanda announced that the President's aircraft had been shot down. On board that flight were President HABYARYMANA (RWANDA), President NTARYAMIRA (BURUNDI), Colonel SAGATWA (Private Secretary to President HABYARIMANA), Gen. NSABIMANA (Chief of Staff of the RAF - Rwandan Armed Forces) and Dr. AKINGENEYE (President HABYARIMANA's personal physician)

7. Diverse Movements

- a. Around 9 p.m., D6 left RWANDEX with S/Offr Rav, 1 Sgt. Major BREDO, to resolve the issue of replenishment at VIPERE. Having noticed roadblocks erected along the road leading to the city, he feared that the main entrance to the airport may not be open and took the SOUTH entrance. He remained blocked at the airport for several days.
- b. At 9.18 p.m., Y6, Y5, Y3 and Y8 left their barracks to fill their tanks in VIPERE. Since it was not a specific mission, only the drivers and the escort of each vehicle went. The third man in the team remained in VIKING. On the way, D6 warned that there were problems at the NORTH entrance and indicated the way to enter the airport by the SOUTH

entrance. A6 used that means to complete his operations at the airport, under the orders of Y6.

c. S1's attempt to leave

At 9.10 p.m., S1 and 1Sgt-Major SCHIEPERS left PEGASUS for the airport in a minibus.

On arriving at N4, they were stopped by some aggressive Rwandan soldiers. After some sort of explanation, they picked up Lt-Col POCHET (of the Sector HQ) who was at that point and reversed out of the junction. On their return, they warned AS3 who was following them not to continue. Before reaching PEGASUS, they crossed A22 returning to FRANCISCUS from Rutongo and made him also turn back to PEGASUS.

d. At the time of the attack, A26 was patrolling between FRANCISCUS and TOP GUN. He went to TOP GUN and called his deputy from there. That is how the Command Post of the PI B of the AIRFIELD Gp ended up at the airport, whereas the rest of the PI was in FRANCISCUS.

8. Developments until midnight

a. Personnel on off-duty outing

Around 9.25 p.m., S3 orders the SAFETY patrol to pick up all the personnel on off-duty outing and bring them to the nearest barracks.

B7 undertook to collect the men of the SOUTH Company from KIGALI NIGHT. YI was instructed to collect personnel from «*Péché Mignon*», but found no one there. However, he took the EOD personnel from «*Ma Campagne*» to FRANCISCUS (two restaurants in the immediate vicinity of FRANCISCUS).

Around 10.15 p.m., all the personnel who had gone out that evening were back.

b. VIKING

At 10.30 p.m., Y BASE which was quartered in the KIMIHURURA neighbourhood where several of the dignitaries lived, signalled that some elements of the *Gendarmerie* (or of the Presidential Guard) had come to fetch some dignitaries to take them elsewhere. They were possibly dignitaries of the MRND (*Mouvement Republicain National pour le Développement et la Démocratie*), the ruling Hutu party, who were reportedly taken to a Presidential Guard barracks in KIMIHURURA for protection.

c. At 9.56 p.m., the Sector HQ upgraded the Bn to red alert (Cf. Ann C) and requested maximum presence of UN troops at the airport. Orders having already been issued by the Bn for patrol personnel, A6 was compelled to try and ensure the UN presence on the scene by posting the two Sec he had left at TOP GUN. He took advantage of Y's vehicle to get them patrol the eastern side of the runway up to the Air Terminal Building.

d. At 11.38 p.m., OSCAR ordered all the units to cancel all external missions and stay in the barracks.

9. Situation of the sub-units on 6 April at 12 midnight
- a. The Battalion Command Pos.
 - (1) Distributed between PEGASUS and DOLCE VILLA.
 - (2) Those who went to KIGALI NIGHT and who had been taken to FRANCISCUS by the SAFETY patrol went back to PEGASUS around 2 a.m. The RSM and 1 Sgt.-Maj SCHIEPERS undertook the transfer.
 - (3) S14 and his driver were in the Sector HQ.
 - (4) RELAX is blocked in front of the airport with Capt. MADALIJS and Sgt NELLIS.
 - (5) The Padre was at BEVERLY HILLS
 - b. The logistics base
 - (1) D6 was at the airport with 1Sgt.- Major BREDO.
 - (2) TWO men were at CTM in the homes of some acquaintances (CHIEF CORPORAL PIERRE and MORICONI).
 - (3) The rest of the personnel were in RWANDEX.
 - c. AIRFIELD Gp
 - (1) Half of the Gp Command Post with A6 and A7 as well as the Pl A (LESS A12) were at TOP GUN.
 - (2) The Pl B (Less A26 and A22 who were returning from RUTONGO and were stopped in PEGASUS) and the other part of the Command Post were in FRANCISCUS. A22 returned to FRANCISCUS later in the night.
 - (3) A12 was in RUTONGO.
 - (4) FOUR men with the ambulance Jeep were blocked at the entrance to the airport with RELAX
 - d. SOUTH Gp
 - (1) Almost everybody was in BEVERLY HILLS,
 - (2) THREE men on guard at the NGANGO family home.
 - (3) THREE men on guard at NGULINZIRA's family home.
 - (4) B22 guarded PEGASUS and DOLCE VILLA with SIX men.
 - e. CITY Gp
 - (1) The THE COMMAND POST was in CHINATOWN
 - (2) The Pl A (LESS C16 and C 13) was in RAMADAN
 - (3) The Pl B (LESS C21) was at MIRADOR
 - (4) C16, C13 and C21 were in BUTAMWA (about 10 Km SOUTH of KIGALI)
 - f. The Pl Mor
 - (1) Cpl DHYON had returned to BELGIUM for family reasons, he was on board the C-130 which had to land at 8.45 p.m., but which was diverted to NAIROBI following the crash.
 - (2) Chief Corporal ANTOINE, who had fractured his foot some days earlier, remained in VIKING. CPL BASSINE replaced him as driver of the Y5 Jeep.

- (3) Cpls LEFEBVRE, KINKIN and LALOUX had remained in VIKING when the Jeeps were going to the airport to fill up.
 - (4) Y6, Y 5, Y3 and Y8 were at TOP GUN
- (2) Y7 was blocked in front of the airport with RELAX.
 - (3) In VIKING: Y1, Y2 and Y4 with the cook (ISgt HUTSEBAUT), Cpls LEFEVRE, KINKIN, LALOUX,
- g. The Medical detachment.
- (1) The Surgeon and the anesthetist were in KANOMBE.
 - (2) Dr. Major THIRY was blocked in front of the airport with RELAX
 - (3) VITAMINE: 3 persons.
 - (4)
 - (5) P Sec Bn was at BEVERLY HILLS.
- h. Miscellaneous
- (1) The Heli Detachment was in AGUSTA.
 - (2) The EOD were in FRANCISCUS.
 - (3) Lt DALEYERE and Chief Corporal JANSSENS of KIGALODGE were blocked with RELAX.
 - (4) ISgt VERMEIREN and Chief Corporal VANDAM of the LDSG were blocked with RELAX
 - (5) The crew of the C-130 was in *Hôtel des Mille Collines*, except Capt. JACOBS (the flight Captain) and ISM CUYVERS who were out and could not return to the hotel; they were in PEGASUS.

KIBAT - 7 APRIL 1994**7 APRIL DEVELOPMENT**

10. Resumption of missions in the second part of the night.
- (a) At 1.10 am, the HQ Sector requested that patrols should resume as quickly as possible to show UN presence in the town. It insisted that the patrols must be carried out in coordination with the gendarmerie. A maximum number of people must be on the field. Routine escorts continued to be provided for: the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, the RPF Chairman, Alexis Kanyarengwe, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anastase Gazana).
- (b) Towards 1.30 am, S6 assigned missions to the Bn. The PI Mor maintained TWO escorts of 30-minutes notice as a reserve Bn. The THREE Gp got into contact with the local gendarmerie and began patrols at 3 o'clock. The first C6 patrol went to rescue Ms Deliso (Chief, UNAMIR Civil Administration) blocked up at the American Club. S6 insisted on cooperation with the gendarmerie and requested to be informed once the patrols began.
- (c) Five minutes later, K9 contacted S6 and requested him to deploy maximum patrols as fast as possible. He also requested escort for Mr. Booh-Booh who had to go to the Force HQ. That escort was ONE of the TWO escorts of 30-minutes notice. Y6 designated Y2 to escort Mr. Booh-Booh and Y2 ended his mission at 2.34 am. He indicated that N4 was free.
- (d) At 2.09 am, S1, who was on duty, disclosed the number of patrols to be carried out and the number of gendarmes to be requested. The gendarmes in all the Sectors were reluctant. They knew that the President's plane had been shot down and had received no instructions from above. B6 obtained TWO gendarmes out of the SIX requested. C6, whose area of command was covered by the SOUTH and NORTH territorial brigades, obtained gendarmes only from the NORTH brigade.
- (e) B6 began his patrols at 3 o'clock. A6 received a less enthusiastic gendarme who accompanied the Section in charge of patrols on the main road towards the town only for 500 m from the airfield. At 2.20 am, C6 received order to collect his TWO Sec. on Pat deep into Butamwa with ONE Sec., THREE Ug and TWO gendarmes. The gendarmes did not arrive and C12 left at 3 o'clock without waiting any longer. The Butamwa element returned to his quarters at 5.11am. C16 went in his vehicle straight to CHINATOWN to be abreast of the situation. Because of roadblocks, he was blocked up there and only joined his P1 again on 9 April when the latter left RAMADAN.
- (f) At 4.25 am, K9 requested that a helicopter should be sent at dawn to effect reconnaissance flights over the town. S6 remarked that it was dangerous to

have the helicopter fly over the town in the prevailing circumstances. K9 reiterated his order and said that the flights should be adapted to the circumstances. K2 boarded the helicopter as well as a gunner (to serve the machine gun mounted on the side of the helicopter). An escort from the SOUTH Gp, commanded by B16 and composed of B11 on jeep and B13 on Ug, tried unsuccessfully to drive the Alouette crew to the airfield. First stopped by a roadblock manned by Rwandan paratroopers, quite many on N9, it was caught under fire on N8 (Trunk Road 8), when it tried to bypass through a parallel route. B16 consequently returned to BEVERLY HILLS with K2 whom he had met on N8.

11. General situation in the town and activities of the CITY Gp.

- (a) Towards 2.30 am, the HQ Sector informed S6 that Agathe would make a speech, in principle at 5.30 am on Radio Rwanda in order to call for calm. It was essential for UNAMIR to help her prevent any excesses from popular violence.
At 2.38 am, C6 received order to provide TWO sections for the protection of Radio Rwanda. Those Sections had to be there at 4.45 am. Concurrently, Y6 went to Agathe's home with double escort so as to escort her up to the broadcasting house.
- (b) At 3.10, C6 indicated that he had had the gendarmes and staff necessary for the Radio Rwanda mission.
- (c) At 3.48 am, he received order to send ONE Sec., accompanied by a gendarme to rescue Y6 who was blocked up at the *Mille Collines* junction. C6 designated C22 who patrolled in that section of the town with FOUR jeeps.
- (d) C6 personally went to the *Mille Collines* junction where Y6 and C22 were found and where TWO jeeps were on the spot. The TWO other jeeps searched for the American Club, which was quite nearby (mission to rescue Ms Deliso). Despite the presence of gendarmes, everyone remained blocked. C6, realizing the time passing, had the Deliso mission carried out. He went with that mission, brought Ms Deliso back to the MERIDIEN hotel and then went back to the *Mille Collines* junction.
- (e) Shortly after, he disclosed that his sub-units had been blockaded at the roadblocks reinforced by tanks that even gendarmes accompanying him had been unable to have them removed. He further confirmed that he could not execute the Radio Rwanda mission because his Sections had been stopped at the Belgian school by tanks, which blockaded the road. The WHOLE "presidential" neighbourhood of the city centre, which in normal times was protected by many FAR checkpoints, was then completely closed with roadblocks reinforced with AML (light tank of the FAR Recce Bn). S3 tried to obtain, through the HQ Sector, a liaison offer from Rwanda so that the roadblocks could allow the peacekeepers through. Realizing that that liaison offer was not forthcoming, C6 left with C22 to look for another passage for Y6 through the SOUTH. At the *Saint Siège*,

he found a roadblock, which, after long discussions, was opened for him to pass. He communicated the route to Y6 and, while waiting for him, he entrusted another reconnaissance mission in town to C22. After accomplishing his mission, C22 joined MIRADOR towards 5.45 am.

- (f) At 5.35 am, Y6 joined C6 and, without stopping, went past the roadblock towards Agathe's house on Avenue Paul IV. C6 wanted to closely follow Y6, but Y6 was caught under fire in front of Agathe's house. C6 stopped at the French Embassy while, behind him, the Saint Siège roadblock opened fired. He then ordered C13 to join him and hold the Saint Siège roadblock. S6, who believed that C6 was still accompanied by C22, requested C6 and Y6 to take position that was as secure as possible until dawn and, then, try to regroup. Shortly after, the Saint Siège roadblock withdrew.
- (g) At 6.11 am, C6 joined C13 who had just taken position at the junction. He indicated to S6 that he could not join Y6. To his right, in the barracks, the FAR positioned troops and a machine gun in his direction.
- (h) At 6.38 am, C6 requested to withdraw to VITAMINE, given the danger from that machine gun which enfiladed him. S6 authorized him. After joining VITAMINE, C6 indicated that gendarmes accompanying his other elements wanted to leave.
- (i) At 11.05 am, gendarmes who were with C6 wanted to leave. S6 advised them to contact their brigade. But the gendarmes left in spite of everything.
- (j) At 12.47, C6 communicated "CONTACT WAIT".
Shortly after, he explained that while a Rwandan pick-up, filled with Rwandan gendarmes and policemen, was passing in front of VITAMINE, one of the policemen fired in their direction and the MAG gunman, Cpl Raison, posted to the entrance of the house, opened a burst of fire on the pick-up. ONE of the Rwandans fell and the vehicle sped off. C6 then sent an aidman with escort to treat him but the victim died.
- (k) At 2.38 pm, an AML followed by Rwandan soldiers got closer to VITAMINE. The latter disarmed the MAG gunman (Cpl Raison) who was in front of the house and insisted that the others should hand in their weapons and ammunitions. C6 positioned the rest of his men and went (without his weapon) to negotiate with the Rwandans. He told them that there was no question of giving the weapons and he collected his gunman's weapon. The Rwandans who, it seemed, were looking for Faustin Twagiramungu (future Prime Minister of the broad-based transitional Government) went and positioned themselves a little further in front of the Netherlands Consulate.
- (l) At about 5 pm, C6 realizing that it was not easy to defend VITAMINE, proposed that they should give up the quarters and move into the home of the Belgian Ambassador whose residence was found in front of VITAMINE. C6 agreed as a matter of principle.

Towards 5.20 pm, C6 contacted the Belgian Ambassador at his residence and was told that the Ambassador did not want to take sides and that, consequently, he did not want UN soldiers in his residence.

12. AGATHE's escort

- (a) At 00.10 am, Y BASE indicated that he had contacted Agathe on the telephone. General Dallaire told her that the Presidential Guard was preventing UNAMIR from approaching the plane. She was on stand-by in her home.
- (b) After announcing that missions of the next day, including escorts, had been cancelled, the HQ Sector ordered at 1.10 am that routine escorts should continue (daily routine escorts)
- (c) At 1.30 a.m., S6 requests Y7 to have Two Bn reserve escorts ready in 30 minutes. This means withdrawing the elements positioned at the airport. After contact with A6, S6 decides to leave Y3 and Y8 at the airport in order to reinforce Cie AIRFIELD (Cie = Company) and to pick up Y6 and Y5 who will leave around 2.16 a.m. through the Southern entrance (they will break the padlocks utilized to lock the metal gate). Y6 attempts to join Viking through Capuccino, but has to make a roundabout so as to avoid the roadblocks and the shootings in that area.
Meanwhile, Y1 and Y2, which form the second escort in reserve, receive a mission to escort Mr. Booh-Booh from his residence (near Dolce Villa) to the *QG Force*. They carry out the mission without difficulty and Mr. Booh-Booh arrives at *QG Force* at 2.34 a.m.
- (d) *QG Secteur* informs Oscar that Agathe will make a speech, in principle at 5.30 a.m. on Radio Rwanda in order to call for calm and that she should therefore be escorted. At 2.38 a.m., while he is not yet at Viking, Y6 receives the mission to escort Agathe from her residence to Radio Rwanda station where she must speak at 5.30 a.m., although Two Sections of C6 will take position outside the Radio station. S6 specifies that considering the circumstances, there must be Double escort. Y6 requests to have Two jeeps left at the airport; and S6 refuses. Having heard this order over the radio, Y1 informs Y6 that he has concluded the Booh-Booh mission and that he can therefore carry out the mission together with him, he suggests joining him at the residence of Agathe.
- (e) At 3.4 a.m., Y6 reports that he is stopped at the roadblock at a junction 400 metres to the North of the house of Agathe. Y1 is also blocked by roadblocks and requests the assistance of *gendarmes* so as to pass through. The request will be transmitted to C6 who provides *gendarmes*.
- (f) At 3.19 a.m., however, Y1 and Y2 succeeds in joining Y6 and Y5 at the junction of Avenue de la République and Rue de l'Hôpital, where they are blocked by other roadblocks barricading the city centre. Y6 retreats by about hundred metres up to the junction of 1000 *collines*.

At 3.45 a.m., Y6 reports that Y Base is able to contact Agathe by telephone, but that, unfortunately, she cannot do anything to break the deadlock.

- (g) C6, C22 and the *gendarmes* join them at the 1000 *collines* junction, but are unable to break the deadlock. S3 requests *QG Secteur* to call for the intervention of an RAF Liaison Officer and tells Y6 to remain at the junction until the arrival of the Officer. At 5.3 a.m., the deadlock is still not broken.
- (h) Around 5.15 a.m., Y6 reports that the Agathe mission will still be possible because C6 has just informed him that he has discovered a route through the South.
- (i) At 5.32 a.m., Y1 reports that during a contact he had with an AML crew positioned at 1000 *collines*, RAF told him that only the Minister of Defence can give permission to Agathe to go and make a speech at the Radio Station (but the Minister of Defence is outside the country attending a regional meeting in Yaounde).
- (j) Around 5.35 a.m., the Four jeeps with Y6 pass through the roadblock of Saint Siège in Avenue Paul VI where C6 is and they continue in the direction of the house of Agathe. They came under fire at the height of the house. Two jeeps succeed in entering the property while Two others remain outside on the left side of the road. The entire personnel enter inside the house. Y6 contacts Agathe and transmits to Oscar that she wishes that her guard should be reinforced and that she no longer wants to go to Radio Rwanda. It is 5.42 a.m. and his vehicles on the road are being aimed with an AML.
S6 requests C6 (whom he still believes is accompanied by One section) and Y6 to take the safest possible position until daybreak and, meanwhile, to try to regroup. Y6 says that if he goes inside the house, he will lose radio contact. S6 tells him that radio contact is a priority and that he must therefore position himself in the garden of the house.
- (k) A little before 6 a.m., Y5 informs Y6 that the Rwandans believe that it is Belgians that want to get at Agathe and that the situation should be clarified. After requesting *QG Secteur* to clarify the issue at its level, S6 orders the escort to protect Agathe in or in the surroundings of the house, but to return fire only if they are directly attacked.
- (l) Around 6.50 a.m., Y6 reports of explosions very close to them, obviously rocket propelled grenades. S6 tells them to take cover close to the vehicles, if need be in the house.
- (m) At 7.20 a.m., Y6 reports that he is in the house and that various shootings and movements took place around the house of Agathe. Similar information arrives from many cantonments and particularly from Viking and Franciscus.

- (n) Around 8.20 a.m., Agathe requests assistance through Y6 and says that she wants to flee. S6 tells Y6 to remain under cover and not to follow the Prime Minister is she wants to flee by going from garden to garden, as he would no longer have radio contact with PC Bn, and their behaviour would attract suspicion from RAF positioned on the various roadblocks. On the advice of S6, Y6 tries to persuade Agathe to stay with them because they cannot follow her, but she flees all the same to take refuge in the house of neighbours.
- (o) Around 8.30 a.m., Y6 informs S6 that a Rwandan Major proposed to bring back the escort to UNAMIR if they give up. The behaviour of the soldiers accompanying him is threatening ("if you do not do what is asked of you", that means you want to die"). Y6 adds that Agathe has left. S6 informs him that since Agathe has left, he can negotiate his departure but without giving up his weapons.
- (p) At this juncture, technical problems as regards power supply for the radio compels S6 to leave the operation room and makes contact again from his vehicle at Pegasus parking.
 Meanwhile, K9 intervenes in Bn network and says that Y6 is the head on the ground, that he can assess the situation and do what is best.
 At 8.45 a.m., the situation becomes frantic and Y6 informs S6 that Three of his men are already on the floor, disarmed. S6 then tells Y6, "Since three men are on the floor disarmed, I think that the best thing will be to do what they ask". As from that moment, there is no longer contact with Y6 on Bn network. Having heard strange voices on the network and feeling that RAF can listen to Bn network through the Vehicle of Y6, S6 places Bn on the frequency of Res.
- (q) Around 9.06 a.m., following a message from C6 (the Motorola of M6 is in VITAMINE), the radio operator on duty informs S6 that Y6 is heard on the Motorola network. Y6 just had the time to tell S6, "We have been disarmed and taken to I don't know where, two men are outside, they are being beaten up. My Colonel, I believe that we are going to be lynched." Not knowing what to say, S6 wants to be reassured and replies that he is obviously exaggerating and that perhaps he is only going to be beaten up. As from this moment, the battalion will no longer have ANY contact with Y6.
- (r) At 9.08 a.m., S6 directly informs *QG Secteur* and requests contact with RAF to have Y6 and his men freed urgently, because they are being beaten up. He states that there must be a UN Observer with Y6 because he had mentioned a Motorola. *QG Secteur* then tries to identify the observer and to contact RAF. He also informs *QG Force*.
 A while later, at 9.10 a.m., K9 replies that he only contacted RAF by telephone and that Y6 might have been taken to a barrack near ESM (Advance Military School) with the Ghanaians who were on guard in the house of Agathe.

- (s) At 9.45 a.m., K9 informs the battalion that he is still trying to contact the UN Observer from camp Kigali so as to know the situation of Y6 because he does not have telephone contact with RAF. He adds that the rules of engagement are still in force.
Around 10 a.m., C Base reports that PI of MIRADOR is complete, S6 replies telling him to stay where they are.
- (t) Around 10.30 a.m., *QG Secteur* communicates in Bn network that Y6 has been killed. S6 reacts by demanding if the information is verified and following a negative response, he states that such statement on the network does not hold. He personally goes to *QG Secteur* where, around 10.45, he meets Col. Pursher (Commander of UN Observers at the *Secteur*) and requests him to contact the observer who was near Y6. Col. Pursher will not succeed in making contact.
S6 will stay for a long time at *QG Secteur* to discuss the situation with the officers of *QG Secteur* as well as with Lt. Col Bem Baudoin from CTM who is blocked at *QG Secteur* not able to go to CTM village, who gives S6 the telephone number of the EM RAF on duty.
- (u) Upon return to Pegasus around 12.08 p.m., S6 requests S7 (former CTM Rwanda) to telephone EM RAF, S7 contacted the duty officer and implores him to do everything possible to free the Ten Belgian soldiers held in camp Kigali. Just after that, Lt. Elieze, Liaison Officer of the Rwandan *Gendarmerie* attached to KIBAT, contacts PC Bn by telephone and S6 also requests him to intervene through the *gendarmerie*. About one hour later, with no news coming in, PC Bn will try in vain to contact the RAF duty officer again.
- (v) In early afternoon, K9 who had had contact with *QG Force*, transmits that according to a UN observer, some might have been killed in Camp Kigali. He asks whether KIBAT has more information or can confirm this information.
- (w) KIBAT has no witness regarding what transpired after the group was taken from the house of Agathe. Judicial inquiry should determine it, but this is not within the competence of these notes which are SOLELY based on the facts known by KIBAT personnel. However, it really seems that the ten soldiers, (commandos), found themselves in an unequal fight, and inevitably defended themselves against their aggressors.
- (x) It is only in the evening that that the *QG Secteur* announces that Gen. Dallaire had visited Camp Kigali and seen twelve dead bodies there. For the Bn, there cannot have been more than ten mortars with Y6. Using the radio, he makes sure that there are other mortars (the PI is dispersed with some elements at the airport, Amahoro Stadium and at VIKING). He also makes sure that no other elements are missing in the various *Cie's*. Indeed, two men are missing at the Logistics Base, but had been at CTM to be briefed.

- (y) It is only at 11.00 p.m. that all the verifications are finalized and S6 gives to *QG Secteur* the list of ten victims to be transmitted to Belgium in order to inform the families.

1 st Lt Thierry LOTIN	42610	Born in Charleroi on 28/12/64, married, spouse pregnant
1 st Sgt Yannick LEROY	R67307	Born in Mehaigne on 15/02/65, bachelor
Cpl Bruno BASSINE	R64125	Born in Watermael on 31/12/66, married, 1 child
Cpl Alain DEBATTY	R71293	Born in Charleroi on 18/11/64, bachelor.
Cpl Christophe DUPONT	R70968	Born in Soignies on 30/09/68, married, 1 child
Cpl Stéphane LHOIR	R68214	Born in Blankenberge on 05/04/66, married, 1 child
Cpl Bruno MEAUX	R66169	Born in Tournai on 23/11/65, bachelor
Cpl Louis PLESCIA	R55876	Born in Seraing on 24/07/61, married, 2 children (1 st marriage)
Cpl Christophe RENWA	R68470	Born in Liege on 17/08/67, married
Cpl Marc UYTTEBROECK	R65006	Born in Gosselies on 02/05/68, bachelor

- (z) At night, in a corner at the Hotel Meridien lobby, S1 prepares all the papers required for the repatriation of the bodies to Belgium. According to the Assistant Military Auditor, a certificate to be delivered by the Belgian Embassy is missing. C6, who is not far from the AMBABEL compound, shall contact the embassy the next morning to resolve the problem.

13. Kanombe Patrol

- a. At 01.40 a.m., K3 asks for a *Sec* to be ready to go to Kanombe to identify the site of the plane crash. All contacts are taken to ensure there are no problems. The mission is assigned to A6.
- b. Towards 03.45 a.m., S6 warns A6 that according to the *QG Secteur*, an RAF officer will come to the terminal to take charge of the *Sec* which shall go to Kanombe. The officer never comes.
- c. At 4 a.m., K9 specifies the objective of the mission: ensure that the crash site is not tampered with. He asks if the *EOD*'s are capable of determining how the plane is shot down. S6 answers in the negative. K9 says that the RAF Chief of Staff was contacted and that he had informed the men at Kanombe. The *Sec* shall go to Kanombe to guard the plane up to the time a commission of enquiry arrives.
- d. At 04.15 a.m., A7, who is at the terminal where he attempts to solve the problem of the RELAX group blocked at the airport entrance, is briefed. He leaves the terminal from the southern end and takes the road to Kanombe with A23. They pass by the road in front of the main airport entrance, bypass some obstacles, but there are no more roadblocks *per se*. Upon arrival at the Kanombe guardroom, they are driven back by force. Obviously, the men at Kanombe are not informed.
- e. The *Sec* makes a U-turn. K9 is informed but he asks the *Sec* to stay nearby whilst he makes the necessary contacts with the RAF. Under orders of S6, the *Sec* stations first of all mid-way between the airport and the entrance to the camp. Since K9 cannot break the deadlock, S6 then orders A7 to rejoin TOPGUN. A7 passes in front of the main airport entrance once again, but

is blocked at N8. At 05.40 a.m., he stations between N8 and N9 whilst the RAF mounts a roadblock on the road to Kibungo.

14. The RELAX group at the airport entrance.

- a. At 12.13 a.m., the group assembled along the airport perimeter fence is still blocked by the RAF presence. It has 8 GP's, 2 FNC's and all its vehicles except the MAN vehicle and Lt. DEMEYER's jeep which remain at the roadblock where they had been arrested. Two GP's are taken by the RAF.
- b. At 02.08 a.m., S1 once again asks A6 to contact an officer of the *gendarmerie* based at the terminal in order to resolve the RELAX problem. At 02.46 a.m., the contact with the *gendarmes* is still fruitless and A6 wonders if it would not be possible to ask the elements of the *Gendarmerie* to intervene.
- c. At 04.13 a.m., S3 tells A6 that the RAF will dispatch a Liaison Officer to resolve the problem of the group at the airport perimeter fence. The Liaison Officer never comes.
- d. At 05.45 a.m., RELAX transmits a message that it will try to resume negotiations come daylight.
- e. At 06.44 a.m., some Rwandans turn over a vehicle found at the terminal parking lot. RELAX says that the Rwandans are very agitated.
- f. At 07.18 a.m., A6 states that RELAX is heading for the city under RAF escort. According to the *QG Secteur*, the RAF shall escort our men towards the *PC Bn* following the intervention of the Belgian Ambassador. Later on, we learn that RAF asks the group to leave without their vehicles. RELAX refuses to abandon the vehicles and is finally able to go towards the city with them. The convoy draws level with A7 stuck between N8 and N9. At N8, the group is turned back and makes a U-turn and joins A7 at 07.24 a.m.

15. The NGANGO Guard and VIKING

- a. Since 6 April, at 6 p.m., three men from *Gp SUD* guard Mr. NGANGO's residence, very close to VIKING. Mr. NGANGO is not at home but his wife and family are. During the night, the family is informed that he was attacked. The team of guards contacts *Gp SUD* on the radio.
- b. At 06.32 a.m., K9 asks KIBAT to set up a full *PI* in the street where VIKING is situated. In effect, this is the neighbourhood of ministers and dignitaries and is being systematically cleansed by the Presidential Guard and the *Gendarmerie*. He insists that this be done as soon as possible. S6 gets in touch with FRANCISCUS and VIKING to explore the possibility of creating an element under the command of an officer to intervene in the neighbourhood, but there are only two *Sec's* without officers (A21 and A22) at FRANCISCUS and a few men at VIKING. To intervene, at least

- they have to regroup together to form a group strong enough, but they are blocked on both sides by the RAF and the *gendarmes*. S6 then suggests to K9 to ask RUTBAT, which was assembled with the whole *Bn* at the Amahoro stadium and which has APCs (Armoured Personal Carriers), to intervene.
- c. At 06.36 a.m., the guards at NGANGO's residence inform B6 that about twenty Rwandan soldiers have surrounded the house and they are under surveillance. The Rwandans contact the Belgians and ask them to leave the house; there are agitated and menacing.
 - d. At 06.49 a.m., B6 instructs S6 to evacuate his three men towards VIKING, which is done, but with the family also. OSCAR informs Y BASE.
 - e. 1st Sergeant HUTSEBAUT leaves VIKING, which is just approximately 30 metres from NGANGO's house, with the three men (Cpls. KINKIN, LEFEBVRE and MATHIJS) after posting Cpl. WALBRECQ at the border of the VIKING garden armed with a MAG to cover them; Cpls. ANTOINE, GUSTIN and LALOUX remain in the house. The group is stopped at an RAF roadblock between VIKING and NGANGO's house, and 1st Sergeant HUTSEBAUT discusses with the head of the group manning the roadblock (whose rank is not known) to pick up the NGANGO family and the three guards. The head of the group accepts that the three guards be picked up but not the family. After long and fruitless discussions, 1st Sergeant HUTSEBAUT leaves his *FNC* with Cpl. MATHIJS and crosses the roadblock (he has kept a hidden *GP*) and goes back to the NGANGO residence.
 - f. After explaining the situation, the guard contacts B6 who finally authorizes the men to leave without the family. The family locks itself up in the house and the group leaves with *Ug*, who is threatened by Gren with a gun at the roadblock, and is also searched by RAF soldiers. At 07.05 a.m., they go back to VIKING. Later on in the day, the RAF attacks the residence and stations there.
 - g. The systematic cleansing lasts throughout the day of 7 April. When the RAF approaches the residences of the expatriates, the worse is feared, but at 11.38 a.m., the *QG Secteur* instructs its soldiers to attack only Rwandan businessmen and politicians in the VIKING neighbourhood.
 - h. One of the main concerns of the *Bn* is to pick up the few men at VIKING to ensure their safety. The obvious solution is to take them to FRANCISCUS, but that proves impossible since they cannot go out because of the roadblocks.
 - i. At 4.14p.m., the *QG Secteur* instructs the RFA to avail four *AML*'s to the UN. S6 instructs that the first UN assignment is to go and pick up the staff at VIKING. In the end, the *AML*'s are never delivered.

- j. At 4.30 p.m., K3 suggests to KIBAT to cash in on the confusion created by the RPF exit to try and pick up the people at VIKING.
At 4.36 p.m., S3 tells Y BASE to prepare to go to FRANCISCUS on foot and to carry as much equipment as it can and leave the vehicles behind. It should take the most direct route, which is through the school football field. They should wait for a calm spell to transfer the equipment. Y BASE contacts the three Rwandan soldiers who are at the VIKING perimetre fence and who tell them that they cannot leave VIKING.
- k. RPF's sortie only makes Viking's situation worse. The front line is now closer and more and more shooting can be heard not far from the billet and near Franciscus as well, but to a lesser extent
16. NGULINZIRA's guards
- a. The Gp Sud also has another three-man guard at Mr. Ngulinzira's house near the N12 junction. The guards can communicate with the Gp Sud by radio.
- b. At around 7 a.m., Mr. Joseph Habymana (Tutsi) contacts B6 by radio. He requests that the Gp Sud come to fetch him and take him to Beverly Hills. B6 refuses, since he has not received any such instructions. However, a while later, after a call from the QG Secteur, OSCAR asks him to undertake the mission if possible.
- c. At 7 or 8 p.m., B6 requests permission to use the Sec which is going to fetch Mr Habymana so that he get Ngulinzira's guard and family. He is granted permission. B16 is asked to carry out the mission, together with B11 and B12. Things go smoothly at Mr. Ngulinzira's house where everybody is ready. They all get into a Ug which is hidden under ponchos. The Habymana family are not ready and are still packing. The UN vehicles parked in front of the house draw the attention of about twenty *gendarmes* stationed about three hundred metres away. The *gendarmes* refuse to allow the family to leave with the UN soldiers, saying that Mr. Habymana had shot at the *gendarmes* in the morning.
- d. At around 8 a.m., arrives on the spot after being alerted by B16. He makes arrangements for the Ug in which the Ngulinzira family is still hiding to head towards Beverly Hills and chats up the *gendarmes*, who are apparently annoyed. After failing to get any results, they go towards the *gendarmerie* to try and reach an agreement with the *offr de la Brigade*. The *gendarmes* refuse to let the Habymana family go to Beverly Hills but B6 negotiates for them to return home and personally accompanies them.
- e. During the discussion with Slt Gd Nsengiyumua, Comd 2d from the Kicukoro brigade, Soffr from the said Bde which, some days earlier, made a forceful intervention in the Gp Sud area, show hostility towards the Belgian UNAMIR soldiers and stop only after their *Offr* intervenes.
At 8.53 p.m., B6 returns to his camp.

17. Situation at the airfield

- a. At 03.55 a.m., the Presidential guard Det under the command of Lt Nsabamana, which was charged with the responsibility of welcoming the President on his arrival, has been occupying the air terminal (it has been occupying the control tower since afternoon) while the *gendarmerie* and other FAR are outside. A6 will place ONE sec on the air terminal roof and UN CVRT SCIMITAR looking southward.
- b. At 5.45 a.m., A6 reports that the presidential guard is placing fire brigade buses and lorries across the runway.
- c. At 6.10 a.m., the presidential guard surrounds the air terminal. A6 must withdraw his Sec from the air terminal; the Sec returns to TPO GUN at 7.15 a.m. Half an hour later, the FAR distribute ammunition for the A.A. guns which are at the end of the runway. The guns are then cocked. The ammunition had been stocked not far from VIPERE under the control of the UN observers, and the locks of the container in which they had been kept had been forced.
- d. At 10.08 a.m., A6 reports that FAR in two pick-ups are cleaning out the area to the south of the airfield. The situation at the airfield has not changed.
- e. At 12.45 p.m., A6 reports that the FAR are only waiting to be provoked so that they can shoot. At 1.30 p.m., A6 reports that the C-130 which is always parked at the airfield parking is still intact.
- f. In the afternoon, FAR, *gendarmes* and the presidential guard put various obstacles across the runway.

18. The general situation and massacres

- a. At 6.03 a.m., following information from C6, S6 informs all the stations of a rumour that the Belgians shot down the presidential plane. All the staff on mission outside must remain in their camps.
- b. Around 9 a.m., the staff on duty at PEGASUS see three APC from RUTPAT go from N4 towards town (N15). They are stopped at the roadblock at the junction, towards the Primature (West of N4). S14 reports to OSCAR that the APC have been directed to go through the roadblocks. They remain there for about 30 min. then turn back.
- c. At 8.14 a.m., the QG Secteur reports rumours that a part of the presidential guard is reported to have rebelled. A meeting is scheduled at 9 a.m. at the United States Embassy with Mr. Booh-Booh and some ambassadors (the meeting does not take place, since it was impossible to move about).
- d. At 9.45 a.m., QG Secteur reports that the UN does not wish to change the rules of engagement.

- e. From 10 a.m., Belgian families and journalists try to get news by telephones, which in some camps, are connected to the international line. S6 issues instructions that families should be reassured and that the press should be sent back to the QG Secteur.
 - f. At 11.16 a.m., C7 enquires about the possibility of obtaining more powerful ammunition, such as LAW or ammunition for his mortars. S3 replies that heavy ammunition is available at Rwandex but that given the situation, it is impossible to have them transported to the camps.
 - g. At the same hour, C6 reports that according to some expatriates, Agatha has taken refuge at the American Embassy, that Mrs. Lando and Joseph Kavaruganda have been killed and that some Asian expatriates from the commercial area have been killed and their shops looted.
 - h. At 11.43 a.m., B6 reports that ethnic cleansing operations have started at the Gatenga market near Beverly Hills. Rwandan gendarmes, soldiers and civilians are looting and committing acts of violence, using guns, grenades and machetes. Some fires have been lit in various places in town. This kind of information is received throughout the day and on the following days.
 - i. At 12.52 p.m., QG Secteur asks if KIBAT can provide it with LAW, grenades, FNC and corresponding ammunition. R6's reply is negative, since it is impossible to go to Rwandex to obtain ammunition. K9 insists and a bit later, the request is forwarded to Rwandex by S6. The QG Secteur makes arrangements for an APC from RUTBAT to stop at Rwandex on its way from town. At 2.22 p.m., D Base reports that the ammunition has been loaded on to a RUPBAT APC. They will arrive at the Amahoro stadium but will not be taken further to the QG Secteur. A7 will fetch them afterwards once he goes to the stadium.
 - j. In the afternoon, the telephone is still working and the QG Secteur, Bn and the camps receive more and more calls. Many of the calls are from Rwandans reporting killings and looting.
19. The refugee problem.
- a. Appeals for help from Rwandans and expatriates start arriving. To start with, QG Secteur issues instructions not to go and get them, but Bn adds that they can however welcome those who report to the camps. This is what happens particularly in Vitamine, DolceVilla, Pegasus, Beverly Hills, etc.
 - b. At 10 a.m., S7 goes to Caillou to get the four men who are there. In order to maintain a UN presence in this area where there are many expatriates, S6 at the request of S7 decides to strengthen this camp by adding two men and a radio jeep.

- c. Before midday, B6 reports that a major ethnic cleansing operation seems to have started in the vicinity of Beverly Hills and at the Gatenga market. Continuous explosions are heard throughout the day.
- d. Just after 7 p.m., KIBAT enquires about the situation of the refugees in the various camps. At that time, there are already about 30 people at Franciscus, 500 at Beverly Hills, 30 at Vitamine and 18 at Dolcevilla. The 20 people who had taken refuge at Pegasus went back to Hotel Meridian with the PC Bn.
- e. At 10 p.m., LtCol Avi Rombaoud of the C-130 crew who are still at the Hotel des 1000 Collines, reports that the Hotel has been attacked. 25 minutes later, he reports that, out of the sixty people at the hotel, only four or five people have been wounded.
- f. At 11.40 p.m., the QG Secteur reports to OSCAR that all refugees of Rwandan nationality must leave the camps by 6 a.m. the following day. The order is retransmitted to the camps. A6 reports that the Franciscus fathers oppose UN's decision and wish to keep the refugees. S6 replies that as owners of the camps, the fathers are masters in their own home.

20. Events at Amahoro Stadium.

- a. At 12.15 p.m., A7/RELAX Sq. was still somewhere between N9 and N8. A7 was in regular contact with the N8 soldiers; they still categorically refused to let him pass through, saying they would open fire on him if he tried to force his way through. He went to the roadblock at N9 and spoke with a senior officer who seemed to be in command of that roadblock. He told him that if the situation was not sorted out, he would force his way through the roadblocks. More or less under pressure, the senior officer agreed to take them to Amahoro Stadium, bypassing N8, through bush paths from the north.
- b. At 1.57 p.m., Y7, a member of the sq., reported he was on his way to Amahoro Stadium. The convoy was made up of A7, Y7, M6 Jeeps and Gp AIRFIELD Ambulance Jeep, A23 Ug., RELAX pick-up truck, LDSG minibus, CTM vehicle and a UN civilian vehicle. For its part, KIBAT informed the Sector HQ so that RUTBAT would receive the convoy. At 2.05 p.m., KIBAT asked the Sector HQ to open Amahoro Stadium gates as the A7 convoy arrived at the Bangladeshi post.
- c. As the A7 convoy approached the stadium from the north-east, it attracted an increasingly hostile large crowd. It tried to push ahead towards Hotel Amahoro (Force HQ), but was stopped at a roadblock. It then came back to the stadium, surrounded by an increasingly hostile crowd who punctured the civilian vehicle tyres. The two passengers in the vehicle went into the RELAX vehicle.

- d. A6 requested on several occasions that the stadium gates be opened. S6 put the same request across to K9, who had a direct contact with RUTBAT.
The Sector HQ tried in vain to obtain the help of a Rwandan officer.
- e. At 2.12 p.m., S14 reported that a RUTBAT officer was going to contact A7; he also gave the Bn frequency to RUTBAT so that it could have a direct radio communication with A7.
On several occasions, A7, Y7 and A6 demanded that the gates be opened. Meanwhile, RUBAT claimed the gates were open. S6 and K9 urged the Gp to keep their calm.
S6 also urged Sector HQ to persuade RUTBAT to let him use his APCs. A RUTBAT APC with its crew was on the road outside the stadium. The crew took refuge in their vehicle, with the hatch closed, and did not at any time intervene on behalf of the Belgians.
- f. At 2.18 p.m., as A7 became increasingly squeezed by the crowd, he could no longer guarantee anything.
At 2.22 p.m., K9 took the handset himself and announced that if they were in danger, they must apply the rules of engagement.
At 2.40 p.m., A7 reported that he was unable to negotiate with the crowd and that he would have to shoot.
- g. At 2.48 p.m., a RUTBAT officer, came to the entrance to the stadium and waited. A7 tried to come to the entrance but was unable to do so because of the crowd. RUTBAT did not step in.
At 2.54 p.m., the RUTBAT officer seems to be conversing with the crowd without much success.
- h. At 3 p.m., a vehicle full of Rwandan soldiers arrived, scattering the crowd and giving the Blue Helmets a ray of hope. But the soldiers' unequivocal attitude rather encouraged the crowd to come back to threaten A7 Sq. The crowd moved closer and hit the vehicles. Many among the crowd displayed grenades.
- i. At 3.08 p.m., A7, who was still being asked to keep his calm, reported that the crowd and the soldiers were pushing them back from the stadium and he was still trying in vain to negotiate.
At 3.11 p.m., several boxes were stolen from the back of the ambulance Jeep.
- j. On several occasions, the Bn and Sector HQ asked RUTBAT to open the gates of the stadium. They were told the gates were opened or were being opened, but A7 was still reporting otherwise. On the KIBAT frequency, RUTBAT asked the Belgians not to shoot.
- k. At 3.18 p.m., S1 asked them not to shoot and told them it was time to enter the stadium, but the gates were still closed. Then, RUTBAT got on the network and shouted to A7 not to shoot and KIBAT lost radio contact with A7.

- l. At 3.22 p.m., RUTBAT Commander announced that some of the Belgians have entered the stadium.
 At 3.25 p.m., RELAX reported that it was at the Force HQ at Hotel Amahoro with two civilians.
 At 3.45 p.m., 1 hour 40 minutes after his Gp arrived at the stadium, A7 radioed KIBAT and reported that all the staff were inside the stadium and that there were no injuries. The vehicles were abandoned outside the stadium. S6 commended A7 for keeping his calm.
- m. As a matter of fact, around 3.20 p.m., Rwandan soldiers double crossed Belgian vehicles. Fearing they were going to be trapped, RELAX shot their way through a roadblock mounted on the road to Hotel Amahoro. This dispersed the crowd who but threw a few grenades. A7 people came out of their vehicles and opened fire, standing in the pit along the road. On A7's orders, they withdrew, shooting their way into the stadium. The Bangladeshis were screaming on the radio not to shoot but did nothing to help the Belgians. The Belgians jumped inside over the perimeter wall. For its part, RELAX went back to Force HQ.
21. The outings of the RPF
- a. At 4.11 p.m., an RPF company came out of the CND and went south-east towards RWANDEX. They also positioned themselves along Umuganda Boulevard between N4 and Hotel Meridien.
- b. At 4.23 p.m., D BASE reported that RPF was at the eastern side of the woods located 400 metres south-south-east of the Prime Minister's Office, and there was intensive artillery fire in those woods. Worried that the fighting was close by, he asked for ample information and specific instructions as to what to do about the warring parties. S6 told them to lie low and not to open fire unless they were directly attacked.
- c. At 4.40 p.m., FAR soldiers reacted by attacking the CND from the north. RPF returned fire. By night fall, fighting has greatly subsided.
22. PC Bn. moved to the Meridien.
- a. After the outing of RPF, PEGASUS was caught in the crossfire. Between 4.30 and 5 p.m., four 37 mm missiles from a FAR AA canon fired along the valley-N4 axis hit the house. Two missiles flew right over the operator on duty and pierced the brick walls. S6 rushed to the S1's room, and in the mist of a pungent smoke, informed Adj. DOUDELET, who was shocked by the blast. The room where AS3 was staying was also hit. Fortunately, there were no casualties, just a slight damage to property, like a gaping hole in AS3's shirt hanging above his bed. Other smaller-caliber missiles fired from the other direction hit the cantonment from time to time.

- b. At 5.01 p.m., KIBAT received instructions to escort the Force Senior Officers staying at Meridien to Amahoro Stadium. S3 told the Sector HQ that there were enough UN soldiers at Meridien to carry out that assignment.
 - c. Fearing exposure to direct fire from high-caliber weapons, S6 decided to move its PC to Hotel Meridien, which was right opposite PEGASUS, but had concrete walls and was located a bit outside the firing line. Thus, S6 could respond to the request made the Sector HQ in the course of the day to protect Hotel Meridien.
 - d. A group with the refugees went first, then followed by the rest in small groups. At that moment, S7, chocked by a machine gun shot as he crossed the road, ran into the edge and hurt his foot.
Two weeks later, upon return to Belgium, as his pain did not stop, he did an X-ray and found out he had a broken foot.
All the staff only took minimum luggage.
In order to provide radio communication, the command Jeeps were also put into use.
The cantonment, with the material still inside it, was guarded on the first night by 1SM SCHIEPERS and four men stationed on the ground floor hallway, further away from the missiles. The remaining equipment at PEGASUS was recovered or destroyed in the next few days.
23. The situation of the units at 12 midnight on 7 April.
- a. PC Battalion.
 - 1. Deployed between the Meridien and Dolce Villa
 - 2. S14 and his driver were at the Sector HQ
 - 3. RELAX was at the Force HQ (Hotel Amahoro)
 - 4. Capt. Madalijns and Sgt. Nellis were at Amahoro Stadium
 - 5. The Father was at Beverly Hills
 - b. Logistic Base
 - 1. D6 was at Top Gun
 - 2. Two men were at CTM
 - 3. The rest of the staff were at RWANDEX
 - c. Gp AIRFIELD
 - 1. Half of PC together with A6, P1A (minus A12) and A26 were at Top Gun
 - 2. A21, A22 and the other part of PC were at Franciscus with the EODs.
 - 3. A21 at Rutongo
 - 4. A7, A23 and four PC men were at Amahoro Stadium
 - d. Gp SOUTH
 - 1. Almost everybody was at Beverly Hills
 - 2. Three men at Viking (Ngango guard)
 - 3. Six men at the Meridien and Dolce Villa

4. ETO DON BOSCO was converted into a support base (disengagement from firing range, firing positions and riflemen's trenches)
- e. Gp CITY
1. PC (minus C6 plus Chief P1 A) at Chinatown
 2. P1 A (minus Chief P1 and C13) at Ramadan
 3. P1 B at Mirador
 4. VITAMINE: C6, C13 and Med. Pers.
- f. P1 Mor
1. Y6, Y1, Y2 and Y5 have been murdered.
 2. Y7 was at Amahoro Stadium
 3. At Viking: 1Sgt Hutsebaut, Cpx Lefebvre, Kinkin, Laloux and Y4
 4. At Top Gun: Y3 and Y8
- g. The Medical Detachment
1. The Surgeon and Anesthetist were at Kanombe
 2. M6 was at Amahoro Stadium
 3. VITAMINE: Three persons
 4. CAILLOU: Four persons
 5. P Sec Bn at Beverly Hills
- h. Miscellaneous
1. Det Heli was at Agusta where the entire team spent the night; they were evacuated to Beverly Hills the following morning, on 8 April
 2. The EODs were at Franciscus
 3. Lt. Demeyere and CLC Janssens (Kigalodge) together with 1Sgt Vermeiren and CLC Vandam (LDSG) were at Amahoro Stadium
 4. The C-130 crew was at Hotel des Mille Collines except Capt. Jacobs (the Flight Captain) and 1SM Cuyvers who were at the Meridien with OSCAR.

KIBAT - 8 APRIL

Evolution 8 April

24. **General Evolution**

a. The Bn's three priority missions will be to go and collect the ten mortal remains from CHK (Kigali Central Hospital), to get the few Viking men out, and to collect the Rutongo platoon.

b. **Political evolution**

At 10.49 a.m. a meeting is announced between the ambassadors of Belgium, France, Germany, and the United States. We were not informed of the outcome of the meeting - if indeed it took place.

c. **Bn CP**

(1) The transfer of the Bn's CP to the *Méridien* continues throughout the day. Each person in turn is given the opportunity to return to Pegasus to gather their equipment into their canteen and their backpack, which are loaded into a vehicle for evacuation at a later time. Personnel are only allowed to keep their duffel bag.

(2) At 4.47 p.m., *Caillou*, which only has six men, indicates that as a result of the RPF moving forward there has been an increase in the number of shots being fired around their camp.

(3) The Bn CP puts sentries on the last floor of the hotel to monitor the surrounding areas. Bullets reach the hotel from time to time.

d. **Situation Gp Airfield**

(1) At 3.11 p.m., A6 indicates that the Rwandans at the airport are putting additional obstacles on the runway.

(2) At 4.55 p.m., A6 indicates that the two UN Huey helicopters are still in good condition.

(3) At 8 p.m., at Sector HQ's request, A6 describes FAR situation at the airport. He estimates that there are approximately 20 gendarmes and 50 soldiers (20 at the anti-aircraft guns and 30 around the airport). He cannot determine which unit they belong to. The persons in charge, a gendarmerie warrant officer and Major NTABAKUZE, Commander of the Para Bn came to make contact with him. They seem to want to respect the UN areas. They have added additional obstacles on the runway. There has been no damage to the installations.

(4) At 9.40 p.m., the Rwandans remove the obstacles on the runway with the exception of two trucks one across from Top Gun and the other at the entrance of the airplane parking.

e. **Situation Gp Sud**

The Heli Det will be evacuated from Augusta around 10 a.m. and, as soon as it reaches Beverly Hills, forms a Fus platoon under the command of Major Avi Vandergeeten to ensure the protection of the main building. This platoon will show a remarkable spirit of adaptation in the execution of this mission and will thus allow one platoon to be on zero notice, ready to reinforce the outside evacuation teams without weakening the defence system.

f. **Situation Gp City**

At 11 .32 a.m., a grenades is launched into Ramadan camp, where it explodes without any casualties.

g. **Situation at Amahoro**

At 6.45 a.m., A7, who is with RUTBAT in Amahoro stadium, asks if he can collect his vehicles which remained in front of the stadium and seem to be intact. Sector HQ answers in the affirmative as long as it will not worsen the situation.

During the morning, Relax leaves Force HQ at Hotel Amahoro with a group of Bangladeshi officers and joins A7 at Amahoro stadium.

h. **Log situation**

(1) At 8.10 a.m., Sector HQ asks for an estimation of food, ammunition and fuel supplies. At that point, there is on average three days of supplies for each Gp in the camps.

(2) D Base indicates there is 25,000 litres of water and 30,000 rations at RWANDEX.

(3) After consultation between S6 and those in charge of Log at Force HQ, it is decided that the Bangladeshi Log Cie will come and collect the rations. At 4.35 p.m., one truck will come to collect the rations at RWANDEX. D Base indicates they issued 500 and will provide an additional 600 with Bn's agreement.

(4) At 3.55 p.m., a bullet, allegedly targeting, a sentinel at D Base misses him. Once again the directives are to remain under shelter as much as possible.

25. **Return of the surgeon and the anesthesiologist**

a. At 9.57 a.m., Force HQ requests assistance for a seriously injured UN observer. Allegedly one of his limbs was torn off and he must be evacuated to the Beverly Hills ACP. Sector HQ contacts the surgeon and the anesthesiologist who are still in Kanombe.

b. Doctor Lt Col Pasuch telephones Major Grégoire De Saint Quentin, of the French CTM (*cooperation technique militaire*) to ask him to assist them.

Around 10.30 a.m., H6 and the anesthesiologist leave Lt Col Pasuch's house in the Major's car, accompanied by a French NCO. In order to ensure they will be able to go through the various roadblocks without any problems, they first swing by the house of the Commander of the Rwandan Para Bn, Major Ntabakuze. H6 and the anesthesiologist leave in the direction of Beverly Hills in a FAR pick-up with Major Ntabakuze and Major Saint Quentin.

- c. At 10.43 a.m., the Force announces that the injured person is being evacuated to Faycal Hospital.
 - d. At 12.24 p.m., H6 announces he has reached Beverly Hills.
26. The RPF advance.
- a. At 7.23 a.m., KIBAT indicates that RPF elements have reached Hotel *Méridien*.
 - b. Around 8 a.m., Sector HQ warns that RPF elements are allegedly wearing blue berets. This rumour will never be confirmed.
 - c. At 10.30 a.m., the RPF is occupying an area between the CND, the *Méridien*, Intersection N4, the wooded area south of the *Primature* and Intersection N5. The whole area, the CND in particular, is regularly shelled by Rwandan artillery.
 - d. At 3.55 p.m., KIBAT indicates that the RPF is moving from *Méridien* towards Sector HQ.
27. Preparations to collect the bodies.
- a. Around 1.30 a.m., S6 must contact General DALLAIRE who gives his condolences and asks for an update of the situation.
 - b. At 6.20 a.m., Sector HQ indicates he has obtained reinforcement from the gendarmerie to escort the convoy who will collect the bodies of the ten victims, but there is still no coordination efforts in place.
 - c. At 6.25 a.m., Lt Col Dewez broadcasts the following message by radio to all stations: "I must transmit the worst message I could ever have thought of communicating to you. Our ten comrades who made up Agathe's escort have been killed in the most cowardly way. It seems that several of our Ghanaian friends have had the same fate. Despite the natural feelings of despair and hatred, you must all, without any exception, show the world that even in times of pain, the 2 Cdo does not give in to hatred and continues its mission under the imposed conditions, that is with restraint in terms of the use of weapons, only this restraint can preserve the lives of our civilian fellow country-men; unarmed men, women and children. In closing, under no circumstances should you let yourselves be disarmed."

- d. At 8.30 a.m., Sector HQ proposes a plan for the evacuation of the bodies.
 - e. At 12 p.m., Sector HQ announces that a FAR escort will be at Sector HQ at 2 p.m. to go and collect the bodies. It also suggests the following itinerary. S6 suggests taking advantage of the escort to collect Viking personnel, giving as a pretext that he needs the members of P1 Mor to identify the bodies.
At 12.38 p.m., Sector HQ suggests another itinerary which would allow them to collect the personnel at Amahoro stadium, Viking and the bodies. Log Base will supply UN vehicles and personnel to load the remains.
 - f. At 2.06 p.m., the two AML vehicles scheduled for escort duty go by the *Méridien* and rejoin Sector HQ around 2.15 p.m. The Deputy Military Prosecutor and his team will also go to Sector HQ to join the convoy.
28. Preparation of Viking evacuation
- a. At 6.22 a.m., Oscar asks Y Base to do a short Recce of the remaining roadblocks between Viking and Franciscus. Viking indicates the situation remains the same as the day before.
 - b. At 8.45 a.m., fighting intensifies in Franciscus and Viking neighbourhood. Several shots will reach the two camps. Y Base feels caught in the crossfire. At one point, several shots will clearly target UN installations. When contacted, K9 orders people to protect themselves as best as possible in the camp and to only return fire if directly attacked. As the colour blue is not particularly conducive to camouflage, several Franciscus soldiers remove the blue covers on their helmet.
 - c. Around 11.50 a.m., Y Base states that no more shots are being fired, but there is a great deal of vehicle movement in the neighbourhood. There are still three FAR men at the gate guarding the camp.
At 12.16 p.m., S6 tells Y Base to be ready to be evacuated between 2 and 3 p.m. destination Franciscus. They will be informed of the implementation details. Y Base states it will be able to bring all the individual equipment as it has one jeep and one UNIMOG.
29. Collecting the bodies and VIKING personnel.
- a. At 2.37 p.m., S6, who has contacted the leader of the Rwandan escort to explain what is expected of him, indicates it will be impossible to go by Amahoro stadium, because this would mean going by RPF lines. A7 is advised accordingly.
 - b. At 2.42 p.m., Sector HQ indicates that the convoy is leaving Sector HQ. The convoy is composed of S6 and his driver, Cpl Vicari, of the judicial detachment in their Ford minibus, K9 in his UN jeep, driven by ADC Deweghe. The escort provided by the Recce Bn is composed of one AML with a machine-gun and one AML with a mortar. Capt. Sagahutu is the escort commander.

- S1 prepared all the forms required to return the bodies to Belgium. According to the Deputy Military Prosecutor, one certificate from the Belgian Embassy is missing. C6 who is near the residence of the Belgian ambassador will contact the latter to resolve the matter before tomorrow morning.
- c. The convoy goes through N1 and Kigali Night to reach Viking.
At 2.50 p.m., S6 reaches Viking and takes control of all personnel therein. He leaves Viking at 3.09 p.m. to go to Franciscus. As there are no more roadblocks between the two camps, the mortars come back in a UNIMOG to Viking to collect equipment; Viking personnel leave the camp beds, the generator, three MAG carriages and video equipment. From that point on, 1sgt Hutsebaut, the Viking cook will also accompany Y4 during the various evacuation missions. As soon as S6 and the escort leave Franciscus, the roadblocks will be re-established, the UNIMOG will barely make it back to Franciscus. A jeep with corporals Kinkin and Mathijs accompany S6 to identify the bodies.
 - d. From Franciscus, the convoy joins RWANDEX where it takes on one MAN and four men from Log Base: Corporals Verschaeren, Wathélet, Degraeve and Siewniak.
At 3.27 p.m., S6 indicates he is entering the centre of town. Thanks to the convoy they are able to go through the roadblocks without any problem. The convoy stops for approximately 15 minutes at the ESM where Capt Sagahutu collects his instructions, as he did not seem to be aware of his exact mission; then it rejoins the CHK (Kigali Central Hospital).
 - e. Around 3.35 p.m., C6, who has spoken with the Belgian ambassador, indicates that according to the latter, the documents requested are not required, as the bodies will not be transported by a civilian aircraft. Authorization by the captain of the aircraft is enough. However, the person at the embassy in charge of issuing such documents lives near Viking. If needed this person should be collected and brought to the embassy.
 - f. At CHK, the group must step over several piles of bodies lying in heaps before reaching the morgue full of bodies, in front of which are the ten bodies, each wrapped in a blanket. The face of each body is uncovered so that the two soldiers can identify the faces then they return to their vehicle. As the legal formalities (photographs, description of injuries, etc) for the first body took approximately 20 minutes, a rapid calculation shows that it will not be possible to finish before nightfall. Capt Sagahutu indicates he will not be able to stay that long and the Deputy Military Prosecutor decided to finish the formalities later at Faycal Hospital. An identification bracelet is placed on the arm of each body, and each body is placed in a body bag, taken to the truck with a stretcher stepping over each time the piles of bodies and then loaded by the four men from Log Base.
 - g. The bodies had been washed and were only wearing underwear. All the clothes were wrapped in a single blanket. Although the bodies show signs of fighting, some have rifle-but or bayonet injuries, some show signs of

having been struck by machetes or bullet wounds, there are NO traces of sadistic mutilations (eyes gouged out, nose or other organs cut off) as was incorrectly described in certain articles.

- h. A Rwandan lieutenant, in a pick-up with five or six soldiers, comes to reinforce the escort at that point. The idea being that the two AML will return rapidly to Kanombe leaving the convoy at the centre of town, and the Rwandan pick-up will accompany the convoy to Sector HQ.
At K9's request, the convoy goes to the residence of the Belgian ambassador. The latter confirms that, in his opinion, the documents requested are not necessary. S6 uses the opportunity to make physical contact with C6 at *Vitamine*. Around 6 p.m., the convoy rejoins the Kigali Night intersection and the soldiers go to Franciscus in their jeep.
- i. The convoy, escorted by the pick-up with the Lt returns to Sector HQ and Faycal Hospital, whilst S6 and the two AML, still under the orders of Capt Sagahutu, goes a few kilometres north of Kigali to meet with A12, who is returning after facing many difficulties in Rutongo.
- j. At 6.20 p.m., the Deputy indicates that he is in front of Mr. Booh-Booh's residence (just to the north of Dolce Villa) with the MAN and the ten bodies and that he no longer has an escort. As there is shooting between the house and Faycal hospital he decides to bring the bodies to Dolce Villa, which he reaches at 6.30 p.m.
- k. At 9.50 p.m., KIBAT asks Sector HQs permission to send a delegation, composed of one NCO and three men from *Mortier* platoon, on the C-130 which will take the bodies back to Belgium. Sector HQ grants permission.

30. The Refugees

- a. At 12.54 a.m. C6 indicates that the Rwandan refugees at *Vitamine* have left.
- b. At 5.17 a.m., in the absence of any clear directives with respect to UNAMIR's position towards Rwandan refugees, B6 asks if he should protect all the refugees or only the fathers at Beverly Hills. S3 answers he must protect everyone.
At 08.40 a.m., B6 indicates that there are 400 adult and 600 children refugees. The sanitary situation is disastrous and the doctor has to stop treating those who are ill in order to keep sufficient reserves to care for KIBAT personnel if there were to be any problem. Other refugees continue to arrive.
- c. At 9.40 a.m., B6 leaves Beverly Hills with two jeeps to go and collect the Kicukiro priest and his assistant. The priest, in view of his position towards the government, adopted since 1990, and the Tutsi refugee camp under his care, is a potential target for the *Interahamwe* (Hutu extremist militia) who have been working virtually without any interruption in the neighbourhood. During the same sortie, contact will be made with the

convent of Italian nuns located close by. They refuse to be evacuated, but a few days later, they will be collected anyway.

- d. Identified during the evacuation of Agusta, a mixed family of five persons will be evacuated during an additional sortie of two jeeps.
- e. At 2.39 p.m., B6 indicates that there are 1,200 refugees at Beverly Hills. More and more refugees of all nationalities are asking for asylum in the camps.
- f. At 3 p.m., Bn CP asks where it should evacuate three injured Rwandans who after receiving first aid are waiting in front of the doors of the *Méridien*. At 6.15, he receives an answer that there is no solution for them. At 4.25 p.m., two Rwandans, asking for asylum at the *Méridien* hotel, are sent away. Authorization to access the *Méridien* hotel is the responsibility of the hotel management who applies its own criteria: social standing, connections, etc.
- g. At 6.17 p.m., Sector HQ indicates that a Belgian family is being attacked three houses away from the pizzeria "*Le club*" (300 m to the east of Kigali Night). Many messages of this type reach the Bn, Sector HQ and the camps. At the time, roadblocks manned by Rwandan soldiers and gendarmes throughout the city prevent any sortie from most of the camps, with the exception of the *Méridien* area, which is controlled by the RPF.

31. Rutongo Platoon

- a. At 10.50 a.m., A6 indicates that A12, on guard duty at Rutongo, is endangered by enraged civilians, who have come to demand the rest of the food they were meant to protect. S1 suggests the food be distributed, in order to resolve the matter, which A12 executes.
- b. The population does not calm down because they believe the sisters are trying to keep food for themselves. A6 indicates that the situation has become too dangerous and that A12 must move away from the parish. The later indicates that the nuns in Rutongo do not want to leave with them and they, the nuns, want the soldiers to leave, as the Rwandans believe the Belgians were the ones who killed the president. A6 tells him to hide a bit further in the countryside whilst waiting instructions allowing him to return to Kigali.
- c. At 11.31, A6 indicates his platoon has left Rutongo. The nuns advised Sgt Teyssier not to go in the direction of Byumba, because of the RPF, nor in that of Ruhengeri, as it is dangerous. They also told him not to remain in the vicinity, as the population is hostile. Therefore, A12 goes in the direction of Rutongo using secondary roads. They have 230 rounds for their MAG, 200 rounds for their MINIMI and 100 rounds for their FNC.

- d. S6 asks Sector HQ to contact the gendarmerie so that a Liaison Officer and an escort can be dispatched to Rutongo platoon. Sector HQ requests a *rendezvous* point for the Rwandan authorities. A6 suggests the Byumba road crossroad, also known as Kadhafi crossroad.
- e. A12 leaves slightly after 12 p.m. and is able to clear the first roadblock without any problems. At the Y crossroad in Rutungo, the platoon comes across a ditch dug into the road manned by policemen, gendarmes, and civilians, carrying bows, machetes and rifles. A12 bargains with the gendarmes. The policemen are the most hostile and ask the UN soldiers to surrender their weapons. Sgt Teyssier refuses categorically. A person, who introduces himself as the local governor (*sous-préfet*), speaks with A12. The civilian population is urging the police and the gendarmerie to disarm the Belgians. Shots are fired into the air. The platoon does not respond, but threatens to retaliate immediately if anyone shoots at them. He also encourages the governor to calm the population. The Rwandans give in and two men from the platoon put logs across the ditch in order to allow the UNIMOG through. As the vehicle goes through the roadblock, civilians throw stones and shoot arrows into the air. At the next crossroads, there is another roadblock manned by civilians, armed with bows and machetes. A12 decides to force through the roadblock. Just as they go through the roadblock, one of the soldiers in the platoon shouts: "Grenade!" A12 makes the UNIMOG accelerate, but it's a false alert: a child had thrown a rock. A little bit further away A12 alights and sets up in all-round defence.
- f. S6 is still at CHK collecting the bodies, as he has not yet received any news from the FAR liaison office requested from Sector HQ and A12's situation as communicated by A6 is worrisome, he decides to deal with the matter himself. He asks Capt. Sagahutu for the AMLs to go and collect the Rutongo platoon. The latter is willing to make the two AML's available, under the Lieutenant's command. S6 asks A6 to get A12 to go to the crossroads known as Kadhafi.
- g. When A6 informs A12 that they should meet up with S6, A12 gets back on the road. Slightly further away, they come across Rwandan gendarmes and asks them to accompany them to the junction with the Kigali road. The gendarmes accept. When they reach the junction they come across a roadblock manned with civilians armed with machetes.
- h. At the Kigali Night intersection, as the *Mortier* jeep rejoins Franciscus, S6, in view of the exemplary behaviour that the Captain had shown until that point and the lack of confidence he felt in the Lt, asks the Capt to accompany the escort himself to facilitate the passage through the roadblocks. The Capt accepts. When S6 reaches the Kadhafi intersection slightly after 6 p.m., he does not see A12, and decides to continue in direction of Rutungo. He goes through the roadblocks manned by civilians easily; they are very favourable to the FAR. Approximately ten kilometres to the north of Kigali, at the entrance of a small village, a civilian vehicle coming in the opposite direction brakes suddenly upon seeing the first

AML and tries to turn around. When faced with this suspicious behaviour, the Capt steps out of the AML armed with his FAL and goes towards the car. After a few moments, the Capt comes back to S6 and explains there is no problem and the escort continues on its way. Some one hundred meters further up, S6 sees the A12 UNIMOG on a road coming from the left. He stops and gets out of the jeep. Initially the population seems very excited, but after some discussion between the Capt, S6, and the population, everything seems to be resolved by a round of hand shaking and the *sous-préfet* thanks the gendarmes who accompanied A12.

- i. A12 and S6 return to Kigali without any problems still escorted by the two AMLs.

At 7.16 p.m., S6 and A12 reach the *Méridien*. A12 will remain there to participate in guard duty and in operations to collect expatriates.

32. Unit situation at on 8 April 12 a.m.

- a. CP battalion
- (1) Between *Méridien* and Dolce Villa;
 - (2) S14 and his driver are at Sector HQ;
 - (3) Capt Madalijns, Sgt Nellis and Relax are at Amahoro stadium;
 - (4) The Chaplain is at Beverly Hills.
- b. Logistical Base
- (1) D6 is at Top Gun;
 - (2) Two men are at CTM;
 - (3) The rest of the personnel are at RWANDEX.
- c. Gp Airfield
- (1) Half of the CP with A6, P1 A (minus A12) and A26 are at Top Gun;
 - (2) A1, A22 and the other part of the CP are at Franciscus with the EOD, Y Base AND Y4;
 - (3) A12 is at the *Méridien*;
 - (4) A7, A23 and four men from the CP are at Amahoro stadium.
- d. Gp *Sud*
- (1) Almost every one is at Beverly Hills;
 - (2) Three men are at Franciscus (Ngango guard);
 - (3) Six men from B22 at *Méridien* and Dolce Villa.
- e. GP City
- (1) CP (minus C6 plus Chief P1 A) in Chinatown;
 - (2) P1 A (minus chief P1 and C13) in Ramadan;
 - (3) P1 B in *Mirador*;
 - (4) *Vitamine*: C6, C13 and Med Pers.
- f. P1 Mor
- (1) The bodies of Y6, Y1, Y2 and Y5 were brought back to Dolce Villa;
 - (2) Y7 is at Amahoro stadium;

- (3) 1sgt Hutsebaut, Corporals Lefebvre, Kinkin, Laloux and Y4 are at Franciscus;
- (4) Y3 and Y8 are at Top Gun.

g. Medical Detachment

- (1) H6 and the anaesthesiologist are at Beverly Hills with Bn Sec P;
- (2) M6 is at Amahoro stadium;
- (3) *Vitamine*: 3 persons;
- (4) *Caillou*: 4 persons;

h. Miscellaneous

- (1) The Heli Det is at Beverly Hills;
- (2) The EOD are at Franciscus;
- (3) Lt Demeyere and CLC Janssens (Kigalodge) as well as 1sgt Vermeriren and CLC Vandam (LDSG) are at Amahoro stadium;
- (4) The C-130 crew are at Hotel *des 1000 collines* with the exception of Capt. JACOBS (flight commander) and 1SM Cuyvers who are at *Méridien* with Oscar.

KIBAT - 9 APRIL**DEVELOPMENTS ON 9 April**33. **General Developments**a. **Developments regarding fighting**

- (1) From midnight to 5.30 a.m., the town becomes relatively peaceful, as happens every night. Apart from some shooting and looting reported here and there, the Rwandans do not carry out any significant activities.
- (2) At 8.25 a.m., A7 reports that there are some RPF soldiers in front of the Amahoro stadium. By then, he has already recovered all the vehicles which are inside the stadium.
- (3) At 11.23 a.m., the Kanombe camp and the Belgian Military Technical Co-operation (MTC) (located close to an RPF position near the CND) is shot at by RPF mortars.
- (4) At 3.05 p.m., D Base reports that the main road from Rwandex to the airport is still under RAF control despite the RPF advance. Every effort should be made to avoid this road and to use the small roads south of the airport.

b. **Situation in town**

- (1) At 8.22 a.m., C16 reports that all telephone numbers starting with 8 (i.e., most of the Kigali numbers) are out of order. Most of the expatriates have Ln radios which they use to keep in touch.
- (2) At around 9 a.m., D BASE reports that there are rumours among the locals that the President was killed by the RPF and the Belgians.
- (3) At 9.45 a.m., B6 reports that "large-scale cleansing" has started at the Gatenga market.

c. **The areas surrounding the Meridian**

- (2) At 10.28 a.m., QG Secteur reports that the Tunisian company (which was based at the CND) will put a UN P1 at the Meridian to strengthen the Belgian defence system, and another UN P1 at the Faycal hospital.
- (3) In the afternoon, it is still possible for the OSCAR staff to do the packing and at 4.35 p.m., 1SM Doudelet commanding the PEGASUS guard reports that all the equipment to be evacuated has been loaded on to a MAN which goes to the Meridian immediately.

d. The future of UNAMIR

- (1) At 11.15 a.m., S6 is called to the QG Secteur for discussions with K9.
At 11.40 a.m., S6 transmits the following message to all the stations
"Following an attack by the RPF in Northern Rwanda, UNAMIR may evacuate the country. You must pack your bags in each camp. For each camp, give a list of the staff and equipment to be evacuated and the number of vehicles available. State whether you have sufficient means and if you don't, report your needs. You must take turns to do all these preparations so that the camps can be defended. This is an order only to start preparations for evacuation and not an evacuation order. In any case, the soldiers will not leave the country before the evacuation of all the UNAMIR civilians".
- (2) At 2.15 p.m., the QG Secteur reports to S6 that the UN Security Council will reach a decision concerning UNAMIR's evacuation at 4 p.m. According to the general evacuation plan, the UN soldiers in the DMZ will be evacuated to Uganda, while the KWSA staff will be evacuated by air.

e. Regrouping of the Bn

- (1) In order to step up the security of the various troops and to assign more staff to evacuation duties without weakening the protection of the camp, S6 is still trying to regroup the staff in order to form more substantial groups.
- (2) At 3.40 p.m., the C-130 crew requests to be evacuated from the Hotel des 1000 collines. OSCAR entrusts this mission to C6.
At 4.15 p.m., C6 reports that he has picked up the C-130 crew and received them at Mirador. He reports that there are still about fifty white expatriates and a Sabena crew.
- (3) At 3.42 p.m., the QG Secteur transmits a message from the Belgian MTC for the Bn. The two men from the Bn who are at the MTC participating in the defence of the Belgian MTC return to Bn when he latter is evacuated.
- (4) Ramadan's situation is relatively delicate, since it is isolated in the middle of a "trouble spot" and the house cannot be easily defended. As the CITY Gp has in the meantime received orders to defend the Belgian Embassy and the Belgian Ambassador's residence, it is decided to take back the P1 to RAMADAN. At 4.20 p.m., the P1A(-) leaves RAMADAN and is soon after stranded at the junction to the South West of ESM, but can continue some minutes later and returns to MIRADOR. As the P1 B leader (Res Offr) is finding the situation too stressful, C6 decides to take him with him to the Belgian Ambassador's residence. The P1 is defending MIRADOR and the

Embassy with C7, the C13 section will go back to its P1 at the Embassy the following day.

- (5) At 4.29 p.m., the Operations Commander enquires about the situation from the Bn. The following message is transmitted to him. "At the moment, KIBAT has no official contact with the FAR, but just a few personal contacts; no decision to evacuate expatriates as such. KIBAT has placed one P1 at the Belgian Ambassador's residence to protect him and is trying with its own means, to reassemble the troops dispersed in the following places: Meridian, Mirador, Belgian Ambassador's residence, Rwandex, Beverly Hills. We are taking expatriates with us as much as possible during these exercises".
- (6) At 5.55 p.m., C7 reports that he is going on patrol to fetch P1 Mor's jeeps which are in front of Agathe's residence. C7 takes back the two jeeps which are useable and destroys the other two after removing the radios and other equipment. After his return to Mirador, S6 receives a report.
- (7) At 7.05 a.m., the staff which had remained at Vitamine reports that they are going to the Belgian Ambassador's residence. The Chinatown staff have gone to Mirador.

f. Belgian intervention (Silverback)

- (1) Whereas the Belgian Tp arrived since dawn, QG Secteur reports to S6 at around 2.15 p.m. that he has no information concerning the Franco-Belgian intervention. It would be a good idea for the Belgian Ambassador to get in touch with his French counterpart to find out more about Paris' intentions. The request is transmitted to C6.
- (2) Later on in the afternoon, K9 reports to S6 that Belgium intends to provide 1 000 men in two contingents, at a one-day interval. The first contingent is on stand-by in Djibouti awaiting the order to intervene. The mission of the Belgian contingent will be to ensure general security and evacuate the expatriates in accordance with the UNAMIR plan. There will be co-ordination as soon as the first soldiers arrive. It is planned to evacuate the civilians before the soldiers.

g. Logistical situation

- (1) At 7.55 a.m., D BASE is instructed by OSCAR to prepare 2,500 rations, to be airlifted by the Bangladeshi Log Cie. The request is made by the Force's Log Offr through QG Secteur.
- (2) At 11.20 a.m., A6 reports that there are 23,000 litres of drinkable water.
- (3) At 3 p.m., QG Secteur reports that all units must be self-sufficient for four days.

(4) At 3.30 p.m., OSCAR reports that heavy weaponry which has to be abandoned on site must be destroyed on departure.

34. Arrival of the first French soldiers.
- a. At 3.43 p.m., the AIRFIELD Gp reports the landing of four C-160 (FR) (TRANSAL). The information is transmitted to QG Secteur. A6 was contacted by French military assistants who are in the control tower. QG Secteur asks A6 to transmit to let him know what the French plan to do.
 - b. At 3.54 p.m., A6 reports that he has been in touch with the leader of the French Tps and that he wishes to ensure that the airfield is defended until the arrival of additional troops.
At 5.08 p.m., A6 reports the presence of one Cie (FR) at the airport. There are two P1 around the air terminal and one around the control tower. OSCAR requests A6 to report as much information as possible on the plans of the French.
 - c. At 3.58 p.m., following the arrival of the first French Tps, QG Secteur puts all the KIBAT troops on general alert, with everyone in their positions. He reports that there are no changes as regards both the rules of engagement and the mission.
At 5.30 p.m., K9 gets in touch with S6. He fears that the French intervention and policy might put the lives of KIBAT soldiers on danger.
 - d. At around 6.15 p.m., A6 reports that five C-160 have landed and that two are still on the parking. He reports that the officer commanding the French Tp is a colonel.
 - e. At 8.40 p.m. the Rwandans once again block the runway with obstacles. It will be noted that after each landing of the planes announced, the Rwandans block the runway, mainly with boarding staircases. QG Secteur asks A6 to enquire why and he is told that it is to prevent unauthorized planes from landing.
 - f. At 8.40 a.m., D BASE reports that French vehicles are passing in front of its positions.
 - g. At 9.55 p.m., S6 informs A6 that Gen Dallaire has instructed that he must collaborate with the French, but that he can neither join nor participate in their operation.
 - h. At 10.31 p.m., according to A6, the French have the runway cleared because five C-160 are expected to land. The planes are bringing 190 additional soldiers.
 - i. At 11.45 a.m., A6 reports to QG Secteur that the French do not control access to various zones. Everything is decided by FAR. The French soldiers are willing to help UNAMIR but need authorization from Paris.

- j. At 3.40 p.m., A6 reports that the French are expecting reinforcements in the evening. They are preparing the evacuation of expatriates of all nationalities. They agree that the road be open to other troops, but need a formal order from Paris.
 - k. At 11.45 a.m., A6 reports that four C-160 have landed. At the same time, QG Secteur announces that the French seem to have started evacuating their nationals.
35. **Contacts with Belgian Ambassador**
- a. At 8.25 a.m., the Belgian Ambassador transmits the following message via C6 "Minister Claes has contacted Mr Boutros Ghali asking for escorts for the Ambassadors. Mr Boutros Ghali is demanding escorts for the Ambassadors of Belgium, France, Germany and the United States". The Belgian Ambassador requests that this message be transmitted to QG Secteur and to the Force. This done straightaway.
 - b. Just after 2 p.m., C6 reports on the outcome of his discussions with the Belgian Ambassador. The Belgian Ambassador wishes to know to what extent Belgian nationals can be included in the UNAMIR evacuation plan. He also enquires whether arrangements can be made at the KIBAT camps to take in and look after the Belgian nationals until the Silver Back contingent can take over. He would like to have an idea of the time available to him before the UNAMIR evacuation. He would like to discuss with K9. The information is transmitted to QG Secteur.
 - c. At 2.50 p.m., QG Secteur orders the deployment of Mirador P1 around the Belgian Embassy because the life of the Belgian Ambassador is allegedly in danger.
At 3 p.m., the P1 is deployed.
 - d. At 3.15 p.m., C6 asks for instructions for his P1 from the Belgian Ambassador. The instructions are that nobody may approach or enter the Belgian Embassy. Vehicles may pass in front of the Embassy. C6 must try and reassemble the staff who are in Chinatown in Mirador. This is done by 4.30 p.m.
 - e. At 4.05 p.m., C6 reports that gendarmes and soldiers from the Presidential guard have come and joined the Belgian Embassy defence troops. The Rwandan soldiers have apparently come to ensure the security of the new Prime Minister due to arrive at the Belgian Embassy (to hold discussions with the Ambassador).
36. **Rescuing of expatriates and protection of refugees**
- a. At 5.40 p.m., QG Secteur asks KIBAT for an ambulance to transport a wounded person from the United States Embassy to Faycal Hospital. The mission is undertaken by the Caillou ambulance. The CLC Christophe and

Cpl Zels are in the ambulance. They pass through the QG Secteur where their escort is waiting for them (2 MP from UNCTV POL in a UN pick-up), pick up the wounded person from the Embassy and go to the Faycal hospital. On their way back, they are stopped by Rwandan soldiers but after a brief discussion, they are allowed to continue and return to Caillou.

- b. At 6.50 a.m., B6 goes out with a team of three jeeps equipped with MAG and MINIMI with a 360° carriage to (according to information from an Italian refugee) rescue a wounded child, the only survivor from a family which has been massacred. Equipped with an anti-fragment jacket, the Italian refugee leads the section in the search. At 8.18 a.m., B6 reports that he has found the family which has been massacred, but despite searching in the area, he does not find any trace of the child. The team however returns with six other persons. In the meantime, the child (a small three-year old girl) has arrived in Beverly Hills with his neighbours. Passing in front of SONATUBE (on the Rwandex road towards town), the team makes a first attempt to enter the Rwandex premises and rescue the Six family, but in vain. The family is rescued later by B7.
- c. At 7.50 a.m., D Base reports to OSCAR that the Italian Consulate feels threatened by a furious crowd which is gathering in front of the Consulate gate. C6 still has a *gendarme* at his disposal and he gets in touch with D BASE to try and settle the matter.
- d. At 9.15 a.m., Americans request UN protection for the American Club and the International School (the school is located near Franciscus in the middle of FAR positions which the RPF is firing at). Given the situation of the Bn and the location of the institutions in question, S7 sends responds negatively. K9 then insists that Franciscus look after the International School and Mirador the American Club. S6 refuses since he does not have enough soldiers to protect all those places (few people at Franciscus and Mirador already has the responsibility of protecting the Belgian Embassy), but he adds that if the Americans so wish, they can go to the camps occupied by KIBAT.
- e. At 9.40 a.m., D BASE asks what to with two Tutsi refugees who have reported to his camp. Bn tells him to take them in, just like the other refugees.
- f. At 10.47 a.m., Caillou reports that all the technical assistants living on that street are gathering together in their camps. S2 advises them to be careful with the food and water supply.
At 11.03 a.m., a first group of expatriates from this secteur is escorted up to the Meridien by AS3 who had brought to QG Secteur, plans for the defence of the airfield.
- g. From 11.40 a.m., following the order to prepare UNAMIR's evacuation, the camps wish to know what to do with the expatriates. Can they direct them to the various assembly points planned or take other measures to evacuate the expatriates?

At around 12.30 p.m., QG Secteur confirms that in any case, the soldiers will not leave before the civilians and that, in principle, the expatriates know the various assembly points. The evacuation can only be started by the Belgian Ambassador who is waiting for the arrival of the Belgian contingent.

The problem is all the more delicate because the French nationals have received an evacuation order. The various nationals are therefore instructed to stay at home and await instructions.

- h. At 2.40 p.m., in view of the intense fighting in the area, OSCAR tells the Caillou staff to go to the Meridien with all the refugees who are at the camp or in the surrounding area. Refugees who do not wish to leave must be told that no one will go back to fetch them. S2 with A12 on Ug goes there to ensure the safety of the convoy which is forming in front of Caillou.
- i. At 2.08 p.m., Ramadan asks whether he may accept the Belgian nationals because there are rumours that they are under threat. S3 replies that he may.
- j. At 3.48 p.m., Franciscus is notified that a Canadian family will try to join them. QG Secteur reports that they have requested protection from our troops.
- k. At 5 p.m., C6 reports that the Belgian Ambassador has requested that Bn look after the Fuchs, Duchateau and Raymondo families. A few minutes later, he requests the assistance of the Belgian UNAMIR troops to help in assembling the Belgian nationals together in designated centres.
- l. At 5.23 p.m., the Belgian Ambassador requests that Mr and Mrs Dessarault who live on the dirt road behind Chez Lando (junction N6) be rescued. KIBAT requests that the couple should instead try to go to the stadium or hotel Amahoro which are nearer. A7 who is at the stadium says he can undertake the mission and OSCAR authorizes him to do so.
- m. At 5.40 p.m., S6 transmits the following message to all the stations.
"May I remind you all that negotiation together with firmness are the only means of achieving our aim which is to save as many lives as possible, especially those of our compatriots. This tactic has so far worked for us quite well, except in one case where the circumstances were equally exceptional".
- n. At 6.10 p.m., A26 reports that he has gone to fetch English nationals from Rwandex.
- o. At 6.17 p.m., D6 asked if he could go to collect the nationals in GIKONDO following a request from AMBABEL. He replied yes to him, insofar it was not too risky.

- p. At 7.20 p.m., B6 reported that there were 73 expatriates of all nationalities including the Fathers from ETO. At 9 p.m., B6 inquired about who was going to protect the Rwandan refugees who were at his camp when his Gp would leave the place.
- q. At 11. 40 p.m., C6 reported that a Black family from the French mission had gone to AMBABEL's residence. AMBABEL did not want to take care of them, but he contacted the French Ambassador who was ready to receive them. AMBABEL asked if KIBAT could provide an escort to take them to the other Embassy. The French soldiers would provide security from the nearest crossroad to the French Embassy. S6 explained that a Belgian escort was not necessarily a guarantee under the present conditions and that it would be better for the French to provide the escort otherwise this family should try to get to the French Embassy on its own under the cover of darkness. Since the French were refusing, the family decided to return to where it came from.
- r. The situation in the various camps around 9 p. m.
- (1) BEVERLY HILLS: 1,200 Rwandan refugees, 73 expatriates
 - (2) Belgian School (Gp CITY): 33 expatriates (17 men, 16 women and children).
 - (3) MERIDIEN: over a hundred people, but I do not have the exact figure since that was the responsibility of the Hotel Manager.
 - (4) RWANDEX: 3 Europeans and 3 children; 2 Tutsis.

37. Repatriation of the dead bodies.

- (a) At 7.30 a.m. requested the HQ Sector whether it was possible to have an escort from FAR to take the bodies to the airport. The C-130 was to transport the bodies to NAIROBI.
TWO men from the crew, including the Captain of the C-130 had been with the PC battalion since the night of 06 April. At 7.40 a.m., C6 told those who were still at the *Mille Collines*, to be ready to meet them at the airport under escort. In fact, they would be taken in the afternoon to MIRADOR by the Gp CITY.
- (b) In the meantime, the last documents were prepared by S1 and taken to DOLCE VILLA where the judicial Unit was is located.
- (c) At 8. 05 a.m., B BASE communicated that the *Padre* who was at BEVERLY HILLS wanted to accompany the flight to NAIROBI. S6 accepted so long as the conditions enabled the convoy to pass through BEVERLY HILLS. Later on in the afternoon, B BASE contacted us again to know whether the *Padre* could go to CAPUCCINO. S6 pointed out that according to information received from B6 himself, it was at present dangerous to leave BEVERLY HILLS.

- (d) At 8.25 a.m., H6 asked whether it was possible to use the flight to NAIROBI to evacuate a wounded UN staff who had a broken leg. It was CLC ANTOINE (PI Mor) who had been evacuated the day before from VIKING to FRANCISCUS. He replied that it was at present too risky to go to or leave FRANCISCUS.
- (e) Several times during the day, KIBAT insisted to have an escort from the HQ Sector, but FAR did not respond.
- (f) At 3 p.m., since it was still impossible to evacuate the bodies that day and it was also impossible to transfer them to the mortuary of FAYCAL hospital because of lack of space, S6 decided to transfer the remains in a Ford minibus which basically had been transformed into a hearse.
- (g) The purpose of the transfer was threefold: to facilitate the evacuation by the C-130 by loading the minibus directly into the plane, to protect the remains better from the climatic conditions and to retrieve the MAN to be able to use it for the UNAMIR evacuation. The minibus was taken to the MERIDIEN where the battalion had arranged a place in the shade and under close watch.
- (h) At 10.10 p.m., S6 went to the HQ Sector to arrange for the repatriation the next day. At 11.20 p.m., S6 who had not received a response from the HQ Sector, asked A6 to contact the Rwandan authorities at the airport to get the approval for the C-130 to take-off with the remains. He also requested for an escort to go and fetch the pilots at MIRADOR. These requests remained unheeded.
- (i) Shortly after, the HQ Sector communicated that the remains should be transported to FAYCAL hospital in the morning to get them ready for the evacuation by air.
38. Preparing for the arrival of the Belgian contingent.
- (a) At 10.04 a.m., the HQ Sector asked for the exact position of the AA guns around the airport as well as the specific type of anti-air armament. This information was necessary for the Cops in BRUSSELS so that they could communicate it to the Belgian contingent which was preparing for its landing.
At 10.34, the HQ Sector again asked for the position to the nearest metre of the various AA parts around the tarmac as well as all the details on their possible use.
- (b) At 10.57 a.m., S3 communicated that these positions were on the airport defence map which should be in the possession of the HQ Sector and even the Cops, AS3 will provide the HQ Sector a copy of this map. At 11.05 a.m., OSCAR confirmed by radio the exact last positions of the AA parts.

- (c) At 1. 30 p.m., A6 communicated to the HQ Sector that there were only TWO trucks on the tarmac. There was enough space for the UN C-130 to land, but not a wide-bodied aircraft.
At 1.40 p.m., S14 communicated the instructions to OSCAR, to enter into contact with the Belgian planes.
- (d) At 7.10 p.m., A6 reported that the tarmac was free.
Around 8 p.m., AMBABEL inquired through C6 whether the Belgians could land. A6 replied that the tarmac was free.
- (e) At 8. 53 p.m., A6 reported that the Rwandans were putting obstacles on the tarmac. At 9. 23 p.m., A BASE reported that A6 had gone to the airport to find out about the intentions of the Rwandans.
- (f) At 9. 40 p.m., S3 reported to C6, for the attention of AMBABEL that the HQ Sector had communicated that FOUR C-130 were expected before midnight and that FOUR others would land later.
- (g) At 10.20 p.m., the tarmac was still blocked and, according to the information received by A6, the FAR at the airport were expecting a written order from their Staff headquarters in order to cooperate with the Belgians.
- (h) At 11.50 p. m., AMBABEL inquired, through C6 whether the battalion knew the arrival time of the Belgian Contingent. He said no.
39. Evacuation of FRANCISCUS to the *MERIDIEN*.
- (a) At 3.10 p.m., FRANCISCUS received the order to get ready to be evacuated to the *MERIDIEN*.
- (b) At 3.20, A6 reported that he had contacted Maj. NTABAKUZE, the Commander of the Rwandan para-Battalion at KANOMBE, who was proposing to provide escorts for KIBAT. D6 asked to seize the opportunity to go to RWANDEX.
A6 proposed to ask for escorts for the evacuation of FRANCISCUS and RWANDEX to the airport. S6 did not want to evacuate RWANDEX at this stage, because that was where all the supplies and spare parts of KIBAT were located, also he asked whether it was possible to take the FRANCISCUS staff to RWANDEX to reinforce the contingent. In that case, would there be enough room for the civilians and soldiers? D BASE thought that it would be difficult to manage that.
- (c) At 3.40 p. m., D6 reported that he was leaving the airport to go to RWANDEX. A26 accompanied him with A Jeep and his PC Pl on Ug, these staff members should join the rest of the Pl at FRANCISCUS. D6 reported on the way that the population was very aggressive.

- (d) At 4.15 p.m., D6 arrived at RWANDEX, he reported that Maj. NTABAKUZE would be there within an hour and that he could perhaps provide an escort for FRANCISCUS.
- (e) At 5.45 p.m., Maj. NTABAKUZE had still not returned. Since it was getting dark, we had to decide either to evacuate FRANCISCUS immediately, or to wait the next day. S6 decided to try and evacuate FRANCISCUS immediately without the FAR escort, but going in the direction of the *MERIDIEN* because this route seemed to be the safest in his view. S6 issued an order to Sgt. BULLINCKX to get ready and meet him at the KIGALI NIGHT crossroads with all the FRANCISCUS staff, AS3 and A12 met him surveying the road from the *MERIDIEN* to the KIGALI NIGHT.
- (f) Shortly after 6 p.m., AS3 and A12 left the *MERIDIEN*. They went through N3, N2, N1. They stopped at several military and civilian roadblocks at which, each time, they crossed after some never-ending discussions. On arrival at KIGALI NIGHT, A12 disembarked and AS3 communicated, by radio, that the FRANCISCUS staff could meet them. In the camp, every thing was ready, but just as the ignition was being switched on, one MAN refused to start. Finally, after a few minutes of tension, the people from FRANCISCUS managed to start the truck. Most of the expatriates boarded the military vehicles.
- (g) At 6.42 p.m., AS3 reported that they had met up and that they were going to the *MERIDIEN* by the same route. On the way, one of the roadblocks checked the vehicles.
At 7.05 p. m., AS3 and the convoy arrived at the *MERIDIEN*.
- (h) A26 and his PC Pl remained at RWANDEX where they participated in the picking up of the expatriates in the zone with a few people from the Log Base.

40. Position of the units on 9 April at Midnight

- (a) The PC Battalion.
- (1) Divided between the *MERIDIEN* and DOLCE VILLA
 - (2) S14 and his driver were at the HQ Sector
 - (3) Capt. MADALIJS, Sgt. NELLIS and RELAX were at AMAHORO stadium
 - (4) The *Padre* was at BEVERLY HILLS
- (b) The Log Base.
- (1) D6 went to RWANDEX where almost the entire staff was.
 - (2) TWO men were at the CTM.
- (c) Gp AIRFIELD
- (1) Half of the PC with A6, the Pl A (MINUS A12) at TOP GUN
 - (2) A26 was at RWANDEX

- (3) A21, A22 and some men from PC went to the *MERIDIEN* where A12 already was.
- (4) A7, A23 and FOUR men from PC were at AMAHORO stadium.

(d) Gp SOUTH

- (1) Virtually everybody was at BEVERLY HILLS
- (2) THREE men (guard NGANGO) and the SIX men from B22 were at the *MERIDIEN*.

(e) Gp CITY

- (1) PC (MINUS C6) at MIRADOR
- (2) C6, P1 B and C13 at the residence of AMBABEL
- (3) P1 A (MINUS C13) at MIRADOR and at the BELGIAN Embassy

(f) P1 Mor

- (1) The remains of Y6, Y1, Y2 and Y5 were at *MERIDIEN*.
- (2) Y7 was at AMAHORO stadium
- (3) 1Sgt. HUTSEBAUT, Cpls. LEFEBVRE, KINKIN LALOUX and Y4 were at the *MERIDIEN*
- (4) At TOP GUN, Y3 and Y8

(g) Medical Detachment

- (1) H6 and the Anesthetist were at BEVERLY HILLS with the P Sec Battalion
- (2) M6 was at AMAHORO stadium
- (3) THREE people from VITAMINE were at the residence of AMBABEL
- (4) FOUR people from the ACP left CAILLOU and went to the *MERIDIEN*

(h) Miscellaneous

- (1) The Det Helt was at BEVERLY HILLS
- (2) The EOD were at the *MERIDIEN*
- (3) Lt. DEMEYERE, CLC JANSSENS, Sgt. VERMEIREN and CLC VANDAM were at AMAHORO stadium
- (4) The C-130 crew was at MIRADOR except for Capt. JACOBS (Captain) and the ISM CUYVERS who were at the *MERIDIEN* with OSCAR.

KIBAT - 10 APRIL 1994

DEVELOPMENTS ON 10 APRIL

41. General situation

a. Development of fighting

At 8.15 a.m., A7 confirms that the RPF has continued its advance to the East and is now occupying N7.

b. Situation in town

(1) At 8.05 a.m., C6 reports that its MIRADOR patrols searching for nationals did not encounter any difficulties.

(2) At 9.49 a.m., the Red Cross building on Akagera road is attacked.

(3) Shortly before 1 p.m., C6 transmits that according to information obtained, there are a lot of unprotected expatriates at *Milles Collines* Hotel. They are worried about the attitude of the FAR who is asking them a lot of questions.

(4) At 3.40 p.m., the QG secteur (HQ secteur), states that TWO teams of UN observers will be stationed at AMBABEL's house and at the airport. Provision of the teams with food and ammunition shall be the responsibility of KIBAT elements on the spot.

c. MERIDIEN neighbourhood

(1) Around midday, a group of about ten persons from the RPF arrive at the hotel and try to enter in order to carry out a search because, according to them, the hotel is housing RAF soldiers in mufti who are informing the RAF of RPF positions. S6 refuses to allow them in and assures them that there are only civilian refugees in the hotel and that they are not passing on information to the RAF. The hotel manager also participates in the discussion which lasts for a while; eventually, the RPF group leaves.

During that encounter, the leader of the RPF group issues fairly clear threats to the French in general and the hotel management in particular. The latter want to leave, as soon as they have the opportunity, for the French assembly point, and hand over the hotel keys to S7.

After that contact, civilian control is tightened at the hotel: all curtains are drawn and people are barred from approaching windows. Rooms on all the floors are searched. In one of the rooms, a set of RPF uniform and some documents are found. However, as far as we are concerned, no RPF members are lodging at the hotel, therefore, it could be clothes used by a RAF member to pass himself off as someone from the RPF; the clothes are burnt in order to avoid any incident. A few days later, an RPF member came to ask if we had found his clothes in a room, and, as we dared not tell him we had burnt them, we told him we had not found them.

(2) At 6 p.m., the QG *secteur* orders KIBAT to provide supplies for the Tunisian coy who have been without food supplies for TWO days. The Tunisians receive rations immediately. Unfortunately, they can only be given rations that do not contain pork.

(3) Shortly before 8 p.m., the QG *secteur* reports that a Belgian soldier has come to FAYCAL Hospital. The Bn asks for his name. After investigating, the QG *secteur* informs that it is Cpl CRESPIPE of Para 1 who has returned to Rwanda to look for his girl friend. Much later, he is taken to the MERIDIEN and evacuated from there to the airport with other expatriates.

d. The future of UNAMIR

(1) At 4 p.m. ONE UN ILIOUCHINE lands. This UN plane has come to evacuate UN civilian staff from the MERIDIEN and AMAHORO Hotel; their presence in Rwanda was not absolutely indispensable.

(2) The QG *secteur* reports that the staff will be escorted by the APC of RUBAT and that they should be ready to be evacuated to the airport.

(3) At 9. 50 p.m. the QG *secteur* asks KIBAT how many lorries over 3 tons are available for the evacuation of the staff of the Force during the night. The Force also asks the Bn for forklifts. (They are available at UN Vipere and UN Rwandex.)

e. Bn Missions

(1) Throughout the day, the various groups continue their evacuation missions either on their own initiative or on the request of OSCAR or the QG *secteur*.

(2) At 10 p.m., the QG *secteur* issues a warning order for the missions scheduled for the following day:

- at 10 a.m.: ONE section out of TWO Ug has rendez-vous at the QG *secteur*.

- in the afternoon: ONE section out of TWO Ug is available for the missions ordered by a major of the QG *secteur*;

- The whole day: ONE PI on stand-by.

The coordination of all the missions was slated for at 8 a.m. the following day at the QG *secteur*. As a matter of fact, no follow-up was done.

g. Logistics

(1) At 11.15 a.m., the Force inquires about the situation of rations and fuel.

(2) Around 12.15 a.m., D base transmits information on the situation requested by the Force. There are 25000 rations and 40000 litres of water left.

The fuel reserve was more worrying: there were only 45000 litres of petrol and 3500 litres of diesel left at the airport.

42. Operations of the French Tp

- a. At 07.05 a.m., A6 transmits that the French are coming in and going out as they like through the SOUTH gate of the airport. They have surrounded N8 at the south in order avoid problems.
- b. At 08.45a.m., following a request from S6, A6 transmits that the French have agreed to help us go through roadblocks. In exchange, as they have no vehicles, they are asking for THREE Ug. S6 gives his approval and states that A6 must work hand in hand with the French.
- c. At 11.20 a.m., QG *secteur* reports that the RPF has contacted the UN to forbid collaboration between the French and the UN Tp. It is therefore forbidden to support the French with UN vehicles. At 11.50 a.m., the QG *secteur* spells out the directives of the Force: no non-UNAMIR soldier must ride in a UN vehicle.
- d. Throughout the whole day, French planes land and take off with expatriates.
- e. Learning of the arrival of the Belgian contingent around 2 p.m., the French Tp communicates to A6 that they prefer the evacuation of Belgian nationals to be carried out by UN troops because of the anti-Belgian sentiment prevailing in Kigali.
- f. At 3.25 a.m., the French at the airport requests that the Belgians collect the bodies of THREE French volunteers near the N4 (RPF controlled area). S6 agrees, but states that it will take sometime because the area is often under mortar fire. The mission is implemented the following day.

43. Arrival of the first Belgian elements

- a. At 00.30 a.m., A6 informs that the runway has been blocked again.
- b. At 04.54 a.m., the QG *secteur* requests immediate contact with S6. K9 wants AMBABEL to be promptly informed of issues concerning the arrival of the Belgians. He has to contact the QG Force in order to coordinate at the political level. The Belgian contingent assures the security of nationals.
- c. K9 holds a conversation on the Bn network with AMBABEL. The thrust of the conversation is that the Belgians have obtained the verbal agreement (from the RAF and the RPF) to land its plane for a relief operation. Belgian Tp are on stand-by in Djibouti (the Det is in fact in Nairobi) while

- awaiting confirmation of the agreement. The agreement is to enter into force around 8 a.m. Therefore, the Belgians will arrive in Kigali between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m.
- d. At 8.30 a.m., AMBABEL reports through C6 that authorization to land has been granted.
 - e. At 9.10 a.m., the QG secteur reports that he will inform the Bn when the planes take off from NAIROBI.
 - f. Around 10.00 a.m., the QG secteur reports from KIBAT that the Belgian planes have not left NAIROBI yet.
 - g. At midday, A6 informs that the French announced the arrival of TWO Belgian units that afternoon. He wants to know what the Belgians plan to do. The QG secteur responds that some of them will take care of defence at the airport while others will be in charge of welcoming expatriates.
 - h. At 12.55 a.m., responding to a question by S6, K9 informs that the operations commander is Col. BEM ROMAN, Comd of the Para-cdo brigade and that the mission of the contingent is to evacuate expatriates. K9 requests that a UN soldier be deployed to ensure coordination between the various forces (UN, French Tp and the Belgian contingent.)
 - i. At 14.15 a.m., A6 reports that he has contacted the Col commanding the French Tp; the Belgians are expected to arrive in 15 minutes. The French requests A6 to be liaison officer.
 - j. At 2.25 p.m., before the arrival of the first Belgian elements, the QG of the secteur requests S6 to remain vigilant because RAF reaction to the arrival of the Belgian Para-Cdo of the SILVER BACK operation is unknown.
 - k. At 3.45 p.m., C6 reports that the first set of Belgian C-130 took off from NAIROBI at 3.18 p.m. FOUR C-130 are expected around 4.45 p.m., at a 10-minute interval. A second lift of FOUR C-130 is expected at 5.30 p.m.
 - l. At 4.27 p.m., QG reports that the second lift left NAIROBI at 4.04 p.m.
 - m. At 4.59 p.m., the first Belgian C-130 lands followed by another 3 minutes later. The third arrives, at 5.20 p.m., followed by the 4th at 5.26 p.m.
 - n. At 5.30 p.m., the QG secteur informs that the RPF wants to know when the Belgian C-130 is arriving. It can open fire on planes which it does not recognize.
 - o. At 6.07 p.m. the 5th C-130 arrives. The 6th and 7th arrive respectively at 6.13 p.m. and 6.16 p.m.

- p. At 7.08 p.m., S6 issued orders to A6 to keep his blue beret but should, as much as possible, infiltrate the new arrivals.
According to K9, the evacuation of expatriates will be done in the following manner: the Belgians will take over the defence of the airport, the French will secure the route while UNAMIR will provide escort. The evacuation will take place during the 48-hour truce negotiated by Gen Dallaire which is to be signed this evening between the RAF and the RPF.
At 7.34 p.m. S6 transmits the same message to various Gp. He adds that in that regard, 240 Para-Cdo have arrived. In principle, the 2nd commando remains with UNAMIR and the UN intends to continue the mission after the evacuations. He requests an estimate of Log requirements for the evacuation of refugees from various camps and then that of KIBAT Pers.
- q. At 9.30 p.m., the Commander of the Bde Para Cdo informs that he would like to meet S6. S6 responds that it will only be possible the following day.

44. Assistance to expatriates and to refugees

- a. In the course of the night, requests for assistance and information concerning expatriates in distress continue to pour in.
- b. At 6.40 a.m., S6 transmits the following message to Gp comd. The various Gp will fetch expatriates in conformity with the information they receive and of the assessment of the Gp comd. They will begin around the camps. The refugees will be taken to the closest camp. The Gp will keep OSCAR informed of the various movements. All outings are to be carefully supported and prepared.
That order simply made what was already happening de facto in the various Gp official.
Informed of the message by S6, the QG secteur reports that the evacuation of Belgian nationals could only be authorized by AMBABEL. Therefore, KIBAT could not commence the evacuation. S6 asks to speak to AMBABEL through C6. He asks him if he should refuse to grant the assistance requested by the nationals on his behalf. AMBABEL states that the evacuation order has not been issued, but that the Bn could start evacuating the Belgians who want to be evacuated to the camps or the assembly points.
- c. From that time onwards, all the Gp stood out at all levels because of their initiative and courage with respect to assistance to refugees and nationals.
At the South Gp, based on information furnished by the Italian refugee mentioned above, B7 prepared a fleet of THREE jeeps which left around 7 a.m. to complete the pick-up exercise which commenced earlier.
Elements of the PC Bn, also organized pick-up patrol.
Even the Gp of AMAHORO stadium participated in the collection of expatriates.
Requests for assistance are received at all levels. Nationals near the camps made direct requests to the camps. Requests also flood in from the QG secteur and from OSCAR. Requests for pick-up are even received from the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Defence in Belgium via the Cops. AMBABEL also receives a lot of requests which he transmits to Bn.

- d. In spite of the efforts deployed by those who receive calls to obtain specific information, expatriates are sometimes unable to state their exact location. The roads still have no names and, very often, houses have no visible numbers. Description of houses are often confusing. All this vagueness often result in waste of time for the teams who go in search of expatriates and often place them in danger.
- When sections arrive at the residence of some nationals, they encounter other problems:
- sometimes, the people have changed their minds and no longer want to be evacuated. In that case, they are informed that there is no guarantee that the team will return to fetch them. Several hours or days later, most of these people request for help and the Bn will do all in its power to assist them.
 - Sometimes, again, they are not ready and must pack their bags, thereby delaying the section that has gone to fetch them.
 - Sometimes they want to leave with a lot of luggage and have to be advised to take less.
- It goes without saying that all these outings allow the gathering of a lot of information on the situation in town and on other expatriates.
- e. Around 9 a.m. ONE Det made up of D7 (jeep with Lt Belliere, ISM Timsonnet and CLC BARAS of B26 with his Ug armed with ONE Mi 50 and TWO MAN of D Base leave Rwandex to fetch the DUQUESNOIS, BURTON ZICOT, ROBERT families etc... When the column stopped in one street, a civilian pick-up truck with FIVE RAF soldiers suddenly appeared in front of the convoy and opened fire. The reprisal was immediate and the Mi 50 neutralized the vehicle. A team rushes out covered by firing. 4 RAF fled into the garden, the 5th is disarmed and left at the location. Nobody, neither the escort nor the civilians evacuated, is wounded during the operation.
- f. 9.20 a.m., S6 orders A6 to begin organizing the evacuation of nationals to the airport. He tells him that the selection of the people who will board the plane will be done by a representative of the Belgian Embassy.
- g. At 10.00 a.m, OSCAR inquires from C6 about Pierre DANDOY's family. C6 goes to check and informs that the name of the family is no longer on the list of the Belgian Embassy. This creates additional problem in the search for expatriates. The Belgian Embassy's list is not up to date; some of the names on the list are those of persons who are no longer in Rwanda while some have lived in Rwanda for sometime and their names do not appear on the list.
- h. Shortly after 10.00 a.m., K9 and AMBABEL again have a conversation. The summary of the conversation is transmitted to S6 by K9. AMBABEL does not want to issue an evacuation order given the insecurity. He prefers to wait for an agreement between all parties. General Dallaire tries to

obtain such an agreement but it is difficult to obtain a cease-fire from both parties and free movement in town at the same time.

S6 responds that that he continues to evacuate the expatriates who wish to leave. With regard to the area surrounding the MERIDIEN, evacuation was carried out in collaboration with the Belgian national who is in charge of the evacuation plan for that area. Around 10.45 a.m., following divergence of views with K9, S6 requests AMBABEL to make a clear decision about authorization to evacuate. AMBABEL responds that if they are Belgian nationals, they have to be evacuated.

- i At 11.11 a.m. B6 reports that 150 expatriates are at his residence; he cannot assure the security of a convoy of 25 to 30 civilian vehicles to the airport because that would seriously affect security in his cantonment and dishearten the refugees.
- j Around 12.30 p.m., C6 transmits a request from AMBABEL. Senior officials of the Embassy, the Chancellor and the decoder are stranded in Gitarama (and at the KABGAY Bishop's residence 5km south of Gitarama) with other Belgians. AMBABEL requests for UNAMIR escort in order to rescue everybody. S7 responds that for the time being, that is not possible but the matter will be looked into.
At 1.20 p.m., AMBABEL is still waiting for an answer to his request. S7 contacts the QG secteur to see if a solution could be found. After contacting AMBABEL, K9 suggests UN observer intervention and seeks all necessary information to accomplish the mission.
At 14.55 a.m., AMBABEL states that he will allow some of the troops deployed to protect him to be used as escort to Gitarama. S3 explains that given the distance and the risk that the bridge can be destroyed, at least ONE PL will be required.
- k. At 14.40 p.m., B6 overwhelmed by about 2000 refugees, transmits that he has contacted MSF. MSF responds that it cannot do anything for him.
- l. At 15.15 p.m., S2 leaves MERIDIEN hotel to take French expatriates to the French School which was one of the assembly points for French nationals.
- m. At 8.00 p.m., S6 seeks information from QG secteur about evacuation: Can expatriates use their vehicles, are there instructions for the selection of expatriates, are evacuations limited to Kigali, what role is RUTBAT to play?
- n. At 8.20 p.m., C6 transmits fresh requests from AMBABEL. He is requesting for UNAMIR presence at Milles Collines, permanent radio communication with ONE senior officer at the Embassy and the beefing up of defence near the Belgian Embassy. S6 wants to know if C6 can provide TWO sections for Milles Collines. C6 says no. S6 therefore envisages the possibility of leaving the residence and having ONE complete PI guard the embassy as dictated by the situation and the

behaviour of the RAF between MIRADOR and Milles Collines with external resources from KIBAT.

- o. At 9. 15 p.m., CTM requests for an escort to evacuate EIGHT adults and ELEVEN children, and TWO KIBAT members. The evacuation is scheduled for 11 April.

- p. Example of missions undertaken and recorded in the log book.

		Request by		Gp in charge	
	0645		5 persons Sultanat Oman	D Base	
0645			DEVOS family not found	A26 and D base	
0705	0832	S6	Collection patrol pick-up	PC	S2
0705	0752	S6	Six person Collection patrol	PC	S7
0720		D6	Two families	D Base	
0725			One wounded child	South	B7
	0733		DE VOS family picked-up	D Base	D7
0740		D6	AUVERDIN, MAHY, to be picked up as soon as possible	D Base	
0745		S14/Force	Pick-up people at Kimihurura		
	0814		BARBARA trial pick-up	SOUTH	B7
	0840		I picked-up MAHY, return to base	D Base	D6
	0855		I picked-up Belgian expatriates	CITY	C6
0920	1011	OSCAR	Mr Michel SIX	D Base	
0930		S7	About 20 persons: DUQUESNOIS, BURTON, ZICOT, ROBERT families, MR. BRUNO, MR ASHAG	D	
0935		S7	Mr DUQUESNOIS, the families of CAMIER, JORLETTE, 3 persons from Caritas centre.	AMAHORO	A7
0940		B7 B6	Mr Six and GREGOIRE IT Kicukiro nuns, Italian family, UN Doctor	SOUTH SOUTH	B7 B7
1000		QG secteur	Kenyan Ambassador in the first C-130 for NAIROBI		
1120		QG secteur	Request for escort for persons near PEGASUS	OSCAR	
1124			Leaves with 2 jeeps, 1 unimog, 1 MAN	D Base	
1150			Leaves to fetch some nuns in G7, F7	D6	
	1150		No nuns found at GFTENGA	SOUTH	
	1325		A7 has just picked-up two persons	AMAHORO	A7

q Situation of expatriates around 9.00 p.m. on 10 April

AMAHORO	18
BEVERLY HILLS	147
RWANDEX	160
MERIDIEN	150
MIRADOR	71

45 Evacuation of remains to Nairobi

- a. At 5.43 a.m., S3 asked if the remains can be taken to FAYCAL hospital. The QG secteur responds in the affirmative. However, after contacting the UN doctor working at the hospital, S6 learns that, in any case, he does not have the time or the means to prepare the remains for air transportation in a lead coffin. S6 then decides to speed up the evacuation of the remains as much as possible.
- b. At 7.05 a.m., S6 requests A6 to check if the French can assist in picking up the pilots at MIRADOR because the day before, they could move around freely in town.
- c. At 8.10 a.m., S6 asks A6 to contact FAR at the airport to authorize access through the main entrance. At 8.29 a.m., SI reports that he is leaving with the convoy, (the minibus with the remains, the Det judiciaire and the TWO crew of the C-130) and an escort for the airport; at that moment, A6 is still negotiating.
At 8.45 a.m., A6 informs that the French will really like to help and, in exchange, are asking for vehicles to move around in.
At 9.00 a.m., SI reports that he has arrived at the airport and will be living the minibus with the bodies the Pers accompanying them as well as the Det judiciaire there and he that he will return to the MERIDEN shortly.
All that was left to be done was to take the rest of the MIRADOR C-130 crew to the airport.
- d. Shortly after 11 a.m., QC secteur informs that ONE APC from RUTBAT will go and fetch the Kenyan ambassador, THREE wounded persons at FAYCAL hospital and the MIRADOR pilot in order to proceed to the airport.
Around 12.45 a.m., the QC secteur announces that the BTR requested for is to arrive and that he will receive instructions from the QC secteur on the itinerary to follow. He requests that the pilots are informed and remain on stand-by.
- e. Around 1 p.m., the BTR arrives at the QC secteur. S13 issues instructions to its crew (ONE capt. "chauffeur" and TWO unarmed soldiers) and boards the APC. They proceed to FAYCAL hospital where the doctors advise them to take the wounded last because of the serious nature of their wounds. They then proceed to the Kenyan embassy (near the N4 cross roads) where they are informed that the ambassador is at his residence.

The BTR therefore proceeds to the residence where the guard refuses them entry but states that the ambassador is at the embassy. The convoy therefore continues its journey to MIRADOR. After they are unable to go through several roadblocks, S13 finds a route through the Belgian school. They board TWELVE persons (including the crew) on MIRADOR and put the luggage on the roof of the vehicle.

At 2 p.m., C6 reports that the APC has just left for the airport with his escort. S13 returns to the Kenyan Embassy where he is given the same information as when he visited before. APC then takes him to the QG secteur and then goes in search of the wounded at FAYCAL hospital before proceeding to the airport.

At 3.05 p.m., A6 informs that the rest of the C-130 crew has arrived at the airport. Given the difficulties with all the movements, it is not possible to recover the Priest to accompany the plane to NAIROBI.

- f. K9 requests to be kept informed of the time of the plane's departure. He also asks that the Det judiciaire remains in Rwanda because he does not know if the Belgian contingent arriving will bring one.
- g. At 15.25 p.m., S6 asks A6 to form a guard of honour when the bodies are being put into the C-130. A6 assembles TEN men available at TOP GUN and takes them to the plane.
At 3.40 p.m., they take up position on the ramp and salute, rendering homage as the bodies are being placed into the minibus.
- h. Around 4 p.m., the C-130 takes off for Nairobi with the remains, the Det Judicaire, TWO of the FOUR members of the Logistic Base who had collected the bodies from the hospital. (Cpl Chief Verschaeren and Cpl Siewniak) and FOUR "mortars" (Sgt. PAUWELS, Cpl P DUPONT, Cpl MAHIEU and Cpl CRESPIE).

46. Situation of the units at Midnight on 10 April

- a. MERIDIEN + DOLCE VILLA (81 persons)
 - (1) PC Bn WITHOUT Capt MADALINS. Sgt. NELLIS. RELAX and the Padre
 - (2) A21, A22, A12 and some men of the PC Gp AIRFIELD
 - (3) NINE men of the South Gp (THREE NGANGO guard and SIX of the B22 garde PC Bn)
 - (4) 1 Sgt HUTSEBAUT. Cpx LEFEBVRE. KINKIN, LALOUCX and Y4.
 - (5) FOUR men of the ACP
 - (6) EOD staff
 - (7) S14 and his driver at the QG secteur
- b. RWANDEX (49 pers)
 - (1) Log Base (LESS TWO men at the CTM)
 - (2) A26 and his PC PI
- c. TOP GUN (39 Persons)
 - (1) Half of the PC AIRFIELD Gp with A6

- (2) PL WITHOUT A12
- d. BEVERLY HILLS (92 per)
- (1) Gp South
 - (2) Det Heli
 - (3) Part of the ACP and the Psec Bn
 - (4) Priest
- e. ANBABEL RESIDENCE (34 pers)
- (1) C6
 - (2) Pl B CITY Gp (as Offr Res Chef Pl increasingly supports the nerve wracking tension of the last few days badly, in order to guarantee defense and security of staff, C6 entrusts the command of the the Pl to 1 sgt DESSAMBRE soffr Mec who was in charge of the Pl for TWO days.)
 - (3) THREE men of the Det Med
- f. MIRADOR + BELGIAN EMBASSY (65 Persons)
- (1) PC CITY Gp WITHOUT C6
 - (2) Pl A CITY Gp
- g. AMAHORO (28 persons)
- (1) A7, A23 and FOUR men of the PC AIRFIELD Gp
 - (2) Y7
 - (3) Med Maj THIRY
 - (4) Cap MADALIJINS, Sgt NELLIS
 - (5) Lt DEMEYERE and CLC JANSSENS of KIGALODGE
 - (6) 1 Sgt VERMEIREN and CLC VANDAM of LDSG
 - (7) RELAX
- h. Miscellaneous
- Det Judiciare + FOUR Mor (Sgt PAUWELS, Cpl CRESPIE, Cpl P. DUPONT and Cpl MAHIEU) and TWO men of the Log Base (CLC VERSCHAEREN and Cpl SIEWNAK) in NAIROBI with the bodies.

KIBAT - 11 APRIL 1994

DEVELOPMENTS ON 11 APRIL

47. General Situation

a. Developments in the fighting

- (1) RPF continues to gain ground on RAF positions, especially in the vicinity of RWANDEX, where RPF elements are advancing into the town.

At 16.25, D Base provides information about shots being fired from various parts above RWANDEX.

In the course of the day, the *Gp* [Group(s)] send regular reports of shots being fired around them either during their movements or in the vicinity of the camps.

- (2) At 16.31, D Base reports that some of its men are suffering from stinging eyes and tickling noses. A cloud of smoke was seen around 16.30. D6 asks for the detection paper drill to be conducted. The test comes out negative. The staff of RWANDEX are probably suffering from the effects of the residue of the tear gas thrown by FAR while searching houses in the area close to the Log Base [Logistics Base].

- (3) In the vicinity of *MERIDIEN*, N4 and FAYCAL Hospital, sporadic mortar fire could be heard throughout the day.

At 16.40, OSCAR reports that ONE of his men has been wounded. The man is CLC Declerq who was on observation duty on the terrace of the last floor of *MERIDIEN*. When he raised his head above the terrace guardrail, a bullet, which did not seem to be a stray bullet, brushed his temple.

b. Logistic situation

- (1) At 00.40, the *QC Secteur* [Secteur Headquarters] transmits the Force's Log directives. In case of a ceasefire, KIBAT must collect fresh supplies from the Force's *Cie Log* [Log Company] between 15.30 and 17.30. It must take the equivalent of FOUR days' rations. With regard to fuel, the *Cie Log* can only supply diesel for the generators. Other types of fuel can be found at the airport.

That seemed rather funny, since until then only KIBAT and not the *Cie Log* seemed to have stocks and, for a few days, it was the *Cie* that came to look for rations at RWANDEX and not the other way round. Given the situation, these directives were not applied directly by KIBAT, which had its own stocks; it will be TWO to THREE more days before the *Cie. Log* receives rations from the United Nations (UN).

(2) The various *Gp* send in their Log situation reports

<i>Gp</i>	Food	Petrol	Diesel	MAN
AIRFIELD	60 Rat C	Nothing	Nothing	Nil
SUD	200 l of water 1 day fresh 2 days Rat C 1 day water	(Bn stocks at 8 JC	the airport) 14 JC	2 loaded 1 empty
CITY	65 Rat C 100 l water	10 JC	Nothing	2 loaded

(3) At 08.33, S6 requests D6 to evacuate the expatriates of RWANDEX to the airport and take advantage of the trip take some JCs, fill them with diesel for OSCAR's generators and send them to *MERIDIEN*. He must leave someone at *VIPERE* to supervise the distribution of fuel to the various units.

D6 leaves RWANDEX around 10.20 and arrives at the airport without a problem. At 12.07, D6 does not go to *MERIDIEN*, but goes back to RWANDEX via N12 where S2 has problems (see para. 48j (4)).

(4) At 13.55, S2 reports that all the nations assembled at the airport are using our fuel reserves and that there is no one in charge of distribution.

(5) Around 15.15, *QG Secteur* requests NINE MAN for the Force. S7 replies that there are no more trucks available.

(6) At 15.54, D6 reports that he is leaving RWANDEX to go to the *QG Secteur*. He had received the order, a little earlier, to take provisions, water and fuel to *MERIDIEN*. He arrived at *MERIDIEN* around 16.15 and left again around 17.09 to go to RWANDEX, arriving at 17.50, accompanied by P1 B of the *Gp SUD* [Southern Group], sent to reinforce the defence deployed at the Log Base.

6.[sic] At 19.55, D67 transmits the Log situation of KIBAT Stocks to *QG secteur*.

Food: 22000 Rat C, 40000 litres of water

Fuel: 200 JC of petrol, 50 JC of diesel, plus the fuel contained in the tanks at RWANDEX which, upon the owner's agreement, KIBAT could use (10 litres of petrol and 30,000 liters of diesel).

48. Evacuation of expatriates from Kigali.

- a. At 00.52, C6 sends a message that the order to evacuate the Belgians would be officially given by *AMBABEL* at 07.00. *AMBABEL* requests *UNAMIR* to make the effort to also go to the interior of the country to pick up the Belgians there. Neither *QC Secteur* nor KIBAT ever gets confirmation that the order had been given, however, since the order was meant for the expatriates, it may have been sent via their channels.

- b. At 01.18, AMBABEL has C6 confirm that the screening of refugees will be done at the airport.
- c. At 03.15, C6 sends a message that, for the evacuation, AMBABEL requests ONE vehicle and ONE escort for about 20 people at the Embassy, at 06.30. The mission should last ONE and HALF hours. OSCAR puts C6 in charge of this mission. At 06.30, C12 will drive the embassy staff who will be responsible for welcoming the expatriates arriving at the airport and conduct the screening for the evacuation to NAIROBI to the airport. He will return around 08.00.
- d. At 07.57, S6 transmits practical directives concerning the refugees. The use of personnel vehicles to the airport must be encouraged. The refugees will carry only ONE piece of luggage and provisions for 24 hours. All those who wish to go to the airport should be taken there; their selection for evacuation will be done later at the airport.
- e. At 09.40, C6 transmits AMBABEL's request for an escort for some nationals. He says that he could provide jeeps, on condition that he is not assigned other missions. S3 replies that the mission has been assigned to the *Gp AIRFIELD*.
At 10.15, C6 transmits a request for two escort jeeps for the town.
- f. Evacuation of expatriates from AMAHORO.
- (1) At 08.33, A7 who is still at AMAHORO Stadium with RUTBAT, receives the order to prepare to evacuate the expatriates from the stadium to the airport. He will then have to go to *MERIDIEN*.
 - (2) At 09.10, A7 reports that he is leaving the AMAHORO Stadium for the airport with SIX civilian and FOUR escort vehicles. At 09.15, he asks if he should allow the RAF who stop him to search the vehicles. S3 asks him to talk his way out of it each time.
 - (3) At 09.25, A7 send a message that he is dropping off his expatriates at the airport.
- g. Evacuation of expatriates from RWANDEX
- (1) At 08.33, S6 asks D6 to evacuate his refugees from RWANDEX to the airport. He also has to take diesel to *MERIDIEN* for the generators of the PC. A26 accompanies him to ensure security until he returns to RWANDEX.
 - (2) At 10.20, D Base reports that D6 has left for the airport with six trucks. At 10.32, D6 reports that he has arrived at the airport. He was stopped at N9; some Rwandan para military checked the trucks and let them go.

h. Evacuation of CTM

- (1) At 09.10, the CTM staff are ready to be evacuated and are waiting for a UNAMIR escort.
- (2) At 13.15, CTM requests that its evacuation be considered. S6 who has no more resources available reports that he is awaiting the arrival of the *Gp SUD* at *MERIDIEN* to send them an escort.
- (3) At 14.30, S3 with M6 and A21 set off from *MERIDIEN*. They must first pass by the access road north of N4 to go and pick up the bodies of THREE French technical assistance workers, as requested by the French the previous day. They should then go and collect the people at CTM and then onto the airport. 20 minutes later, he reports that they have searched the house and found nothing. He asks that the French Commander be informed of this report. He then goes to the CTM village, passing in front of CND. The convoy passes amidst RPF and FAR fire without much trouble.
- (4) At 15.00, S3 reports that he is setting off for the CTM village with the Belgian personnel in order to escort them up to the airport.
- (5) At 16.20, S3 reports that he is at TOP GUN. He had no particular problem on the road except at N8, where he did not obey the orders given by some RAF soldiers who wanted to stop him. The Rwandans did not react.
- (6) At 16.30, S3 reports that he is leaving TOP GUN. He is going to escort back to the CTM village the CTM personnel who are not leaving yet, and then go back to *MERIDIEN*.

i. Evacuation of expatriates from BEVERLY HILLS

- (1) Around 10.30, B6 reports that some French people have organized a first convoy to take the expatriates at BEVERLY HILLS to the airport (it turned out later that they drove them to the *Ecole française*). The French who, according to their own words, had come to evacuate only the French and the Italians, are told by B6 that the French expatriates will leave BEVERLY HILLS last, in order to ensure that all the expatriates as well as the Rwandan religious workers benefit from the "special" relations between the Tp (Fr) and RAF. Dissatisfied, the French comply and return a little later to pick up the others. They take a route to the airport that bypasses N8 and N9 via the south.
- (2) At 12.30, all the expatriates at BEVERLY HILLS are evacuated under the protection of the French. About 2000 Rwandans are left at the camp of the *Gp SUD*.

j. Evacuation of expatriates from *MERIDIEN*

- (1) At 11.20, S2 leaves *MERIDIEN* with the refugees and expatriates. The convoy is made up of about 50 vehicles escorted by A12 and A22 as well as by ONE APC with THREE Bangladeshi. It takes the northern route (N2, N1, N14, RWANDEX, N12, N7, N8, N9 and the entrance to the airport) in order to avoid crossing the frontline between RPF and RAF.
- (2) At 11.50, he passes N1 where there is a roadblock. Looking back he sees that half of his convoy has not crossed the roadblock. The RAF force the Rwandans to disembark. S2 moves the APC forward to make room for the vehicles, and stops at the level of the roadblock. He asks A12 to disembark. His appearance and the troops disembarking made the crowd surrounding them move back. He waves forward the vehicles that had been blocked. During this time, the crowd throws stones and some show grenades. After the last civilian vehicle passes, he gets the section to re-embark and gets into his jeep, with the crowd running behind them. He overtakes the convoy and when it reaches the river, he is surprised by the impact of the .50 that strike the embankment near his jeep. Following this incident, S6 requests *QG secteur* to warn the Force Commander that RAF are opposing the evacuation of refugees to the airport.
- (3) Later, S2 reports that he has again been stooped by RAF at KIGALI NIGHT. The RAF soldiers want to check everyone. They allow the whites to pass, but make trouble for the blacks. In particular, they have refused to allow Gazana's family to pass. One Rwandan aims his weapon at the vehicle, but S2 interposes himself and pushes the weapon away. The weapon is then aimed at him. He had his two Ugs put under the bridge where they had stopped. He suggests that the convoy should be allowed to pass and the matter of the Gazana family discussed later. He asks that the civilian vehicle be parked in a somewhat concealed way in front of one of the Ug. The family takes advantage to change vehicles. When the last vehicle has passed, S2 takes his position at the head of the convoy, and everyone drives off.
- (4) At 12.01, S2 reports that his lead vehicle is passing by RWANDEX. At 12.05, he passes the next roadblock at N12. While passing a second roadblock, his second section informs him that the convoy has again been split into two. He sends A12 with the APC and the first part of the convoy to the airport. He wants to come back to N12, but he is stopped at the roadblock that he just passed. The Rwandans are very menacing and they are ready to strike with their machetes. S6 requests A6 who was not far from the *QG [HQ]* of the French and Belgian Tps to send quite a strong patrol of French and RAF soldiers to resolve the situation. S2 threatens the man in charge of the roadblock and he finally lets him pass. Arriving at N12, he contacts the Lieutenant in charge of the roadblock. The latter is formal. He will not allow any vehicle to pass. S2 does not ask anyone to disembark, but asks the section to locate all the automatic weapons. Seeing the attitude of the

Peacekeepers, the Rwandan Lieutenant orders all his weapons to be armed and pointed at S2.

- (5) At 12.13, S2 sends a message that the problem is urgent. S6 calls back A6, who sends ONE section and TWO CVRT, and also contacts QG *secteur* to intervene as quickly as possible with RAF..
 - (6) At 12.15, the RAF authorities at the airport inform A6 that the convoy has passed the roadblock.
 - (7) At N12, the atmosphere is all the more tense as mortar rounds fall 50 m away from their position. The Rwandan Lieutenant wants S2 to accompany him to his Chief's house. S2 refuses and says that it is the Chief who must come to him. The Rwandan is hesitant, but finally calls his Chief. A Rwandan Major appears and says that he knows S6. This is Major Ntabakuze, the Commander of the Rwandan Para Bn. At 12.29, S2 puts S6 in radio contact with the Major who tells S6 not to worry, since they are only conducting a simple routine check and all will be well.
 - (8) By the time calm is restored, the TWO CVRT with the section sent by A6 arrives. S2 informs them that the situation is being resolved. The reinforcements take position and wait. The convoy of S2, reinforced by TWO CVRT and accompanied by the Major, start off again some minutes later for the airport. D6, who arrived shortly after the CVRT, goes back to RWANDEX
 - (9) At 12.50, S2 reports that he has completed his mission and that he is refueling his vehicles before returning to MERIDIEN. At 15.52, S2 reports that he is leaving the airport.
- k. Evacuation of expatriates from the town centre
At 12.16, C6 reports that the convoy with the Embassy staff has left. This convoy must pass by N12 where S2 is experiencing difficulties. As such, S6 requests that the Embassy convoy be blocked at RWANDEX. The convoy is stopped by C6 who is waiting for the problems being encountered at N12 to be resolved before having the convoy start off again around 13.15.
- l. Shortly after midday, owing to the incidents that occurred with certain convoys, the QG *secteur* says that no more Rwandan refugees should be taken in the convoys.
 - m. At 13.05, D6 requests permission to go and look for expatriates in Kimihurura neighbourhood. S6 tells him that he is transmitting the information to QG *secteur* for it arrange for the French, who have easier access in that area, to join in the operation.
 - n. Throughout the day, various BE and FR planes land and take off, carrying expatriates.

o. The "parcel"

In the course of the afternoon, Colonel Rusatira, Commander of the *Ecole supérieure militaire rwandaise*, asks *QG secteur* if the UN troops can help take the close Tutsi family of some RPF personalities to the RPF. The Bn assigned this task will conduct it with the strictest secrecy to transfer the eight adults and three children across to RPF lines.

p. The convoy from the "*Ecole Française*" [French School]

(1) At 17.29, K9 requests ONE PI to go and pick up expatriates who had assembled at the *Ecole Française*. The Chief of P1 has to go to the *QG Secteur* to receive his directives.

(2) At 17.55, KIBAT reports that P1 B of the *Gp SUD* has set off from *MERIDIEN* to carry out the mission. He goes to *QG Secteur* where K3 gives him instructions and accompanies him. He must go to the *Ecole française* and transport the refugees there to the airport.

(3) At 18.34, B16 reports that he is approaching KIGALI NIGHT. He arrives at the *Ecole française* at 18.34. He contacts a French Offr at the place. The Offr. tells him that all the arrangements had been made for the expatriates to spend the night there and to set off the next day.

(4) K9 is informed of this situation, but he wants the expatriates to be brought to the airport this evening. B16 informs him that it will take 45 minutes to get everyone aboard the vehicles.

(5) At 20.12, B16 reports that because of the civilian vehicles accompanying him, he cannot use the minor routes that skirt round N8 to the south. S6 first answers him that the situation seems calm, but then following information received from A6, B6 informs him that at N8 RAF was preventing even the French from passing.

(6) The French accept to guide B16 through the minor roads, but in fact, they lead him to KIGALI NIGHT and not to the airport. Finally, therefore, at 20.47, S6 decides to have the convoy come to the *MERIDIEN* where the 200 expatriates spend the night.

49. Evacuation of expatriates outside Kigali

a. At 06.09, the *QG Secteur* requests KIBAT to get ready to provide TWO escorts for the expatriates in the interior of the country.

b. Around 07.10, C6 reports that there are 15 persons at RUHENGERI and 44 at AKAGERA who are waiting to be picked up.

c. At 08.40, S6 tells B6 that his evacuation will proceed later and that he should get ONE P1 ready with ONE command jeep and THREE Ugs to go and pick up the refugees in GITARAMA and KABGAY and bring them to

the airport. He must await the execution order since an RAF escort will be necessary. B6 informs him that the GITARAMA mission is forcing him to slacken security at his camp and reduce his personnel in order to go and pick up the refugees. S6 replies that the GITARAMA mission has priority. At 08.55, B6 reports that TWO sections with ONE command jeep and ONE MAN are ready to undertake the mission. At 10.35, B6 is still awaiting orders to execute the GITARAMA mission. QG *Secteur* sends him a message that he has to be on stand-by.

- d. At 08.41, C6 send a message that he must provide ONE escort to RWAMAGANA, about 30 km east of Kigali. S6 tells him that he can provide an escort if the French will replace him at the Belgian School. At 09.08, C6 explains that he has left only ONE MAN and TWO Ugs that are on stand-by for escorts in town. S6 says that is not sufficient and cancels the mission.

50. Regrouping of Battalion

- a. S6 must regroup the units into a minimum number of billets in order to be able to discharge priority missions assigned to him, namely requests for evacuation of expatriates (inside and outside Kigali) and the guarding of vital areas like the airport, the Log Base and the Belgian Embassy.

- b. Return of the personnel from AMAHORO Stadium.

(1) At 08.33, A7 still at AMAHORO Stadium with RUTBAT, receives the order to prepare to evacuate the expatriates at the stadium to the airport. He should then go back to *MERIDIEN*.

(2) At 09.10, A7 reports that he is leaving AMAHORO Stadium for the airport with SIX civilian and FOUR escort vehicles. At 09.25, A7 sends a message that he is dropping off the expatriates at the airport and he is heading for *MERIDIEN* through AMAHORO Stadium to pick up the unarmed military personnel.

(4) At 09.55, he leaves the airport for AMAHORO Stadium. While returning, he is arrested at N9, but continues on his way after some negotiations.
At 10.10, he arrives at AMAHORO Stadium.

(5) At 10.30, S3 tells him to go back to *MERIDIEN* by avoiding the N4 and going by the minor road just to the north-east.

- c. Movement of *Gp SUD*

(1) At 12.30, as all the expatriates had been evacuated from BEVERLY HILLS under the protection of the French. B6 asks if his unit can move, given the increasingly intense pressure exerted by armed bands and the fact that the itinerary chosen by the French is still free. S6 requests K9 if he can move his *Gp SUD* (he leaves 2000 refugees at

BEVERLY HILLS). K9 gives his approval, but does not agree that the Gp goes to the airport; it must move to the *QG Secteur* and *MERIDIEN*. The unit can, however, pass by the airport to leave the trucks carrying the luggage and the dispensable equipment. ACP and the PSec Bn will also remain at TOP GUN.

- (2) At 12.40, S6 tells B6 that he can move as soon as he is ready.
 At 13.45, B6 reports that he is leaving his camp for the airport. He abandons TWO broken-down vehicles and ONE generator.
 At 14.45, A6 reports that the *Gp SUD* has arrived at the airport. B6 requests a bit more time to refuel and to take provisions. He is given 60 mins.
 At 15.35, B6 radioes to find out what task the *Gp* will perform upon arrival at *MERIDIEN*. He is told that he will be told upon arrival.
- (3) At 13.05, K9 ask for a ONE P1 to be sent with TWO CVRT to go and guard the *QG Secteur* as soon as the *Gp SUD* arrives at *MERIDIEN*. S6 sends a message to A6 to send TWO CVRT to the *QG Secteur*.
 At 14.00, A6 asks if he cannot send the CVRT without troops to the *QG Secteur* in order not to reduce his personnel further. S6 agrees; the Sec will be provided by the *Gp SUD*.
- (4) At 16.00, H6 reports that he is at TOP GUN with the ACP equipment.
 At 17.25, S6 reminds A6 about the TWO CVRT to be sent to *QG Secteur*.
- (5) At 16.12, B6 reports that his *Gp* is leaving the airport via the south and is going to the *MERIDIEN* with the P1A. The P1 B moves down towards RWANDEX with D6. He leaves his CSM and his CQMS at the airport in order to install a round the clock radio system (B BASE) and check the baggage of the *Gp*. Upon arrival at the *MERIDIEN*, B6 picks up SIX men who were on guard duty on the night of 6 April.

d. At the town centre

At 15.40, S6 contacts K9. Given the hostility of the Rwandans towards the Belgians and the departure of the French, he proposes that the *Gp CITY* gathers in the vicinity of the BELGIAN Embassy and AMBABEL's residence. K9 agrees and the order is transmitted to C6. In the evening, the staff of C6 is divided between the Embassy and AMBABEL's residence. In order to respond to the multiple requests for evacuation made by the Belgian Embassy *cellule*, C6 requests a few Ug reinforcements at SILVER BACK. One should be aware that the *Comd Bde para Cdo* [Commander of the Para Commando] remained the whole day at the BELGIAN Embassy, that he was joined there by Major Moors (3 L para) who served as Liaison Offr of the Bde [Brigade] to the ambassador until evacuation of the Embassy the next day. It was not empty Ugs that arrived in the afternoon, rather they came with about 50 men from the *17 Cie*. [17th Company] of the 3 para with Capt. ONRAET. Due to the lack of space, C6 tries to accommodate them at the Swiss Embassy nearby, but he is refused permission. For the night, they are accommodated, as best as possible, in

the C7 apparatus at the Embassy. Around 19.00, part of them escort a first convoy of expatriates to the airport. The remainder will go to the *Ecole française* the next morning.

- e. At 16.10, H6 reports that the ACP contingent SILVER BACK wants to send back the ACP KIBAT to NAIROBI. S6 answers that ACP KIBAT is under UN and for that matter must remain in KIGALI.
- f. At 20.07, A6 reports that the *Det judicare* [Judicial detachment] that had accompanied the remains, has returned from NAIROBI. S6 sends a message to them that they should remain at the airport.

51. Situation of the units on 11 April at 24.00

a. *MERIDIEN/DOLCE VILLA*

- (1) PC Bn including Capt. MADALUNS, Sgt. NELLIS and RELAX MINUS *le Padre*.
- (2) *Gp AIRFIELD*: A7, A12, P1 B EXCEPT A26.
- (3) *Gp SUD*: PC, P1 A.
- (4) M6 and a party of ACP Pers.
- (5) Y7, Y4, Cpx LEFEBRE, KINKIN, LALOUX, and 1Sgt. HUTSEBAUT.

b. *RWANDEX*

- (1) Base Log (MINUS TWO men from the CTM who went to the airport).
- (2) A26 and his PC P1.
- (3) P1B *Gp SUD*.

c. *TOP GUN*

- (1) Half of the PC *Gp AIRFIELD* with A6.
- (2) The P1 A MINUS A12.
- (3) TWO MEN from Y3 and Y8.
- (4) *Det judiciaire* returned from NAIROBI.
- (5) Det Heli
- (6) Psec Bn and part of ACP Pers.
- (7) Padre
- (8) Lt. DEMEYERE and CLC JANSSEN de KIGALODGE.

d. *AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE*

- (1) C6
- (2) P1 B *Gp CITY*
- (3) THREE MEN Det Med

e. *BELGIAN EMBASSY*

- (1) PC *Gp CITY* MINUS C6
- (2) P1 A *Gp CITY*
- (3) ONE P1 17 *Cie.* of 3 Para
- (4) Maj. MOORS and Eq Ln Bde Para Cdo

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- f. The **FOUR** Mor and **TWO** from the Log Base who accompanied the bodies to **NAIROBI** remained in **NAIROBI**. They will be the first members of **KIBAT** to return to Belgium with the remains on 14 April.

KIBAT - 12 APRIL 1994

DEVELOPMENT ON 12 APRIL

52. General situation

(a) Activities of the belligerents

Like every day, the fighting between FAR and RPF resumed exactly at dawn. The hottest spots are the surrounding area of CND and *carrefour N4* [junction N4] which are under regular mortar fire from the two parties.

(b) French operation

1. At 3.45 p.m., A6 communicates that French soldiers starts to leave Kigali Airport. The total withdrawal of French troop should complete the following day.

2. Recovery of the bodies of the three French volunteers

(a) At 12.45 p.m., A6 requests M6 to contact his French military counterpart regarding the bodies of the French volunteers which were not found the previous day. The French ask whether a team cannot go and verify once more if the bodies are in house indicated.

(b) M6, S3 and few men went back to the house indicated and conduct thorough search. Finally, they were attracted by fresh heap of soil in the garden.

(c) At 6.15 p.m. Doctor Thiery mentioned that three bodies have been found (one man and one woman of white race and an adolescent of black race). They found clues in the house, which allowed them to identify the bodies. The bodies will be taken to the airport the next day. A message in that regard is sent to A6 to inform Lt. Col. Maurin, head of the *coopération française* [French Oversea Volunteer Service].

(d) A while later, the French contact Bn again because the body of the adolescent of black race was not one of the bodies searched for. Searches will resume the next day because of nightfall.

(c) Ops SILVER BACK

1. 17 Companies protecting the French School where they relieve a French Company, the remaining at the airport.

2. At 8.43 p.m., D6 states that in a radio news in Belgium, it was said that all Belgian troops are positioned at the airport. The information comes from Mr. Vigneron, the manager of RWANDEX who was in telephone contact with his brother in Belgium. As the elements of KIBAT are

still at the MERIDIEN and at RWANDEX, it is felt that it is not an information on Ops SILVER BACK.

(d) Msg. Gen. Charlier

At 1.48 p.m., Bn receives a message from COps: "I would like to congratulate you and the entire 2 Cdo. After the painful experience by Bn yesterday, Thursday, the readiness, devotion and effectiveness with which you accomplished the greater part of the work of assembling and escorting the citizens, compel admiration. Everyone is proud of you. It is seen that among the bleu berets, there are green berets, who are really para-commandos."

Signed Gen Charlier

(e) Log situation

1. At 10.15 a.m., the Commander of Byubat Golf Company comes to remove 800 rations at Log Base. After verification with the QG Secteur, Bn delivers the rations.
2. At 11.37 a.m., QG Secteur transmits that from now on the supply at RWANDEX belonged to the Force. Distribution must be done according to the list drawn up by the Log Officer of the Force. D6 must execute the instructions in the list. D6 replies that it did not have the list, but perhaps the Log Officer of Bn, Capt. Madalins.
3. With the departure of Gp CITY to the airport in the afternoon, S6 intends to also have the Base log evacuated to the airport.
At 1.28 p.m., D6 receives order to load his means of transport with all what he can, and be prepared to follow the column of C6 which, in about one and half to two hours time, will pass in front of RWANDEX.
4. At 2.52 p.m., D6 and S6 assesses the situation of RWANDEX. If the Base Log is reinforced with One Pl, its security can be ensured and this would allow escorted movements to the airport in order to transport maximum material to the airport. We will take advantage of the first lift in order to take the elevator to the airport. When the column of C6 will pass by, D6 will pick up B7 and the Pl A of Gp SUD. The already loaded lorries will join the column, and will unload and return to RWANDEX. Sec B12 will accompany them to ensure their protection when returning from the airport.
5. At 4.10 p.m., the column of C6 passes by RWANDEX. The Pl of B7 stops there. D7 and the first six lorries as well as the elevator from Base Log and B12 will join the column which does not stop.
6. At 5.35 p.m., S7 communicates to D6 that the lorries will be taken back to RWANDEX the following day due to the time taken to offload and the nightfall.

(f) Other operations

1. At 3.45 a.m., Oscar communicates the plan of missions to QG Secteur. At 7 a.m., Mrs. Rupp will be taken from the MERIDIEN, the PI for Gitarama will depart from RWANDEX at 9 a.m.; the 200 expatriates at the MERIDIEN will be taken to the airport at 9 a.m. under escort by One PI of Gp AIRFIELD which, in doing so, will carry out the RWAMAGANA mission.
 2. Protection of QG Secteur
At 1.05 p.m., QG Secteur requests Two sections for protection. The sections must have night vision material and bring ammunitions and food for 47 people. S3 replies that it will send them once it has the means. Gp SUD will supply the Sections and Gp AIRFIELD with Two CVRT
 3. Helicopter
At 3.30 a.m., QG Secteur inquires about helicopter pilots. A BASE replies that they are probably operational and that he is going to send someone to the helicopter hanger to verify. A little while later, A6 informs that considering the circumstances, the pilots do not want to fly.
 4. M-113 drivers
At 8.31 p.m., QG Secteur requests KIBAT to find M-113 drivers, as in a few days time, the United Nations is going to deliver Six M-113 for the Force. Therefore, QG Force is looking for drivers for these vehicles. The request is transmitted to all Bn units.
53. Evacuation convoys to the airport
- (a) At 9.28, QG Secteur sends directives concerning UNAMIR convoys. There is need for radio contact between the first and the last vehicles. Once a non-UNAMIR vehicle finds its way among the convoy, measures should be taken immediately to expulse the vehicle from the column. This measure must be complied with so as to ensure the security of all UNAMIR vehicles.
 - (b) Evacuation from the MERIDIEN
 1. The expatriates that arrived the previous day should be evacuated in the evening as quickly as possible
 2. At 8.02 a.m., A7 moves from MERIDIEN with a column of 200 expatriates and leads them to the airport where they arrived at 9 a.m.
 - (c) Evacuation from the French School
 1. At 8.15 a.m., QG Secteur assigns a new mission to Bn. The mission is to escort and transport 60 people from the French School to the airport. The mission will be assigned to Gp SUD.
 2. At 8.45 a.m., B6 reports that he is leaving RWANDEX with his PI B for the French School.

He arrives at the French School and informs that the so-called refugees that the French left in the school were blacks among whom were some Rwandans working for the United Nations and who are requesting to be evacuated. S6 tells him that he must evacuate, to the airport, anyone that requests such, but that selection for subsequent evacuation would be done by the authorities of the United Nations or Belgium. It also seems that a convoy of the brigade is envisaged to pick up the remaining Belgians, but it has yet to arrive.

3. B6 boards the black expatriates in Two covered lorries and the European expatriates in an uncovered lorry in order to draw the attention of RAF to the latter.
4. At 9.25 a.m., B6 transmits that he has loaded all his lorries and that he is en route to the airport. A convoy of Bde Para-Cdo will be organized at 11.30 a.m. for the Belgians who are still there. S6 gives him his consent to commence and tells him that once he arrives at the airport, he will receive another mission.
5. He goes through N12 without problems and at N9 he reports of some friendly contacts with Rwandan paras. On the way he reports of armed groups looting houses.
At 10.03 a.m., he reports that he has arrived at the airport.

(d) Evacuation of the Belgian Embassy

1. At 10.05 a.m., QG Secteur gives order to ensure security for the evacuation of the Belgian Embassy staff. As soon as it is possible, 25 people, including one VIP (the Ambassador) should be evacuated. Transport and escort will be provided by KIBAT. At 10.06 a.m., S6 requests C6 to take charge of the evacuation of the Belgian Embassy.
2. At 10.50 a.m., C6 transmits that his plan is to evacuate the 25 people from the Embassy to the French School on board Two Ugs escorted by Two jeeps of his Pl B and One Pl 3 Para. The Two jeeps will then return to the Embassy.
3. At 11.48 a.m., QG Secteur communicates that the Ambassador himself and the rearguard of the Embassy will be evacuated at 1 p.m. One APC will be provided with an officer of the sector to command the convoy. C6 must contact the Ambassador for coordination measures. In the end, no APC or Officer came from the sector.
4. At 12.19 p.m., S6 communicates to C6 that he is sending B7 and One Pl of Gp SUD to the French School in order to reinforce the escort evacuating the Embassy staff. He asked him to agree with the Ambassador to go directly to the French School. So, he will join the convoy that will leave for the airport.

5. Around midday, B7 who is waiting at the MERIDIEN after the suspension of the Gitarama mission, receives order to reinforce the escort evacuating the Embassy staff from the French School to the airport. At 12.30 p.m., he leaves the MERIDIEN with the PI A of Gp Sud. He takes a road avoiding N4 through the North and he is blocked by a broken-down Bangladeshi lorry which obstructs his passage. He reports to Oscar and S2, who is on duty, tells him to go through N4. When going through N4 a mortar shell exploded close to the vehicles. A shrapnel injures the foot of Sergeant Debiasi. B7 describes the nature of the wound to Oscar. M6 tells him to evacuate to RWANDEX by going towards the French School, in order to give him first aid.
6. At 12.29 p.m., C6 communicates that he contacted AMBABEL (The Belgian Ambassador). C7 who is at the Embassy will escort him up to his residence to enable him to pack his luggage, and then go to the French School. C6 requests information on what to do next in respect of his mission in town because after 1 p.m., there will no expatriate in his cantonments.
7. At 12.43 p.m., C7 points out that AMBABEL must be transported in an armoured vehicle obligatorily: it is an order from Brussels. At 13.04 p.m., S6 communicates to C6 that he is sending CVRT to the French School. C6 can utilize them for the protection of AMBABEL.
8. Around 1 p.m., B7 arrives at the French School. He asks what he must do with the Rwandan who wants to leave. Oscar tells him to take all those he can in his means of transport to the airport where selection will be done.
9. At 1.22 p.m., S6 tells C6 that he can evacuate his entire Gp to the airport together with the Embassy staff. The convoy must pass by RWANDEX, and join the lorries of Base Log.
10. At 1.29 p.m., C7 reports that AMBABEL still needs a bit of time to destroy documents.
11. At 1.40 p.m., the Liaison Officer of Bde Para-Cdo who is at the French School tells B7 that everyone must now leave. There is a Company of 3 para at the French School. S6 tells B7 not to leave, but to wait for the convoy of C6, which is on its way with AMBABEL. The plan by Bn should be adhered to.
12. At 1.50 p.m., the CVRTs arrive at the French School and are sent to the Embassy.
13. At 2 p.m., S6 gives C6 the responsibility to pick up Ten journalists from Milles Collines. C6 sends One Ug escorted with Two jeeps to the Embassy before the departure of the column to the airport.

14. At 3 p.m., following his decision to evacuate the entire Gp CITY to the airport, but to maintain Base Log at RWANDEX, S6 orders B7 to leave the column when it goes through the height of RWANDEX in order to reinforce Base Log.
 15. At 3.30 p.m., C7 reports that the column has commenced its advance. At 3.54 p.m., V6 commanding the vehicle transporting AMBABEL, informs that he is leaving the residence for the French School.
 16. Upon arrival at the French school, C6 reorganizes everyone found there and forms the column which he takes command of. The column comprises 120 vehicles. It is escorted with Two Pl of Gp CITY, Pl of Gp SUD with B7 and the Two CVRT attached to AMBABEL.
 17. At 4.10 a.m., C6 arrives at the height of RWANDEX and continues towards N12. The convoy progresses on without stopping, the Six vehicles of RWANDEX and the elevator join them. B7 and the Pl remain at Base Log. B7 had given orders that the injured person who was left at RWANDEX should be evacuated to ACP at the airport in one of the vehicles of D6.
 18. Few minutes after, C6 reports that an RPG 7 (anti-tank weapon) is leveled at the CVRT. He contacts RAF who are positioned at N12, and advances after a never-ending discussion.
 19. At 4.20 p.m., V6 reports that he had to quit the itinerary because a grenade exploded close to his vehicle. He is going to try and join the trunk road envisaged.
Few minutes later, he reports that he is again on the trunk road.
 20. The remaining part of the way was without incidents and everyone arrives safe and sound at the airport.
At 4.55 p.m., S6 tells C6 that he is going to stay at TOP GUN with all his men.
 21. At 5 p.m., H6 reports that the injured person has, indeed, received treatment at the ACP of Bde para-commando.
He then boarded a C-130 going to Nairobi. S6 and S7 contact the Belgian military adviser to the Ambassador in Nairobi so that, upon arrival in Nairobi, soldier Debiasi can personally inform his family.
 22. At 5.35 p.m., C6 reports that he is positioning his Gp at the airport. C6 wants to cut off his radio contacts, but can be contacted via A BASE. S6 tells him that he must maintain constant radio contact.
54. Search for expatriates in Kigali
- (a) German citizens

1. At 1.20 a.m., QG Secteur requests to evacuate Eleven German citizens from DEUTSCHE WELLE as well as Mrs. Rupp and her four-year old daughter who are living opposite CND. The request is made by the German Ambassador to Belgium and is transmitted by COps. Around 3 a.m., S14 will communicate the actual location of these persons. S7 will be responsible for Mrs. Rupp and Gp SUD for DEUTSCHE WELLE.
2. Mrs. Rupp
Two jeeps with S7, Major Bodart (CDG), Sergeant-major Schiepers and Cpl. Themans depart from the MERIDIEN around 7 a.m. to pick up Mrs. Rupp. The house is located south of CND between RAF and RPF lines. After tensesd contact with RAF lines, first S7 does not find the house fitting the description given. Just to be sure, he pushes on a little farther opposite CND where he finds Mrs. Rupp and her daughter at 7.35 a.m. They took them to the MERIDIEN and immediately put them in the convoy of refugees being organized to leave for the airport.
3. DEUTSCHE WELLE
 - (a) At 11.55 a.m., B6 receives order to go and look for Germans at DEUTSCHE WELLE, a German radio station located Four kilometres north of Amahoro stadium.
 - (b) At 12.15 p.m., he leaves the airport to carry out his mission.
 - (c) At 12.36 p.m., he reaches Two kilometres north of CND on the road leading from N5, close to RPF lines. Mortar shells (probably RAF) fall very close to his convoy and RPF elements fire some rounds, but not in his direction. He stops and contacts RPF which informs him that the road he is taking is mined a little farther. So, S6 tells him to return to the MERIDIEN.
 - (d) At 12.53 p.m., since junction N4 is under mortar fire, S2 tell B6 to go to the airport and not to the MERIDIEN. B6 will go to the MERIDIEN a little later when the firing clams down.
 - (e) The people at DEUTSCHE WELLE will be picked up the next day by elements of Bde Para Cdo (ESR) who will take the road leading to DEUTSCHE WELL through a northwest.

(b) CTM

1. At 8.30 a.m., QG Secteur transmits that the authorization for evacuation from CTM was given by Brussels and that KIBAT must undertake to provide escort for the remaining members of CTM. S6 replies that once his mission at the French School ends, this will be possible. QG Secteur requests to be informed of the time so as to warn the military volunteers.
2. At 10.15 a.m., after escorting the convoy from the French School to the airport, B6 receives a mission to evacuate CTM. He has to go to CTM

village by passing near CND which is still under sporadic mortar fire, to look for 10 people who will be taken in Four minibuses.

3. At 11.15 p.m., B6 reports that he is leaving CTM with Belgian citizens. He arrives at the airport few minutes later.

(c) Other operations

1. At 9.10 a.m., QG Secteur requests to search for 9 Sisters of Kanombe Convent. S6 replies that he no longer has any element to carry out the mission. So, QG Secteur requests to try on the side the French or Pers SILVER BACK.
2. At 10.30 a.m., QG Secteur communicates the addresses of Four families requesting assistance. Two of the families had refused to be evacuated few days earlier. Gp CITY takes charge of the mission.
3. At 5.30 p.m., D6 reports that a request for assistance has reached him concerning some people at Nyamirambo. S7 tells him that considering the late hour, he cannot go for them.

55. Search for expatriates outside Kigali

(a) General

1. At 7.10 a.m., S6 requests A6 to consider to what extent missions to the interior parts of the country cannot be carried out by the French or by Bde Para-Commando. He must requests to have RAF liaison officers for his missions. A6 replies that he has no contact with RAF as such, except with the Commander of Bn Para, Major Ntabakuze. Afterwards, S6 contacts QG Secteur on the same subject.
2. At 7.52 a.m., A6 transmits that he had contacted the French and Bde Para-Commando who inform him that, for the moment, they do not envisage any sortie to the interior part of the country.
3. At 10.20 a.m., QG Secteur transmits instructions from the Force Commander that any mission outside Kigali must be coordinated; the Force Commander will contact the Chiefs of Staff of the *Gendarmerie* and RAF to have escorts.

(b) GISENYI - RUHENGERI

1. Evacuation of members of CTM in Gisenyi. The mission could be executed utilizing helicopter. KIBAT will have One PI of Gp on standby at the MERIDIEN.
2. Around 6.45 a.m., B6 receives order to be prepared to execute the Gisenyi mission with the PI at the MERIDIEN. The mission will be cancelled in the afternoon.

3. At 6.45 a.m., QG Secteur adds a rescue mission in Ruhengeri. The mission will not be executed because the expatriates from Ruhengeri left by their own means.

(c) GITARAMA - KABGAY

1. At 3.40 p.m., B Platoon of Gp SUD positioned at RWANDEX receives a warning order to search for expatriates in Gitarama-Kabgai. It must be ready for 9 a.m.
2. Around 7 a.m., QG Secteur communicates that the citizens of Gitarama have gone to the Bishopric of Kabgai. They are 25 people in number.
3. At 8.20 a.m., S6 transmits to QG Secteur that the mission to Gitarama has departed from the MERIDIEN, but without escort neither from the Rwandan *gendarmerie* nor from RAF. The convoy commanded by B7 is composed of One MAN of Base Log escorted by the Pl A of Gp SUD and reinforced with One CVRT.
4. On the way, the convoy receives additional order to pick up some Sisters in Kamomy half way between Kigali and Gitarama.
5. A little before 9 a.m., the convoy arrives at the bridge over Nyabarongo (Six kilometres East of Kigali). The bridge is not destroyed as some rumours claim, but it is guarded by an RAF Company positioned as support with few heavy weapons. Lt. Lecompte contacts the Company Commander. The Commander has no instruction concerning them and does not want to allow them to pass through.
6. At 9.10 a.m., B7 reports that he is returning to Kigali. QG Secteur is informed few minutes later and K9 requests that the escort should stop at a safe place. He is going to contact RAF to open the road. S6 transmits to B7 to determine a safe place and stop there pending the outcome of K9's attempts. Considering the increasingly tensed situation, B7 decides to return to the MERIDIEN and informs S6 of it.
7. On his arrival at PC Bn, B7 reports to S3 and S6 about the presence of Three whites isolated amidst a mob on the flanks dominating NI; they seemed to be in really bad position. As Rwandans armed with grenades overwhelmed the convoy, he could not do anything.
8. At 11.40 a.m. the Gitarama mission is cancelled by Secteur.

(d) RWAMAGANA - KIBUNGO

1. QG Secteur orders the evacuation of about 80 citizens in RWAMAGANA on the side of AKAGERA. S6 assigns the mission to A7 with A21, A22, Y7 and Mor.

2. After escorting the expatriates from the MERIDIEN to the airport, A7 must pick up *gendarmes* from the airport and an RAF liaison Officer and continue to Rwamagana.
At 9.20 a.m., he reports that he is leaving in 20 minutes. In addition to Two Sections out of (sic) Ug, the convoy was composed of One CVRT and Two Recee jeeps. QG Secteur insists that he should not leave without a proper RAF escort so as not to have the same problem like the Gitarama mission. As at present, A7 has a *gendarme* from Rwamagana who wants to take advantage of the means of transport to return to his home, as he does not want to assist the convoy.
3. At 10 a.m., realising that there will be no RAF escort, A7 commences the trip to Rwamagana with his one *gendarme*.
4. At 10.45 a.m., A BASE reports that it has lost radio contact with A7 and that it does not know his position.
5. At 11.05 a.m., A7 reports his position through BLU. He is 30 kilometres northwest of the airport with Two *gendarmes* as escort.
At 11.23 a.m., A7 arrives at the entrance of Rwamagana.
6. At 11.37 a.m., he reports that he is blocked by the local *gendarmerie*.
7. At 12.08 p.m., after the intervention of the local Commander of Bde Gd, contact is established with the expatriates who point out that Four expatriates are in Kibungo, 60 kilometres south of Rwamagana. With the consent of S6, A7 leaves to pick them up before returning to Kigali.
8. At 3.40 p.m., A BASE reports that A7 left Kibungo an hour ago. There was no news of the people he was to find there so as to return to Kigali before nightfall, he did not wait for long. He picked up a total of 67 refugees and returns to Kigali.
9. At 3.52 p.m., A6 informs that because the *gendarme* from Rwamagana no longer wants to return to Kigali, A7 returns without the *gendarme*. However, he asks the *gendarmes* to return to Kigali. If he does not receive them, if need be, he has to force his way.
10. At 5.20 p.m., the convoy of A7 arrives at TOP GUN. He prepares to return to the MERIDIEN, journalists who accompanied him request to be lodged at the MERIDIEN. S6 refuses.

56. Situation of the units on 12 April at midnight

(a) MERIDIEN

1. PC Bn without Padre
2. A7 and Pl B Gp AIRFIELD
3. B6 and Pl B Gp SUD of which Two sections are on guard at QG Secteur.

4. Y7, Y4, Cpx LEFEBVRE, KINKIN, LALOUX and 1 Sgt. HUTSEBAUT
5. EOD, a medical element

(b) RWANDEX

1. Base Log without D7 and few drivers
2. B7 and Pl A of Gp SUD without B12

(c) AIRFIELD

1. PC and Pl A of Gp AIRFIELD
2. The entire Gp CITY
3. P Sec Bn and ACP
4. Det Heli.
5. B12
6. D7 and few Base Log drivers

(d) QG Secteur

1. Two sections of Gp SUD
2. Two CVRT

KIBAT - 13 APRIL 1994

DEVELOPMENT ON 13 APRIL

57. General situation.

(a) Situation of the belligerents

Fighting is rather scattered, mainly on the northern side of the MERIDIEN and towards RWANDEX. As from 5 a.m., Log Base finds itself between RPF and RAF fires. The installations are not directly targeted, but the situation does not allow any movement. In the course of the morning, the firings moved elsewhere and finally calmed down.

(b) French Ops

1. At 8.25 a.m., A6 informs that it remains just a small French element close to him.
2. Remains of French nationals
 - (a) At 11.18, M6 points out that the bodies of the French are still at the MERIDIEN. He will go and look for the third body after the bombardments on N4, and will bring them from there to the airport. A6 replies that the last French elements are no longer waiting for the remains in order to leave.
 - (b) At 12.43 p.m., the French point out that they will be content with the two bodies found. They will leave without the third. S3 transmits that as soon as it is possible, he will bring the third body to the airport.
 - (c) At 1.14 p.m., S3 reports that he is leaving the MERIDIEN for the house where they found the bodies so as to conduct a last search. The convoy is escorted by A7, A21 and part of A13 on board a CVRT.
 - (d) At 1.30 p.m., S3 reports that he has found the third body and that he will come to the airport and he arrives at 1.45 p.m.
3. Around 3.30 p.m., S6 warns K9 that the French are asking when they can hand over the defence of the airport to UNAMIR. K9 replies that that is a political issue. The take over of the airport will be done, first by Bde Para Cdo and afterwards by KIBAT.

(c) Ops SILVER BACK

1. At 9 a.m., K9 leaves QG Secteur for the airport, escorted by Two CVRT. He stops at the MERIDIEN to assess the situation with S6 and

to take M-113 drivers. At 9.10 a.m., K9 and S6 leave the MERIDIEN for the airport. There, they find Col BEM ROMAN, Comd Bde Para Cdo.

2. At 10.45 a.m., QG Secteur communicates that JS gave order that Two Helicopters of KIBAT are under the command of Bde Para Cdo.
3. At 11.50 a.m., while a C-130 (BE) with Tutsi orphans is preparing to take off, a mortar bomb explodes on the runway going from where planes are parked towards the main runway. S6 and Comd 3 para, who were leaving where the planes are parked to join PC 3 Para, take shelter in a trench along the runway. Two other bombs very close explode while the C-130 (BE) is taking off. S6 and Comd 3 Para then join PC 3 Para to coordinate the take over of the airport defence.
4. At 12.27 p.m., the convoy of K9 and S6, escorted by the Two CVRT of V6, leaves the airport for QG Force, and then went back to the MERIDIEN.
5. All day long, Belgian, French and United Nations planes are taking off and landing. A little after 1 p.m., Two Italian C-130s land and Italian Paras disembark. They are an Italian contingent coming to participate in the operation with Bde Para Cdo.
6. At 3.50 p.m., K9 reports that General Dallaire is not available for the takeover and handover of the airport defence and that KIBAT must contact Bde Para Cdo to coordinate the modalities. He stresses that it should be done in due form.
7. At 4.15 p.m., S6 prepares the Two sections of A16 still at the MERIDIEN to go to the airport.
At 5.20 p.m., S6 gives order that the two sections should immediately go to the airport.
At 6.14 p.m., the sections leave the MERIDIEN, but are blocked by the firings on N4; they return to the MERIDIEN where they will spend the night again.
8. At 5.25 p.m., QG Secteur communicates the following instructions: Gp CITY is taking the French positions; Company 17 of the 3 Para will go to the airport tonight, will be refreshed and leave for Nairobi. Two Cie of 3 Para will be relieved early tomorrow morning; Bde Para Cdo will be relieved by 3 L Para and 1 Ch Ch; the relief at the airport ground will last four hours after BMCT; after which Bde will be refreshed at the airport and fly out in the afternoon; the relief will be carried out directly between Bde and KIBAT; KIBAT can take over, from Bde Para-commando, the ammunitions ordered few week ago at EMG.
9. At 6.19 p.m., QG Secteur requests KIBAT to inform it on the number and type of hardware taken from Bde para-cdo. It is crucial to make official the handover and takeover by the United Nations and Belgium.

10. At 6.23 p.m., A6 reports that he has taken the positions of the French east of the runway. He asks whether the rules of engagement have been changed and what must be his attitude towards RAF who are at the airport. S6 replies that the elements of RAF must not be integrated into that of A6, but well "juxtaposed and kept under surveillance".
11. At 8.36 p.m., A6 communicates that he will visit the network of 3 Para which commands the defence of the airport. Comd 3 Para requests S6 to come to the airport the following day at 4 a.m. At 8.47 p.m., S6 responds that like C6, A6 must maintain radio contact in the KIBAT network. Furthermore, it is not allowed to move between the MERIDIEN and the airport at night. Therefore, he proposes a rendezvous at 8 a.m. as long as the mortar fires and fighting, which normally resume at dawn, do not hinder it.

(d) Log situation

1. At 7.30 a.m., D6 transmits the situation of its food stock. He has 19,000 C rations and 12,000 litres of water left at RWANDEX. At the airport, there are still Six *palettes* of water and Six *palettes* of C rations.
2. At 9.21 p.m., QG Secteur directs personnel to offload the C-130s bringing drugs in the night to the Force (the mission will finally be carried out by one Pl of the Bangladeshi Engineering Corps, positioned at the airport).

(e) Various operations

1. Problem of M-113 drivers
 - (a) At 1.35 a.m., QG Secteur makes an appointment for Two M-113 drivers at 8.45 a.m. at the QG Secteur. They will go to the airport with the convoy taking K9 there. They will be in charge of the M-113s which arrived during the night in order to carry out the mission to the MERIDIEN. At this moment, Bn has only found Four M-113 drivers among whom are Two officers and one Sub-officer. The search continues.
 - (b) At 7.05 a.m., QG Secteur instructs to place One M-113 driver at the disposal of Bde Para Cdo. KIBAT should provide a standby escort at the airport as from 10 a.m. to ensure the protection of the M-113s which will carry out a mission to the MERIDIEN.
 - (c) At 7.50 a.m. QG Secteur stresses that Two M-113 drivers, at least, should be at the airport at 10 a.m. Meanwhile, Bn found Two M-113 drivers among the EOD team.

(d) When the Two M-113 drivers arrive at the airport, the problem of paint should be resolved because the M-113 are not in White colour (UN colour). They are *kakis* M-113s delivered by the US Army with radios and one Mi.50 superstructure.

2. Location of QG Secteur

At 8.15 p.m., QG Secteur requests some JC of diesel, food and water for itself. This was done, but all the same, S6 suggests to K9 to come and stay with QG Secteur at the Hotel MERIDIEN, which provides more protection and will allow easier coordination between both of them. K9 feels that in the current circumstances this was not possible.

58. Ops for expatriates

(a) At 7.45 a.m., C6 receives order to be prepared to provide Two sections of Ug to accompany the M-113 to the MERIDIEN at 10 a.m. S6 is not aware of the mission. The sections will therefore equip themselves adequately. At 8.30 a.m., K9 cancels the mission of M-113 for the MERIDIEN and gives priority to the evacuation of expatriates according to the requests which are still arriving.

At 8.40 a.m., S6 tells C6 to take orders from Bde for an evacuation mission.

(b) Mission of C6 in town

1. At 10 a.m., C6 communicates that it is under the orders of Bde. He must provide a patrol in town composed of One command jeep with himself, Two Ug with Mi.50 of C16, Two reconnaissance jeeps with Sub-Lt. Audry and Sgt. Schuermans and Two CVRTs of Bde in which are found Lt. Col. Chantraine of CTM, among others.
2. At 10.24 a.m., C6 leaves KIBAT network and enters Bde network. He must go and look for 15 Polish at Gikondo, 6 or 7 foreigners around the French School, journalists, Zairians, Senegalese and Americans at Hotel des *Mille Collines*, 10 Burundian priests at Nyarugenge, 1 young girl at *Lycée Notre Dame de Citeaux*, 2 priests at Groupe Scolaire St André, 2 nuns at *Eglise de la Sainte Famille* and the children of a Russian at Nyamirambo.
3. He picked up the Polish from Gikondo, refugees from *Mille Collines* and the young girl from *Notre Dame de Citeaux* and brought them to the French School. He then leaves again for Nyamirambo, through *carrefour C4* and rue de la Justice. He arrives at two roadblocks in C26 and C12 where the population is hostile to Belgians. He crosses the roadblocks pretending that they are French (the uniforms on which they had Belgian flags were removed), but after they went through, the Rwandans realise the trick.
4. They picked up two priests of *Gp Scolaire St. André* as well as a Rwandan family. The Russian who accompanied the convoy picks up

his two children who had been in the house of a friend since the beginning of the events. A grenade is thrown into the buildings of *groupe scolaire* and the atmosphere is becoming tumultuous. C6 realises that it is going to be difficult to go through the roadblocks again without harm. He decides to take a road that passes through the bottom of Rwampara valley between Nyamirambo and Gikondo. Therefore, he cannot go and look for the Burundian priests at Nyarugenge.

5. While he is advancing, the convoy comes under fire from pockets of Gunmen. C6 opens fire on the visible gunmen with all his weapons. He brings the CVRT SPARTAN in front of his column to demolish the low walls mounted as roadblocks. Few propelled grenades drops in the surroundings. The personnel of the convoy counter-attack. The CVRT slows down because it bends the axis of its barrel. An English journalist who accompanies the convoy in a Renault Clio (against the will of C6 who had warned him that he would not stop the convoy for him) abandons his vehicle and hold on to stretched out hands in order to jump into one of the moving Ug. Finally, the convoy arrives at the French School without harm.
 6. Elements of 3 L Para who are on the spot, then carry out the mission of evacuation around the French School.
 7. Afterwards, Blue helmets, elements of 3 Para and 3 L Para form a column which will go to the airport. On the road, an RAF lorry wants slip into the column in order to pass through RPF lines. The lorry is blocked by the vehicles of 3 L Para.
 8. At the height of RPF lines, Two CVRTs break down. C6 leaves the armoured vehicles on the spot with military and civilian personnel who are accompanying them and goes to the airport. Bde Para Cdo immediately sends one of his elements to bring back the two broken down vehicles.
- (c) At 8.03 a.m., QG Secteur requests to provide an escort to the French School and look for the last expatriates. S6 asks whether Cie 3 Para which is on the spot cannot carry out the mission.
- (d) At 1.13 p.m., QG Secteur requests Two lorries to transport refugees. These Two MAN must go and pick up the refugees at the French School under Bde escort.
- (e) Mission with Italian Paras
1. At 2.30, S3 communicates that the Italians are requesting an escort to pick up refugees in town. Since the request is supported by Comd Bde Para Cdo, S6 accepts to provide escort which accompanied S3 and the remains of the French to the airport. In order not to increase tension due to the presence of Italian uniforms which are not known by RPF and RAF, S6 requests QG Secteur that the Two parties should be

informed, more so that the Italian Paras are on board civilian vehicles "retrieved" at the airport. QG Force is informed few minutes later.

2. The escort is composed of A7, Y7 and Y4 in Two jeeps and One pick-up, B26 on board an Mi.50 jeep, A21 and One CVRT. The mission takes place in the area between the Office of the Prime Minister and Kigali Night.
 3. At 4.50 p.m., A7 communicates that the atmosphere is tensed on the side of Franciscus and that he might have problems.
 4. At 5.05 p.m., he reports that he has picked up civilians at Franciscus, but that he had to fire on Two Rwandan soldiers who had aimed at him. Later, he informs that they are only wounded.
 5. At 6.25 p.m., A7 reports that he is at the airport with Four expatriates. S6 tells him to remain at TOP GUN.
- (f) At 9.55 p.m., KIBAT communicates to QG Secteur regarding a Zainan family to be picked up in town when this is possible. QG Secteur replies that evacuation operations in town are not envisaged on the following day, 14 April. Only convoys to the interior part of the country will be organized.

59. Removal of Log Base

- (a) At 1.20 p.m., S6 tells D6 that he is going to send Four lorries to RWANDEX. The lorries will be under Bde (SL Para) escort with the Two lorries requested by QG Secteur for the French School. D6 must have the lorries loaded, but that does not mean that he is going to evacuate the entire RWANDEX.
- (b) At 1.41 p.m., the convoy with the lorries leave the airport. D7 accompanies them to the Log base.
- (c) At 3.35 p.m., D7 reports that the airport road to RWANDEX is held by RAF. There are five men every ten metres and Rwandan paras are at the height of RWANDEX in groups of four.
- (d) At 4.55 p.m., S3 requests D6 to load One MAN with C rations, water, white paint and UN stickers. In fact, the United Nations M-113s and the CVRTs taken over by Bde para-commando should be painted in white. The lorry will be added to one column of refugees which is coming from the town to the airport.
- (e) At 5.55 p.m., since it was close to nightfall and the convoy of refugees has not arrived, S3 decides to postpone all movements from RWANDEX to the following day.

- (f) At 7.35 p.m., D Base reports that one of the lorries parked at RWANDEX has been fired on, the fence set on fire and irate civilians are moving around the cantonment. D6 places his men on alert and requests Bn to reflect on the Log Base problem of security since there is no longer any element of KIBAT in town.

60. Situation of KIBAT on 13 April at midnight

(a) MERIDIEN

1. PC Bn, EOD
2. Two sections of Gp AIRFIELD
3. B6 and Pl B of Gp SUD (of which Two sections are on guard at QG Secteur)
4. Y7, Y4 and 1 Sgt Hutsebaut

(b) RWANDEX

1. Log base personnel
2. B7 with Pl of Gp SUD

(c) AIRPORT

1. Gp AIRFIELD minus Two sections and Two CVRT on guard at QG Secteur
2. Complete Gp CITY
3. Elm PC of Gp SUD
4. ACP, Helis, EOD

KIBAT - 14 APRIL 1994

DEVELOPMENTS ON 14 APRIL

61. General situation

(a) Fighting between belligerents

1. As soon as dawn broke, information was received about RPF movements in the vicinity of RWANDEX.
2. The fighting resumed during the day. With KIBAT elements present only at RWANDEX, *MERIDIEN* and at the airport, the reports on fighting come only from these areas.
3. Around midday, as the French are ready to board the plane, three mortar rounds fall in the proximity of the runway: ONE at 100 m to the NORTH of C16's positions, TWO in the middle of the runway just a few metres southwards. Lt. Col. MAURIN contacts the RAF STAFF HEADQUARTERS and threatens them with air strikes by A JAGUAR on standby a little distance away from KIGALI. The last C-160 (FR) takes off and flies away without any hindrance by putting its AA decoy into operation during the flight over KANOMBE.

4. Conciliation meeting

At 07.15, K9 announces that an important meeting is going to take place at *QG Secteur* [*Secteur Headquarters*] in the presence of Mr. BOOH BOOH. This is one more attempt to bring the belligerents together to seek agreement. The TWO CVRTs of the *Gp AIRFIELD* [*Airfield Group*] will therefore remain on guard at *QG Secteur* for a while longer. As the two parties distrust each other and fear for the security of their representatives, they did not honour the appointment in the end.

(b) Ops SILVER BACK

After KIBAT elements take up positions, SILVER BACK elements continue their redeployment to NAIROBI. At the end of the day, the last *Bde Para Cdo* [*Para Commando Brigade*] elements are ready to be evacuated but they remain on alert to back up KIBAT, if need be.

1. At 15.05, the *Bde Para Cdo* sends a message to pick up the 4 ChCh elements who had been put under the orders of KIBAT. As its contribution, it releases ONE PI (SIX CVRT) of the 3 L Para, commanded by Lt. BOUDART and which will remain with KIBAT until the end of the mission.
2. The Bn also picks up ammunition for the MILAN.

3. In order to have an *Sp feu courbe* [self-propelled curved fire??], S6 is allowed by the *Comd Bde* [Brigade Commander] to keep FOUR Mor 81 of the 3 Para together with the personnel to use them.

(c) News from Belgium

1. KIBAT is informed very early during the day that a THREE-day national mourning is to start on that day at 11.00 in memory of the 10 commandos killed. S6 requests Bn to commemorate the event in the most appropriate way, in view of the security imperatives.
2. At 14.45, K9 informs S6 that BELGIUM has decided to end its participation in UNAMIR. This termination applies to the whole of KIBAT, plus the *Offr BE* of the *QG Force* [Force Headquarters] and *QG secteur*. He shall keep S6 informed of further directives.

(d) Logistic situation

1. Around 11.30, some Ghanaians come to take supplies at RWANDEX for the last time.
2. At 15.07, D6 requests S6 to intervene at the airport because information had been received that some KIBAT elements were helping themselves to stocks of cigarettes and T-shirts kept at the airport. In fact, the case had already been settled by S6 and S7 who had asked the judicial detachment to carry out an investigation.
3. At 12.41, A6 asks if it possible to have some trucks to go and pick up equipment of his *Gp* at FRANCISCUS. He is authorized to take advantage of the last column going to RWANDEX. A7 will escort the column and then go to FRANCISCUS with two trucks to pick up his equipment. He will then return to the airport with the two Log base trucks.
The column leaves the airport around 14.25. A7 with his group (Y7 and Y4 in TWO jeeps and ONE Pick-up truck and A16 aboard one M-113) arrive at FRANCISCUS between 14.45 and 15.00. The TWO Salesian Fathers who had refused to be evacuated the day before, agree to the evacuation this time. A confrontation occurs in the vicinity of FRANCISCUS, and TWO Rwandan soldiers are killed. The same evening, the RAF general staff protest and request that all necessary action be taken to prevent a recurrence of the incident. On its way back to the airport, the group again picks up an Iranian family at N7.

(e) The Romanian Offrs

Five Romanian offrs had been in Rwanda since the beginning of March. Following an agreement between Belgium and Romania, they were studying how the Belgians were operating within UN. TWO senior offrs were in the Force and THREE others (Lt and SLt.) were in the KIBAT Gp, working with the Chief of PI. Further to an order from the Cops [Chief of Operations], these Offrs assembled at the airport terminal on 14 April and were then evacuated to NAIROBI.

62. Gathering of KIBAT at the airport

(a) PC Bn

1. The move from *MERIDIEN* is done in two columns.
2. The first column, with S6, leaves *MERIDIEN* at 07.45 and arrives at TOP GUN at 08.15. ONE of the TWO CVRT guarding the *QG Secteur* escorts the column and then returns to the *QG Secteur* passing through *MERIDIEN* to pick up Mr. BOOH BOOH to go and attend the planned conciliation meeting.
3. The second column with S7 and the last elements of KIBAT remaining at *MERIDIEN*, leaves when S6 arrives at the airport. S7's column arrives at the airport at 09.00.

(b) Log Base

1. At the Log Base, S6 has the maximum amount of equipment loaded. As a priority, he takes all the ammunition and the maximum amount of provisions and water. He then fills his trucks with the remaining equipment. What is left behind is largely spare parts.
2. At 09.27, D6 sends information that his first column is formed and is ready to leave for the airport. It is composed of FIVE jeeps, FOUR Ug, FOUR MAN, FIVE civilian trucks and TWO VW pick-ups. The entire column is escorted by B7 and ONE section of the *Gp SUD*.
3. The trip goes ahead without any major setbacks although, as D6 reports later, there was still fighting between CAPPUCINO and airfield. The first *RWANDEX* column arrives at the airfield at 10.05.
4. D6 returns with the escort and TWO of VICTOR's CVRTs to *RWANDEX*.
5. At 12.40, S6 informs him that he is going to send him a column of trucks for him to be able to load the maximum amount of equipment. This column of TEN Trucks escorted by TWO CVRT of the 3L para and A7 with ONE section of the *Gp AIRFIELD* leaves the airport at 14.25.
6. This last convoy of the Log Base with its escort leaves *RWANDEX* around 16.15 and arrives safely at the airport at 16.40.

(c) Guard unit at *QG Secteur*

At 13.00, S6 requests *QG secteur* if it can take over from the staff of *Gp SUD* which had the CVRT of VICTOR and *QG secteur*. Given that TWO Ghanaian sections had been assigned to guard *QG secteur*, K9 accepts. B25 and B23 will go to the airport in a Ug while the TWO CVRTs go to pick up Mr. BOOH BOOH.

63. Defence of the airport

(a) General deployment

1. In the course of the day, the THREE KIBAT *Gp* take over all the defensive positions held by the 3 Para and 3 L Para companies.
2. The *Gp SUD* relieves the *Gp AIRFIELD* south of the airport and on either side of the presidential hangar where PC KIBAT and the Base Log unit replaces the PC 3 Para.
3. *Gp AIRFIELD* relieved by *Gp Sud* is concentrated around the terminal building and the control tower right from 12.00s.
4. *Gp City* relieves *Cie 3 Para* between the terminal building and the extreme eastern end overlooking KANOMBE. After its Recce at 20.30, C6 asks for a digger (JCB) to prepare its positions. It reports at the same time that relief of the guard is in progress and will soon be completed. It expects its northern position to be relieved at 13.00. PI A takes up position in the helicopter hangar, PI B at the end of the runway and PC with one Mi.50 in the centre.
5. A 17.39 when all the CVRT with the exception of those still at *QG secteur* are at the airport, S6 divides the PI 3 L Para by putting CVRT at the east side of the runway and FOUR on the west side.

(b) Activities of RAF at the airport

1. During the afternoon and evening, RAF marked their presence in the deployment by manipulating the AA cannons and their ammunition. It also undertook a conspicuous reconnaissance of our positions.
2. At 16.59, C6 reports that RAF (Paras) have just conducted reconnaissance of its positions.

(c) Take over by BYUBAT

1. At 13.45, *QG Secteur* announces that TWO BYUBAT PI will come to reinforce KIBAT in the early afternoon.
2. At 16.00, ONE BYUBAT Offr goes to the airport terminal to contact S6 regarding participation in the defence of the airport.
3. A coordination meeting is planned to take place at *QG Force* at 21.00. That should make it possible to settle Log problems regarding the take over of the Belgians' mission by other UN troops. The meeting is postponed to the next day due to the prevailing insecurity between the airport and AMAHORO Hotel.
4. Breakdown of the lighting system
Around 19.30, a general electric power cut extinguished all the lights on the runway. C -130s which were still to land could not do so. At the

request of the Comd 15 W Tpt, S6 provided emergency lighting by aligning vehicles along the runway with their lights on. This system allowed TWO aircraft to land and take off again.

(e) Miscellaneous

At 16.48, S6 asks A6 to provide ONE section to escort the CDG Offr, Major BODARET, and some people from *MSF [Médecins sans frontières]* to the *QG Force* to discuss coordination. This mission began at 17.02.

64. Situation as at 14 April in the evening

With the exception of TWO CVRT at *QG secteur*, the WHOLE of KIBAT is assembled at the airport.

KIBAT - 15 April 1994**DEVELOPMENTS ON 15 APRIL**

65. General situation

(a) Rules of engagement

At 04.40, *QG Secteur* sends information that the rules of engagement have changed slightly. It has been given authorization to respond by firing to any hostile act against UN installations.

At 05.35, S6 send a Msg detailing the changes in the rules.

1. Any positioning of arms against UN installations shall be considered a hostile attitude. The disposition will be equipped to return fire if the weapon shoots at the UN installation.
2. Any direct shooting at a UN installation shall be considered a hostile act that shall be responded to by fire.
3. A hostile attitude shall be responded to by fire only after giving a warning, loudly, of the intention to shoot.
4. Any direct shooting shall be preceded by warning shots fired into the air.
5. Where the installation is protected by a fence or wall, shooting shall not be permitted unless the persons attempt to forcibly penetrate this enclosure.
6. Direct shots shall be fired only with the authorization of OSCAR and by specifying the type of weapon used which shall be proportionate to the threat faced.

(b) Activities of RAF

1. At 05.35, B6 reports that the Rwandans have installed a fuel truck on the runway. This truck is removed one hour later. The Rwandans regularly place obstacles on the runway for no apparent reason. In general, these obstacles are removed or displaced in time in order not to interfere with announced landings of the C-130s.
2. At 10.15, A6 reports that the RAF have placed an MRL (multiple rocket launcher) opposite the airport terminal. The MRL is directed at the town. Some minutes later, RAF opens fire. Following these shootings, TWO RPF mortar rounds fall near the helis hangar. The Comd of the *Bde. Para Cdo* [Para Cdo. Bde] intervenes in the meantime and orders one MAG shooter of the *Gp AIRFIELD* positioned all over the terminal building to fire in bursts near the MRL.

to get it to move. Having understood the message, the MRL leaves its position.

3. At 11.23, A BASE provides information that RAF are turning their AA canons in all directions in front of their positions.
4. At 12.48, C6 reports that the gunners of the AA canons in front of its position have received grenades and that they are adjusting the distances between their positions and his.

(c) Ops SILVER BACK

1. While waiting for the arrival of the Ghanaian Bn, KIBAT receives ONE Coy of the 3 Para (the 15th) as reinforcement. However, at 11.50, this Coy receives its order for evacuation to NAIROBI. The only people remaining in Kigali are Col. BEM ROMAN, Commander of the *Bde. Para Cdo*, Col. BEM LEGRAIN, Col. Avi VAN EECKHOUT, Commander of the 15 WTpt and one close protection section.

66. Activities of KIBAT

(a) Defence of the airport

1. According to information communicated to S6 by K9, Staff headquarters wants to withdraw the UNAMIR Belgian Tps as quickly as possible. However, that cannot happen until there are enough UN forces at the airport to relieve KIBAT. *QG Force* plans to let BYUBAT relieve KIBAT. The problem posed is how to bring BYUBAT from the *DMZ secteur* [Demilitarized Zone *secteur*] in northern Rwanda as the road is constantly cut off by fighting between RAF and RPF; this will prevent the BYUBAT elements from reaching KIGALI especially aboard trucks of the Bangladeshi Log company. Part of BYUBAT based close to Carrefour KHADHAFI [Khadhafi junction] is also blocked by the fighting going on in this area. The movement of BYUBAT becomes the priority objective of *QG Force*.
2. The PL Mor 3 para is kept in Res at the centre of the KIBAT deployment i.e. close to the presidential hangar. Compared to the Mor used by the belligerents, our Mor 81 are singularly lacking in range capability.
3. The PL CVRT is stationed at the two extremities of the runway. FOUR to the WEST, TWO of them behind the Ghanaians' position and TWO to the EAST, reinforcing *Gp CITY*.
4. At 15.29, C6 reports that the digger has cut the electric cable for the runway lights while undertaking excavation work. At 19.32, C6 communicates that the runway lights are back on.

5. At 21.35, *QG Secteur* communicates that the Force Commander will come to the terminal building the next day at 06.00, to give instructions to *QG Secteur* and to the Bn. Security of the airfield must be assured at that hour must. In the end, the visit did not take place.

(b) Escort missions

1. *QG Secteur* again requests that some escort missions be undertaken with armoured vehicles and some sections either to go and pick up people or to escort the authorities to *QG Force*.
2. At 11.15, *QG Secteur* requests that TWO APCs be sent quickly to *QG Force*. They must transport the refugees at AMAHORO. The *Gp AIRFIELD* provides two M-113 as well as A16 and its PC PL.
3. At 14.10, A7 set of with TWO of VICTOR's CVRT SCIMITAR to *QG Secteur* to escort the movement by *QG Secteur* that is coming to set up at the airport to take up the position occupied by the *PC Bde. Para Cdo*. ONE of the CVRT breaks down at the N8 intersection. A7 continues with the remaining CVRT.
At 14.57, A7 reports that he is leaving *QG Secteur*. At 15.12, he arrives at the airport with the *QG Secteur* column. The CVRT that still moves sporadically reaches TOP GUN shortly afterwards.
4. V6 must undertake a rescue mission. At 16.43, he arrives at the terminal building with ONE adult and TWO children.

(c) Preparations for withdrawal

1. At 08.11, S6 transmits the order that all the individual luggage must be put together. Personnel will keep only their backpacks. At 13.25, the luggage is loaded into MANs ready to be airlifted by C-130s.
2. The Ops to withdraw KIBAT is organized jointly by the Comd *Bde para Cdo* and the Comd 15 W Tpt. It is code-named BLUE SAFARI. TWO possibilities are envisaged:
The first consists in evacuation of the personnel and equipment by air. This solution requires a completely safe access to the KIGALI airport to the C-130s.
The second possibility consists in airlifting the maximum amount of equipment and personnel by air, leaving behind the equipment that is indispensable for the protection of the airport; this equipment will later be moved overland to Tanzania.
3. At 18.30, S7 and CLog. [Chief of Logistics] go to *QG Secteur* (in the main airport terminal building) to have discussions with the authorities of *QG Secteur* and the *Bde Para Cdo* about the equipment that will be left at the airport. Upon his return from the meeting, S7 convenes all the *Gps* for a Log coordination. The authorities must have all the

administrative data concerning the means of transmission, vehicles and organic weapons.

Following that coordination, S7 return to *QG Secteur*, K9, in fact, needs all this information for a meeting with the Force Commander tomorrow. S6 is also invited to attend this meeting. COps [Chief of operations] is also provided with the data concerning all that KIBAT plans to leave to the UN.

KIBAT - 16 APRIL 1994**DEVELOPMENTS ON 16 APRIL**

67. General situation

a. UNAMIR

- (1) S6 attends briefing at the QG Force [Force's HQ] at 8 a.m. General Dallaire gives an overview of the general situation particularly the fact that Hutu hard-liners are back in power.

He had proposed various options in New York regarding the future of UNAMIR but owing to the present deadlock, they all revolve around the reduction of UNAMIR forces. The minimum option is to leave observers only. For the time being, following the decision to withdraw Belgian troops, all UNAMIR soldiers must assemble in Kigali. The first priority is for BYUBAT to resume the defence of the airfield.

- (2) RWANDEX keys

At 11.49 a.m., the Force's Cie Log [logistics company] arrives at Rwandex to take back the stocks left by KIBAT. Since D6 had locked all the doors before leaving the Base Log [logistics base], they ask for the keys to the warehouse. They are told that they cannot get them at this time, on the pretext that it is impossible to go to RWANDEX because of the fighting. It should also be noted that Mr Vigneron (the manager) had authorized the use of RWANDEX facilities by the UN only on condition that the buildings would be occupied by the Belgians (there had been tense negotiations with the Force on matter on a number of occasions). Moreover, the stocks that had been left at RWANDEX were mainly spare parts (for Belgian vehicles) and very little food, which means that there was no urgency.

b. Social telephone

On leaving Rwanda, the Belgian CTM left his INMARSAT satellite telephone to KIBAT. S6 decided that it would be used by his staff only, while the QG secteur telephone would be reserved for official communications. Each person is allowed three minutes to talk to his family in Belgium, in accordance with a roster drawn up by S1. This is the first opportunity some people have to talk to their families and to reassure them, ten days after the beginning of the events. The KIBAT Soffr Tr is charged with the responsibility of controlling the use of the telephone and recording the duration of the calls. The staff are informed that once they return to Belgium, they would be required to pay for the calls (communication via satellite costs about 300 BF per minute). It would be advisable for the KIBAT Otr to note down all calls in a notebook but up to now the EMG seems to have let the KIBAT staff use the telephone free of charge because nobody has yet been asked to refund.

At 5.30 a.m. OSCAR gives all the stations the timetable for the various groups.

c. Minute of silence for our ten comrades
 At 9.24 a.m., S6 sends the following message: "All Gps are requested to assemble the staff at 11 a.m., to observe a minute of silence in memory of our comrades who lost their lives. They should leave minimum staff to man the positions for operational reasons. A ceremony will be held at the same time to pay tribute to the ten "mortars personnel" who were murdered".

d. Ops SILVER BACK
 At around 2.00 p.m. Comd Bde Para Cdo [Para Commando Brigade Commander] leaves Kigali with the staff who had remained with him, in a C-130 which took the last luggage belonging to the KIBAT staff.

68 KIBAT activities

a. BYUBAT

(1) At 12.50 p.m., BYUBAT Commander arrives at the airfield. His Battalion is still waiting for the RUTBAT lorries which were unable to get through the Khadafi intersection.

(2) At 5.30 p.m., two P1 from BYUBAT arrive at the airfield. They take their positions within the Gp Sud operation near the fire brigade shed and the southern entrance.

(3) At 6.30 p.m. the QG secteur informs S6 that he is required to attend a meeting at the Force concerning KIBAT's withdrawal by road and continuation of mission by BYUBAT.

b. Incident at the GP CITY

(1) At 7.37 a.m., C6 reports that one of his TRIP-FLARE was activated. Gunshots were fired and his men opened fire after shouts of warning. S6 orders them to stop shooting as long as they do not know what is going on.

(2) Some minutes later, C6 explains that a Rwandan wearing a red beret (a *gendarme*?) activated a TRIP-FLARE while trying to enter the airfield and, obviously frightened, fired a shot. After the usual warnings, C6's men returned fire. S3 then goes to the spot with a *gendarme* from the control tower. He notices that the TRIP-FLARE has been activated but does not find the *gendarme*, who has disappeared in the meantime.

c. Special missions

(1) At 9.29 a.m., the HQ Secteur requests two M-113, with 30 minutes' notice.

(2) At 3.30 p.m., COps sends a message asking that someone should go and get Mr Nsanzuwera, Director of Public Prosecutions, who was supposed to be at the *Hotél des 1000 Collines* under the nickname "ami de Mukonde". COps requests that he be evacuated to Brussels if

possible. Since it is impossible to get to the *Hôtel des 1000 Collines*, the request is forwarded to the Force whose observers are still in town on a mission.

- (3) At 11.22 p.m., the QG secteur asks for two M-113 to go to the QG Force on the following day at 6.45 a.m.

69 KIBAT's withdrawal

- a. At 8.15 a.m., KIBAT receives a message from COps concerning withdrawal using the "option route": Tanzania authorizes the KIBAT column to pass through its territory, but requests that the column escort about one thousand Tanzanian refugees. COps also requests that they try and recover as much equipment as possible.
- b. At 10.15, EM Bde in Nairobi asks for an estimate of the number of planes required to start evacuating non-essential equipment. KIBAT asks for another two planes today.
- c. At 2.38 p.m., S7 requests that each Gp appoints two men to supervise KIBAT's equipment in Nairobi. The men are to board the next C-130 to Nairobi.
- d. At around 7.45, COps sends a fax concerning the organization of redeployment:
 - (1) In case KIBAT pulls out by air or road, you are requested to let us know your assessment of the minimum means it will require to defend the airfield until the departure of the last plane and to enable KIBAT unit to pull out, with the column of Tanzanian refugees under its escort.
 - (2) You are requested to call Tanzanian drivers to your PC and ask them for their assessment of the state of the roads that will be used for the deployment.
 - (3) The findings of your Heli study in support of the redeployment Mov by road are required ASAP.
 - (4) S6 replies that according to the information he has, the BYUBAT relief troops are enough to protect the departure of the Belgians and that, furthermore, the Tanzanian refugees are already on their way to Tanzania. In view of the situation, S6 prefers total withdrawal by air. He would however study the two possibilities.
- e. At around 10 p.m., COps sends his instructions concerning withdrawal arrangements:
 - a. Phase 1: Comd de secteur hands over command to the Force. He hands over to KIBAT the staff that will be required for withdrawal of the

other Belgians. He then leaves for Nairobi with the other Belgians from the QG secteur and the QG Force.

- b. Second phase: KIBAT Commander withdraws his unit after ensuring that all his soldiers have been relieved by the other UNAMIR contingents. There are two options: option 1 Air/road and Option 2: Road.
- c. Third phase: transportation of the staff from Mwanza (Tanzania) to Brussels in C-130. The equipment together with the staff required to operate it will be transported by C-130 from Mwanza to Djibouti.

70. General situation

- a. At 7.56 a.m. KIBAT requests medical evacuation from Nairobi for a mild heart attack. The patient (Maj Bodart) will be evacuated early afternoon.
- b. At 20.10 p.m., Rwandans put back obstacles on the runaway. After contacting the QG secteur, it seems there is an agreement with the RAF and the Force to the effect that the Rwandans can put obstacles on the runaway when there is no air traffic expected.

71. KIBAT activities

- a. At 10.30, QG secteur tells KIBAT to provide M-113 training to Ghanaian drivers and also Mi. 50 and mortar 81 training to other Ghanaians, in preparation for BYUBAT's take-over of this equipment to be used in defending the airfield.
- b. The P1 of the Sud Gp whose positions were taken back the previous day by a BYUBAT P1 is kept in Res Bn.
- c. These last few days, KIBAT staff who still remember the fate of the ten comrades of the M1 Mor and saw the behaviour of the RAF and *gendarmes* in town, are finding it increasingly unbearable to live with the Rwandan troops on the airfield (*gendarmerie* and RAF), as they have been forced to do.

One night a Rwandan *gendarme* was cornered in the tower stairway by KIBAT members and bullied. The Rwandan flag which used to fly on a mast from the terrace of the control tower was stolen. When the *gendarmerie* Lt complained to S6, the latter found the flag after investigating, and had it returned. That was a mistake, for he should have checked it first. The flag had been torn to shreds. During the daily briefing, S6 asked everyone not to lose their composure, because such an incident could degenerate into an open conflict with the RAF, with uncontrollable consequences for KIBAT members or the entire Battalion.

72. KIBAT's withdrawal

- a. At 1.15 p.m., COps asks KIBAT to evacuate by C-130 ASAP, as much equipment as possible leaving behind only minimum equipment (even equipment that is out of order) and to relieve KIBAT of this burden as much as possible when it withdrawals by road.
- b. At 9.27, S7 must go to the airfield for co-ordination with Col Legrain who returned from Nairobi to determine what equipment should be handed over to the UN. After that meeting, Col Legrain returns to Nairobi with KIBAT's proposals.
- c. At 2.46 p.m., S7 sends to COps and Bde para-commando a report on the Log situation.
- d. At 4.45, S6 is called to the QG secteur for a briefing on co-ordination of KIBAT's withdrawal.
- e. At the end of the day, 36 men from the GP Sud and half of the PI Mor 3 Para leave Kigali for Nairobi. This is mainly a political signal indicating the beginning of KIBAT's withdrawal. S6 also sends back PI Mortier (with the exception of 1 Sgt Maj Leconte and at his special request), to participate in their comrades' funeral.
- f. At 7.17 COps sends a message enjoining Comd KIBAT to evacuate on 18 April, as many staff members as possible who are not required for the journey by road.
- g. At 10.20 p.m., KIBAT sends to COps and Bde Para Cdo his air transport requirements for complete (20 C-130) and partial (9 C-130) evacuation. He also reports on the situation in Kigali, stressing that the airport is still operating.
- h. At the same time, Col Bern Legrain sends a fax to Nairobi specifying the equipment that could be left to the UN.

KIBAT - 18 APRIL 1994**DEVELOPMENTS ON 18 APRIL****73. General situation**

During the daily meeting at the QG Force, General Dallaire explains that the (UN) mandate does not allow to interfere in the fighting between the two factions.

Considering the development of the situation, he is going to suggest to New York to reduce UNAMIR personnel. In the evacuation, priority will be given to personnel. Hardware will eventually be evacuated by road.

74. KIBAT activities**(a) Behaviour of Rwandans at the airport**

1. Since KIBAT took over the defence of the airfield, Rwandan soldiers at the airport regularly carry out activities that cause confusion: the gunners of the anti-aircraft cannons are pointing their cannon in the direction United Nations positions, additional troops have just taken position, etc.
2. At 8.19, S3 reports that Two RAF Pl have positioned themselves at the West side of the airport. There is no way of knowing their exact mission because they are saying that their commander is not present.
3. At 8.57 a.m., A7 reports that RAF have pointed their AA cannons to direction of the airport. S3 is going to the spot to verify. He is accompanied by One M-113 and contacts RAF and tells them that they cannot in any circumstance increase their strength. S3 personally installs a system allowing him to keep them updated and tells them that Two MILAN are ready to fire on their cannon if they do not point them to another direction. Willy-nilly, the Rwandans will no longer move and point their cannon to the south.
4. At 10.14 a.m., RAF officials return to meet A7 with a United Nations observer to explain that its only mission is to protect the AA hardware. S3 asks A7 to warn them that if they move again, Bn will no longer discuss.
5. At 9.50 a.m., One RAF officer is arrested by sentries (Pl Mor 3 Para) because he is carrying an FNC although RAF do not have FNC. He is overpowered and taken to PC Bn. After verification, it appears that it is an FNC of Y1 (1 Sgt Leroy). On the spot, the substitute of the military auditor interrogates the Rwandan officer who claims to have bought the weapon from another Rwandan soldier. The weapon is seized, the identity of the officer is verified, and then the RAF officer is released.

6. At 4.45 p.m., QG Secteur reports that Major Ntabakuze (Rwandan Bn para commander) is going to verify the problem of his men positioned west of the runway. S6 who was on the spot in order to monitor the behaviour of the RAF contacts him. It is well stated that these Two Pl should occupy a position in the direction of the town and their weapons cannot in any case be pointed towards the airport. They are under constant surveillance by Two CVRT of 3 L Para.

(b) Relief by BYUBAT

1. At 10.32 a.m., S6 requests S3 to contact a BYUBAT Company commander who has just arrived at the airport. In fact, few elements of BYUBAT arrived and are going to take positions East of the runway.
2. The Belgians hand over grenades, HAFLA, LAW, 60 mortars and Mi.50 with their ammunitions to the Ghanaians.
3. During the afternoon, Bn gives MAN and Ug instruction to 20 Ghanaian drivers who will take over the "*materiel roulant*". Seven MAN and Two Ug are given directly to BYUBAT to go and find the Ghanaian personnel who are not yet picked up by RUTBAT.
4. At 1.35 p.m. B6 reports that his last element (Pl A) is relieved by the Ghanaians.
5. At 1.35 p.m., S3 reports that due to the delay in the arrival of BYUBAT, QG Force asked the Bangladesh Engineering Corps (Cie Génie) to take the positions of Gp CITY around 3 p.m. The Commander of the Engineering corps (Cie Gn) gives as pretext a number of problems hindering him from carrying out the mission.

- (c) Apart from few escort missions to QG Force, Bn does not receive any particular mission from QG.

75. Evacuation of KIBAT

- (a) At 6.40 a.m., Bde Para Cdo announces that Four planes are expected for the day. It demands that cargoes for the planes should be prepared so as not to waste time on the ground.
- (b) At 11.44 a.m., after the first relieves by BYUBAT, S6 plans to have the rest of Gp SUD go to Nairobi the same day, and possibly with an element of Gp CITY.
- (c) At 12.05, KIBAT receives the results of the air reconnaissance (by C-130) on the itinerary to Tanzania: no major difficulties were located on the route to Mwanza.

- (d) Before nightfall, 83 men of Gp SUD and Base Log and 1Sgt Maj. Leconte left Kigali. They will then take off from Nairobi on the 18th in the evening and arrive in Brussels on the morning of 19th.
- (e) At 5.20 p.m., Bde Para Cdo sends air transport estimates for the next day. Eleven planes are expected during the day of 19 March, but Five of the flights must be confirmed.
- (f) At 5.59, K9 ask S6 to establish an estimate of its transport needs for the next day. KIBAT replies that to transport all that must be evacuated, an additional Thirty C-130 are required. The allocation of time for the planes will be done by Bde Para-Commando.
- (g) At 9.20, Bde Para Cdo proposes to KIBAT to increase the number of planes envisaged for the next day. It requests Bn to make an estimate of what can be evacuated according to the operations regarding the takeover of the mission by BYUBAT. Therefore, S6 requests a minimum of Eleven C-130 and if possible Twenty for the day of 19

KIBAT - 19 APRIL 1994

DEVELOPMENT ON 19 APRIL

76. General situation

(a) The future of UNAMIR

1. At the morning Force briefing, which K9 and S6 attend, General Dallaire explains that the situation is evolving a little; that the parties do not have the will to discuss. There is still no ceasefire in Kigali. New York authorizes a decrease in the number of men, and half of Cie Log and Cie Génie (Engineering Corps) with part of RUTBAT will be evacuated as quickly as possible, a United Nations plane should arrive around 1 p.m. General Dallaire still insists that the total relief of KIBAT by BYUBAT should take place as soon as possible.
2. On 18 April, mortar bombs fell on Amahoro Stadium, the cantonment of RUTBAT. It was a counter-battery fire from RAF on RPF mortars positioned near the stadium. During the briefing, several mortar bombs fall very close to QG Force creating a sway among the participants of the briefing. It should be noted that the briefing is taking place in the all-glass circular restaurant of the hotel, and the only protection, are the triple panels installed in order to shield and separate the work areas.
3. S6 contacts Lt. Col. Donkov whom the United Nations assigns to conduct inquiry on the assassination of ten *mortiers*. He gives him administrative information previously requested (number of weapons, posts, etc.), which were handed over to him by S7 and *Det judiciaire*
4. QG Force will ask a while later whether it is possible to utilize (BE) Planes to evacuate UNAMIR personnel. After contact with EMG, it will be told that it is possible, but only after the departure of the last member of KIBAT.

(b) The handover and takeover of QG Secteur between K9 and the Ghanaian Col. Yaache, Commander of QG Secteur DMZ is to take place at 9 a.m. It will take place with a bit of delay, and around 11 a.m., K9 and the last BE Officers of QG Secteur left in a C-130 for Nairobi. However, he leaves a TF by satellite at the disposal of S6.

(c) Butare mission

1. On the day of 18, COps had requested QG Secteur to organize the evacuation of nuns in Butare. K9 had made arrangements to have them return to Kigali at the same time with the United Nations observers who are in Butare, with the means of the United Nations. Considering the situation in the country, it proved to be impossible by road. Only a lift by plane is still possible.
2. K9 then proposes to COps that a C-130, preferably Spanish because the nuns are Spanish, should land in Butare to pick up the nuns and the

observers. After handing over QG Secteur to his successor, K9 requests Bde Para Cdo to be in charge of the operation and that S6 should monitor the process.

3. The people in Butare were informed by the United Nations observers and expect to be evacuated in the evening.
4. According to information from the Air Force personnel still present in Kigali, Butare runway cannot be utilized by C-130. Finally, the following day, an expedition will be organized by Bde Para Cdo to leave from Nairobi. One Belgian C-130 with Cie ATK escort and one Spanish C-130 will land in Butare and will pick up the foreigners

77. Takeover of the airport by BYUBAT

- (a) At 10.46 a.m., QG Secteur summons S7 for the handover of KIBAT Log hardware to BYUBAT
- (b) Late morning, most of BYUBAT elements arrive at the airport.
- (c) KIBAT still provides some escort to QG Secteur
A special escort mission is to be maintained. At 10.08 a.m., upon request by General Dallaire through K9, S6 asks A6 to make M-113 available to enable K3 to go to the QG Force. In fact, the escort is going to look for Faustin Twagiramungu (the appointed Prime Minister of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, and the only personality of the Hutu opposition still alive among those who were in Kigali at the time of the events). He had taken refuge at the Force Headquarters since the beginning of the events. S2 with Two M-113 and A13 will carry out the task under the command of Major Provinciael. The Minister will be boarded discreetly in a United Nations Ilioutchine amidst Bangladeshi soldiers leaving Rwanda.
- (d) At 12.05 p.m., S6 prepares Five MAN which will be put at the disposal of the Ghanaians to go and pick up the last elements of BYUBAT.
- (e) At midday, the relief of Gp CITY by Cie Génie of Bangladesh which was to be evacuated the previous day is still not done despite repeated reminders from QG Secteur. S3 contacts the Officer commanding the Engineering Corps (Cie Génie) and take him along with some men to the positions of C6. C6 quickly conducted the handover of his positions. At 2.42 p.m., he reports that the relief has been done and he receives order to board his Company (Cie) in the planes going to Nairobi.

78. Evacuation of KIBAT

- (a) In the early hours, COps requests details concerning the hardware to be evacuated to Belgium. It wants responses regarding the forms which are sent by Fax.

- (b) At 6.05 a.m., KIBAT replies to the questions asked by COps regarding the general situation. BYUBAT still has Two Cie only with Two Pl at the airport. The handover of the mission of KIBAT to BYUBAT is envisaged for the 19th at 5 p.m. The airport is currently held by United Nations troops, but an element of RAF is also ensuring defence.
- (c) At 9.20 a.m., the helicopter pilots report that they do not have authorisation to fly to Rwamagana because of the fighting along the trunk road leading to Rwamagana. Their evacuation by helicopter to Tanzania is therefore compromised. It is therefore decided to dismantle the Alouettes and load them in the C-130.
- (d) Around midday, S6 learns that he must contact General Charlier. The General asks him about the situation and especially regarding the takeover by BYUBAT. Learning that a considerable part of BYUBAT has just arrived, he compels S6 to evacuate from Kigali this very day. General Charlier prefers an evacuation by road, as he fears for the takeoff of the last C-130. S6 tells him that in his opinion, an evacuation by road is riskier, and certainly, at one time or the other, one has to pass through a roadblock by force. The column can also fall into an ambush at any time; the latest information from Bde para Cdo talks of an RAF Cie positioned on the bridge just before the Tanzanian border. Finally, QG Force said that this morning, RAF does not guarantee anything in the event UNAMIR evacuation by road. Therefore, General Charlier takes the decision for a total evacuation by air and tells S6 that all efforts must be done to complete the evacuation today. He also assures that Paris has given authorisation for Air Support with Jaguar planes.
- (e) S6 therefore contacts Bde Para Cdo in Nairobi and informs it of the decision of General Charlier. Although, 17 C-130 rotations between Kigali and Nairobi had been planned for 19 April, a total of about thirty rotations were required so that all KIBAT personnel and vehicles which are not handed over to BYUBAT can leave Kigali.
- (f) There is no fuel for the C-130 at the airport of Mwanza, but it is located about halfway between Kigali and Nairobi. The 15 W Tpt Commander comes personally to Kigali and from there will monitor the infernal rounds of C-130s between Kigali, Nairobi and Mwanza. Each captain is advised to make as many trips as possible to Kigali, to drop personnel and vehicles at Mwanza as quickly as possible and from time to time according to the needs, to carry out a rotation in Nairobi in order to refuel.
- (g) Embarking personnel and hardware in the planes is done as the handover is effected and as the planes arrive. A team of Rav air under the command of Capt. Hanset is stationed in Nairobi and prepares the C-130 cargoes. Due to the skill and habit of KIBAT personnel in effecting air-transport, only about 12 minutes is required to embark and stow the vehicles and board the personnel; while the C-130s keep their engines running.

- (h) Gp CITY is relieved by Cie Génie of Bangladesh at 2.45 a.m. and immediately embarks Gp Airfield, after being relived by elements of BYUBAT, and embarks around 5 p.m.
- (i) Due to rotation hazards, it required more than One hour between the second-to-the last and the last C-130. The last plane left Kigali at 8.10 p.m. with S6, the last elements of PC KIBAT and PI Rav Air as well as the Commander of 15 WTpt. To make believe that the evacuation has not ended (danger of seeing the last plane being shot down), false cargoes (old camp beds on the Ca in dilapidated condition that did not justify being lifted, etc.) are still ready on the gangway and Two C-130 are en route to Kigali, as announced by the control tower.
- (j) On day 29, C-130 flights would have been necessary to evacuate in one day all that remained of KIBAT. The same evening, the personnel who landed in Mwanza were taken to Nairobi.

Liste nominative du personnel.

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Bataillon.

Commandement	S1/Srt	S2	S3	C Log
Lt Col DEWEZ Maj TIMONNET ADC MARTINUS CLC MAYEUR Cpl THOMAS Maj BOBART (CDO)	Capt MESPREUVE ISM SCHIEPERS CLC CHAUVEZ CLC DEBLIN CLC DUTRIME Cpl DUBOIS	Lt DECUYPER ISM EIBEN Cpl DAVID	Capt CHOFFRAY Capt ROMAN ISM PHILIPPART ISM GREGOIRE Cpl DUMONT	Capt MADALLINS Sgt NELLIS CLC ARNOUL Cpl HARTIEL Cpl GYSSENS
ISC	Liaison	SP	Padre	And MIJ
Adj CANTINEAUX CLC LAMBRETTE	Capt COLLIN Capt SCHEPKENS CLC BERGMANS CLC FAMEREE	Cpl SLIZEWSKI ISM DOUDELET	AIC QUERTEMONT	Subst PEERAER Graf DEROUCK MDL chef CULOT ISgt DRILLEUX
PI Tr	LDSG	Lt Avn	PI Sec Ba	ACP
ISM BOUQUELLOEN ISgt COLLIGÉ ISgt FOOLARI CLC CABY CLC DOUSSIS	Cpl JOLY Cpl LACROIX Cpl LEBRUN Cpl MULLER Cpl SCHORBEN Cpl VICARI	ISgt DERANTOINE ISgt VERMEIREN CLC VANDAM	Cpl VANDERGEESTEN Adj KICHOOUT Adj VANDONGEN ISgt DEVOS	Med Maj DAUBERSE Med Capt (Fam) VAN DEENEN ISM VLAMINCK ISgt PEETERS CLC CHRISTOPHE CLC DE SCHEPERS CLC V. CLEYNENBREUGEL Cpl MOYRON Cpl ZELS
PI Jeep	PI Sec Ba	PI Sec Ba	PI Sec Ba	ACP
Lt LOTIN ISgt LEGONTE Cpl LEFEBVILE Cpl BASTINNE Cpl DUPONT C Cpl DUPONT	Sgt PALUWELS Cpl KINKIN Cpl FOCHEZ Cpl MATHIS Cpl WALTERCQ Cpl GUSTIN Cpl PHYON Cpl LHOE CLC ANTOINE	ISgt LEROY Cpl MEAUX Cpl FLESCIA Cpl DERATTY Cpl KENWA Cpl DUTTEBROECK Cpl MAHEU Cpl LALOUX Cpl CRESPIN	Med Maj THIRY Med Sgt VARGA ISM DE GRAAF CLC DINIART CLC DIECKX Cpl BECKMAN Cpl DESCHONMAKERS Cpl LAUBRY	Med Maj DAUBERSE Med Capt (Fam) VAN DEENEN ISM VLAMINCK ISgt PEETERS CLC CHRISTOPHE CLC DE SCHEPERS CLC V. CLEYNENBREUGEL Cpl MOYRON Cpl ZELS

Base Logistique

Commandement	PI Rav	PI Maint
Capt TEFNIN ADC MABILLE Adj FOLLIE CLC VERSCHAEREN Cpl VANEECKHOVEN Cpl PELTYN	ADC GOEDERT Adj SERESSIA ISM GODEFROID ISM BREDO ISgt CARRIER ISgt ETIENNE ISgt HUTSEBAUT Sgt RENAUT CLC FLAMENT	Lt BELLIERE Adj SCAILQUIN ISM TIMONNET ISM MICHEL ISM DENIS ISgt DECLERCK ISgt DELVALX ISgt SIAENS CLC BARRAS CLC BOOREMAN
EOD	Maint Heli	PI Maint
ISM WILMAERS ISgt OMBELETS Cpl HAENEN	ISgt MARKOWSKI ISM FROUIN ISgt KUNEN Sgt MORETTIN Cpl VEREECKE	CLC DEGRAEVE CLC DEMAZY CLC MASSON CLC MINET CLC PIERRE Cpl DENIS Cpl JACOBS Cpl REALE Cpl BIEWNIAK Cpl POEMANS

HORS KIBAT

OG Secteur Cpl BEM MARCHAL, LtCol POCHET, Maj BEM PROVINCIAEL, Maj PUFFET, Maj VAN ASBROECK, Maj DELOECKER, Lt HOUSEN, Adj Chef DEWEGHE

OG Force LtCol BEM BALIS, LtCol VAN PUT, Lt Col MASSAUX, Maj MAGGEN, Maj PODEVUN, Maj DEPREZ, Cpl DUPUIS, Cpl Avn MANCEL, Capt CLAEYS, ISM YANSENNE, Cpl TRAUTES

HORS ONU

KIGALODGE Lt DEMEYERE et CLC JANSSENS
 Equipage C-130 LtCol Avn ROMBAUX, Capt Avn JACOBS, Cpl COLLEE, ISM CUYVERS et CLC PEETERS

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GROUPE AIRFIELD

~~K0331890~~

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Commandement	Tr	Rev	Mahat	CVRT
Capt VANDRIESSCHE Lt VERMEULEN 1st ROULET Cpl VANDY	3rd CORNET Cpl OILBOUL Cpl LAZARON Cpl PASQUET	1507 TREMONT Cpl BOITHY Cpl HOEDAERT Cpl FIVET Sgt SCHECKS	18M JALMOTTE CLC GUILLAUME Cpl GERLACHE	5Lt VAN CALWENBERGHE CLC VAN DE LANDE Cpl ADRIAANSSENS Cpl BOUCTIONS Cpl MOESKOP
Comdt PI A	Sec 1	Sec 1	Sec 3	
Lt CARLENS Sgt LAMOTTE Cpl ZACSEK Cpl JACQUART Cpl SPAGNOLI Cpl KENER Cpl OILBOUL Sgt CANFJN	Sgt LEIDNO Cpl CRIGNANO Cpl TIBON Sgt MATHIAS Cpl MATERNE Sgt FOTTIER Cpl ANDRE Cpl VANDEPOEL Cpl VAN HOOSTE	Sgt TEYSSIER Cpl MEUNIER Cpl HEMERYCK Sgt ESTRIBAN Sgt SPUYT Sgt LEBVIE Cpl OELMIAUX Sgt AJENJO Cpl KABEYA	Sgt BOUCHOT Sgt VOITURON Cpl HENDRICK Sgt MAREART Sgt FETELER Sgt DOBROGNE Sgt TAMBOUR Cpl BORSACQ Cpl LINCE	
Comdt PI B	Sec 1	Sec 2	Sec 3	
Lt RODRIQUE 1st FAUVART Cpl GUERET Cpl DE MARCHI Cpl MATHIEUS Cpl BOURVIN Cpl MARCHAL Sgt BOENS Sgt MIGNON	Sgt BULLINCKX Cpl VIRDIS Sgt BLOIS Sgt GOVAERT Sgt LEBLIE Sgt VANDERMEULEN Sgt PONS Cpl HASARD Cpl WOUTERS	Sgt LIEBOIS Sgt LHOST Cpl CORNET Sgt FOCKE Cpl LANGER Sgt MOSEAU Sgt FRIX Cpl GEZGORICS Sgt SCHOFFACK	Sgt MAUFROID Sgt GILJENT Sgt OLIDE Sgt PALWELS Sgt WILLIEME Sgt HERION Sgt NICOLAS Cpl DETINNE Sgt LEKEU	

GROUPE SUD

Commandement	Tr	Rev	Mahat
Lt LEMAIRE Lt LECOMTE 18M LIVEMONT Cpl DACHET	Cpl LINSSEN Cpl MERLOT Cpl BUREAU	18M GREGOIRE Cpl BEBOECK 1st DUEZ CLC VOLONT L (CLC VANDERPUTTEN evasue en BE pour brulure le 27 Mar)	Cpl LALOUX
Comdt PI A	Sec 1	Sec 1	Sec 3
Lt LELIBRE Sgt COLIGE Cpl PEIGNAT Cpl VOLONT G. Cpl PEETERS Cpl SAKALA Sgt MAYON Sgt UYTENBROECK	Sgt MIGNON Sgt VANHAMME CLC BEREST Cpl SMARS Sgt LACROIX Cpl DEFOY Cpl DE ROOSE Sgt DENIS Sgt DEDECKER	Sgt LEKEUX Sgt BERMAN Sgt VAN DEN HOUTE Sgt FLAMENT Sgt HENRY Sgt LHOE Sgt MAQUIGNY Cpl VERBECK Cpl MAREE	Sgt JORIS Sgt SZYKULA Cpl YPERSIEL Sgt BOISTAY Sgt GODEAU Sgt FORTLOT Sgt TOMBU Sgt DEBIASI Cpl VERMEERBERGEN
Comdt PI B	Sec 1	Sec 2	Sec 3
Lt DEKEYSER Sgt BECOUET Cpl MATTENS Cpl CRANQUINT CLC BAUDOUX Sgt HASTIR Cpl SAMBON Sgt VANHORICK Sgt KIRSCH	Sgt BONELLI Cpl SCHOLDERS Sgt BORGHEYS Sgt JENARD Sgt BOUDART Sgt COLYN Sgt PIPEAUX Cpl JAUPART Sgt BOUSSEMAERE	Sgt BENBOUHOUT Sgt TIMPERMAN Sgt ABRAHAM Sgt VAN REOEMEUTER Sgt COLLARD Sgt VIATOUR Cpl BALOUBDET CLC DECLERCQ Cpl VANHEE	Sgt DEKERT Sgt NICOLAS Sgt BERNY Sgt DALECHAMPS Sgt POTTET Sgt OLLET Sgt LOUYEAUX Cpl LOUVRIER Cpl BEN YOUSSEF

GROUPE CITY

Commandement	Tr	Rev	Mahat	
Capt MARCHAL Lt THEUNISSEN 18M WARCO Cpl ROBERT-LERUTE	Sgt NILSSON Cpl FIRLET Cpl SERVAIS	18M OHEYSSENS CLC BURSERET Cpl PLESSIET Cpl BOHET CLC BRABANT	Sgt DERSAMBRE CLC NOEL Cpl VAN LAETHEM	CLC PIERARD Cpl VANDERLINDEN
Comdt PI A	Sec 1	Sec 2	Sec 3	
Lt KOENIGS Sgt POCLET Cpl DEMEAUX Cpl BOSSAERS Cpl DESBRAQUEAIRE Sgt VOITURON Sgt VANGENECHTEN Cpl BORGNIET Cpl BOUVIER	Sgt DARGENT Cpl THEYS Cpl VAEREWYCK Sgt DETROZ Sgt THIS Sgt BLOMMAERTS Sgt SAUYELR Cpl PETERSBOURG	Sgt BLESSES Cpl MASSARD Cpl JACQUES Cpl RAISON Sgt CHARLIER Sgt GODINAS Sgt GOFFIN Sgt PULTEAU CLC FERNANDEZ	Sgt RUGG Cpl GOURDIN Cpl MOHNE Sgt FIVET Sgt MERRIOT Sgt MASCAUX Sgt CASTIAU Cpl BOUCHER Sgt DESTRAIS	
Comdt PI B	Sec 1	Sec 2	Sec 3	
Lt AUDRY 1st HEYLEN Sgt GOFFIN Cpl SCULIER Cpl MORELLE Sgt CANSE CLC BOUTILLET Cpl JANSSENS	Sgt HIERNALX CLC STROOBANTS Sgt LUYCKFASSEEL Sgt STRUYKEN Sgt VONECHE Sgt MARTIN Sgt DEMINE Cpl VALLES CLC RESTIAUX	Sgt SCHUTERMANS Cpl DEGREZ Sgt GARCIA Sgt OUNALX Sgt SAVINI Sgt GREBEUDE Sgt HATORSKI Cpl REVILOD Sgt DRAMAN	Sgt PIRSON Cpl DHEUR Sgt ROSEELS Sgt CORNELI Sgt MALLIEN Sgt FRANC Sgt DIDIER Cpl BARLET Cpl TOMASI	

KIBAT -----Annexes**Annex B****PHASES OF ALERT****1. Green phase**

Normal work phase, without any special measures.

2. Yellow phase

(a) Staff Headquarters.

(1) Prepare measures to be taken for the highest phases of alert.

(2) Increase radio liaison

(3) Differ VIP visits

(4) No leave except in exceptional cases

(b) Units.

(1) Precaution phase.

(2) Increase key posts and sentries.

(3) Restrict night movements.

(4) Check shelters.

(5) No leave except in exceptional cases.

(6) Control of collective arms.

(7) Three hour-reserve notice.

3. Red phase

(a) Staff Headquarters.

(1) General alert.

(2) Cancellation of visits.

(3) No leave

(4) Permission only for emergency movements

(5) Special SITREP at the UN Headquarters.

(6) Evacuation of civilians should the situation require.

(b) Units

(1) In defensive positions.

(2) All troops in position.

(3) One hour-reserve notice

(4) No leave

(5) Wearing of flak jacket by troops operating outside.

UNAMIR AIDE-MEMOIRE

1. DEFINITIONS**(a) FORCE**

Force is the use of physical means to impose one's will.

Military force is the use of physical means by trained, armed and disciplined troops, acting under a single command and with the same final objective, and involving, in general, the various means used.

UNAMIR operations are executed, on the one hand, by military observers and unarmed policemen and, on the other hand, by military forces armed solely for self-defence.

(b) THE ARMED FORCE

The armed force is the use of firearms (including warning shots) as well as knives, batons or teargas.

(c) UNARMED FORCE

Unarmed force is the use of physical force without firearms or knives, batons.

(d) SELF-DEFENCE

The use of armed force to defend oneself or one's unit in the event of a sudden and absolute necessity that allows for no alternative means or time for reflection.

(e) HOSTILE INTENT

A hostile intent is an action which appears as preparation for a hostile act.

(f) HOSTILE ACT

A hostile act is any aggressive action against the staff or equipment of the forces of law and order or against property placed under their responsibility.

(g) MINIMUM FORCE

It's the minimum degree of force necessary, reasonable and authorized by the Rules of Engagement (ROE).

(h) COLLATERAL DAMAGE

Damage to persons or surrounding property outside the authorized objective.

(i) POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION

Positive identification is identification ensured through such reliable means as visual observation, electronic means, heat picture, etc

2. INCIDENTS**(a) PROCEDURE TO FOLLOW (EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENCE)**

- (1) Phase 1 In the event of hostile intent or action, make contact and deal with the opposing party through the Rwandan gendarmes.
Request the aggressor to stop his action
Inform his immediate superior right away.
- (2) Phase 2 Repeat the warning, as many times as necessary to make sure that the aggressor has perfectly understood.
- (3) Phase 3 Request authorization to shoot from the battalion.
- (4) Phase 4 Arm, under the orders of the immediate chief.
- (5) Phase 5 Fire a warning shot into the air.
- (6) Phase 6 If necessary, open fire in the direction of one's objective by firing SOLELY SHOT AFTER SHOT.
- (7) Stage 7 Stop fire when the objective is attained or when the threat has been disappeared.

AUTHORIZATION TO SHOOT

FNC (shot after shot)	KIBAT Comd
MINIMI	SECTOR Comd via KIBAT Comd
MAG	FORCE Command via KIBAT Command

(b) MEASURES TO TAKE AFTER ANY INCIDENT**(1) IN CASE OF INJURIES**

Administer first aid even to the aggressor while ensuring your security and that of the staff under your protection

(2) CONTACT REPORT

- ETA at scene of incident
- Type of incidents (Demonstration, shooting)
- Force of opposing parties and attitude
- My attitude

(3) REPORT ON INCIDENT

Report furnished after ANY significant event to be filed with the SITREP and Co. at the end of day at the room of operations Content of report

- = Time (date and hour of incident)
- = Location (coordinates of place and description)
- = Force (persons, hostile units)
- = Activity (description of activities of this hostile group)
- = Equipment(Material, equipment, hostile group weapons)
- = Situation of my Unit (loss of equipment, injured, ...)

3. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)**(a) General considerations**

ROE constitute a means by which the United Nations gives directives to commanding officers relative to the use of force.
The ROE are drafted in the form of prohibitions and authorizations.

(b) Rule 1: CARRYING OF ARMS

- (1) Phase A: Unauthorized
- (2) Phase B: Authorized

(c) Rule 2: CONDITION OF WEAPONS

- (1) Phase A: Loader on weapon, NO cartridges in the magazine
- (2) Phase B: Weapons are loaded, with security device on "S"

(d) Rule 3: HOSTILE INTENT OR ACTS WITHOUT FIRE COVER

- (1) Phase A: Observe and inform BUT withdraw to ensure security of one's elements
- (2) Phase B: Observe but remain on the spot, make contact and establish liaison with the opposing parties and/or local authorities concerned
- (3) Phase C: Observe and inform, remain on the spot, indicate to the aggressor one's intention to use force, show one's determination through appropriate means without opening fire; deploy, take position, arm
- (4) Phase D: Idem as Phase C, but firing is authorized solely as a WARNING.

(e) Rule 4: DISARMAMENT OF CIVILIAN PARAMILITARY GROUPS

- (1) Phase A: Prohibited intervention
- (2) Phase B: Authorization granted. In doing so, use minimum force but open fire if hostile intents warrant it or if hostile acts are committed. Deliver weapons to the competent authorities as soon as possible.

(f) Rule 5: INTERVENTION AND WARNING SHOTS

- (1) Phase A: Prohibited intervention
- (2) Phase B: After the stipulated warning shots, adjusted aims are authorized against objectives identified with certainty.

(g) Rule 6: USE OF ARMS

- (1) Phase A: Use, preparation, movement and firing of weapons are prohibited in the presence of parties to the conflict.
- (2) Phase B: Certain activities in the presence of the opposing forces are authorized but are made explicit as follows:
 - (B1) Put weapon servers ostensibly in place
 - (B2) Move the weapons
 - (B3) Fire
 - (B4) Others (to be specified)

(h) NORMAL PHASES

Rule 1: Phase B
Rule 2: Phase A
Rule 3: Phase B
Rule 4: Phase B
Rule 5: Phase A
Rule 6: Phase A

Change in phases **STRICTLY** with authorization

5. STANDING SECURITY MEASURES**(a) General considerations**

The security of UNAMIR staff takes precedence. It **MUST** be the **CONSTANT** concern of **EVERYONE**.

(b) Staff security

- (1) **ALL** the staff must be in possession of their Belgian military identity card. It is the sole valid official document (pending issuance of a UN identity card) **PARTICULARLY, IN MUFTI**. It must be produced whenever requested by the local authorities, but **MAY NEVER** be remitted or given.
- (2) The staff **MAY NOT** move alone outside the UN facilities
- (3) Access to cafés, bars and clubs are authorized as per prevailing directives

Annex A: List of authorized public places (Ult)**(c) Vehicles**

- (1) Haulage habits are different and **MUST** call for the greatest caution. The Rwandan Highway Code is similar to that of Belgium **EXCEPT:-**
 Speed limit in agglomerations:
 Trucks: 30 km/h and light vehicles: 40 km/h.
 Rem: excepting, however, escort vehicles.
- (2) **EVERY DRIVER** shall be in possession of the Belgian military identity card and the UN identity card, the military driving licence (or civilian driving licence to drive non-military vehicles)
- (3) **ONLY UN** staff may be transported in UNAMIR vehicles excepting:
 - Gendarmes accompanying UNAMIR staff

- **Journalists holding UN accreditation card**
 - **ANY other person on the orders of the commanding officer**
- (4) NO vehicle may stay unguarded, particularly, outside the camps.**
- (5) After a mission, no staff equipment, documents or weapons may be left in the vehicle**
- (6) Inform operational commander as soon as possible through the radio or Tf should a UNAMIR vehicle be involved in an accident.**

Radio call signs

Bn comd

D6	Log Base Comd	Capt. Tefnin
D7	2 nd Log Base Comd	Lt. Belliere
H6	ACP Comd	Med Maj. Daubresse
M6	Det Med Bn Comd	Doc Thiry
OSCAR	PC Bn	
RELAX	ISC	WO Cantineaux
S1	Bn Staff Officer	Capt. Mespreuve
S13	Bn Ln Officer at HQ Secteur	Capt. Collin
S14	Bn Ln Officer at HQ Sector	Capt. Schepkens
S2	Bn Intelligence Officer	Lt. Decuyper
S3	Bn Operations Officer	Capt. Choffray
AS3	Deputy Operations Officer	Capt. Roman
S6	Bn Comd	Lt Col Dewez
S7	2 nd Bn Comd	Maj. Timsonnet

AIRFIELDGP

Gp Comd	A6
2 nd Comd	A7
PI A Chief	A16
PI A Sect.	A11
PI A Sect.	A12
PI A Sect.	A13
PI B Chief	A26
PI B Sect	A21
PI B Sect.	A22
PI B23	A23
CVRT Sect Chief	V6

SOUTH GP

Capt. Vandriessche	B6
Lt. Vermeulen	B7
Lt. Carleus	B16
Sgt Leiding	B11
Sgt Teysster	B12
Sgt. Bouchot	B13
	B14
2 nd Lt. Rodrigue	B26
Sgt. Bullineckx	B21
Sgt. Liegeois	B22
Sgt. Maufroid	B23
Lt. Van Cauwenberghe	

CITY GP

Lt. Lemaire	C6	Capt. Marchal
Lt. Lecomte	C7	Lt. Theunissen
2 nd Lt. Lelubre	C16	Lt. Koemigs
Sgt Mignon	C11	Sgt Rugg
Sgt Lekeux	C12	Sgt Dargent
Sgt. Joris	C13	Sgt Blesses
Sgt. Van Hamme		
2 nd Lt. Dekeyser	C26	2 nd Lt. Audry
Sgt. Bonelli	C21	Sgt. Hiernaux
Sgt. Ben Bouchout	C22	Sgt. Schuermans
Sgt. Desert	C23	Sgt. Pirson

PI Mor

Y1	Eq. PI Mor	S/Sgt. Leroy, LCpl Plescia, LCpl Meaux
Y2	Eq. PI Mor	Cpl Debatty, LCpl Uyttebroeck, LCpl Renwa
Y3	Eq. PI Mor	Sgt. Pauwels, LCpl P. Dupont, LCpl Kinkin
Y4	Eq. PI Mor	LCpl Mathus, LCpl Walbreccq, LCpl Gustin
Y5	Eq. PI Mor	LCpl Dhyon, Cpl Antoine, LCpl Lhoir
Y6	PI Mor Chief	Lt. Lotin, Cpl C Dupont, LCpl Lefebvre
Y7	PI Mor WO	SGM Leconte, LCpl Pochet, LCpl Bassine
Y8	Eq. PI Mor	LCpl Mathieu, LCpl Crespin, LCpl Laloux

HQ Sector

K2	HQ Sector Officer	Maj. De Loecker
K3	HQ Sector Ops Officer	Maj Bem Provinciael
K9	HQ Sector Comd	Col. Bem Marchal

SPECIAL ABBREVIATIONS

ESU	Ejector Surgical Unit
AMBABEL	Ambassador of Belgium
APC vehicles)	Armoured Personnel Carrier (RUTBAT had BTR armoured
CND	National Development Centre (Parliament)
MTC	Military Technical Cooperation
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal - Mine-clearing experts
FAR	Rwandese Armed Forces
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
BBTG	Broad-based Transitional Government
KWSA	Kigali Weapon Secure Area
LDSG	Long Distance Switching Group
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
SRSG	Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General
UNCIVPOL	United Nations Civil Police

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Carte RWANDA

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