

'Invaders who have stolen the country': The Hamitic Hypothesis, Race and the Rwandan Genocide

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The use in genocidal propaganda of a modified 'Hamitic Hypothesis' (the assertion that African 'civilisation' was due to racially distinct Caucasoid invaders from the north/north-east of Africa) has become a key feature of commentary on the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In order to historicise the Hypothesis, the article first traces the transformation by European anthropology of the 'Hamite' in to a racial object and how the extraneous provenance of 'the Tutsi' was articulated in colonial Rwanda. The article then critically assesses the centrality of the Hypothesis in constructing the Tutsi population as a target of genocide. Finally, the article explores both the inadvertent and explicit ways in which contemporary commentary reiterates aspects of the 'Hamitic assemblage'.

Man *is* before he *acts*; nothing he does may change what he is. This is, roughly, the philosophical essence of racism. (Bauman, 1991, p. 60)

Apart from relatively late Semitic influence . . . the civilizations of Africa are the civilizations of the Hamites . . . who are Caucasians, i.e. belong to the same great branch of mankind as almost all Europeans. (Seligman, 1939, p. 96)

[T]he incoming Hamites were pastoral 'Europeans'—arriving wave after wave—better armed as well as quicker witted than the dark agricultural Negroes. (Seligman, 1966, p. 100)

The 'Hamitic Hypothesis' is pervasive in commentaries on the 1994 Rwandan genocide (see Berkeley, 2001, p. 2581; Uvin, 1998, pp. 30–31; Gourevitch, 2000, pp. 50–53; Peterson, 2000, pp. 258–59). A sense, however, of the different incarnations of the 'Hamite', shifting intimation and precise relationship with the genocide is often neglected. The intention here is to destabilise the 'Hamitic Hypothesis' as constant *racial* (rather than linguistic, see Greenberg, 1963) object, to

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trace consistent features and to caution against a simplistic relationship with the genocide—in other words, to re-historicize and re-embed the ‘Hamitic Hypothesis’ in the Rwandan *and* European pasts. Equally, while the ‘Hypothesis’ is now rightly relegated to European fantasy, contemporary discourses simultaneously, sometimes inadvertently, replicate or re-affirm aspects of the ‘Hamitic’ assemblage.

The ‘Curse of Ham’

Edith Sanders (1969, p. 531) notes that Seligman’s definitive assertion (above) masks the evolution of the term ‘Hamite’ which, ‘like a chameleon changes its colour to reflect the changing light’. An indication of this protean nature is that, until the end of the eighteenth century, it did not indicate a ‘civilising race’, but justified African slavery. Furthermore, the shift from the ‘Curse of Ham’ to the ‘Hamitic Hypothesis’ was not substitutory. Rather, a residual aspect of the former remained. For there to be ‘civilising Hamites’ required the maintenance of ‘True Negroes’ (Seligman, 1966, p. 30).

The ‘Curse of Ham’, the belief that the black African, as a descendant of Ham, bore Noah’s curse of servitude, can be found in European and North American writing from the sixteenth century until recent times (Goldenberg, 2005, pp. 142, 176). In Genesis 9:18–27, Noah is drunk and naked. While his sons Shem and Japheth cover Noah, his other son, Ham sees his father’s nakedness. On awaking and discovering what Ham has done, Noah declares ‘Cursed be Canaan! The lowest of slaves will he be to his brothers’. It is not Ham who is cursed, but Canaan and there is no reference to a *physiological* malediction.

David Goldenberg (2005, p. 7) demonstrates that the fusing of the ‘black African’ with slavery was a result of *post*-Biblical exegesis from the seventh century C.E. onwards. In the Hebrew Bible itself, the term ‘Kush’ refers to East Africa (south of Egypt) *and* South-West Arabia (p. 19). The key description of the *African* Kushites *as a people* (Isaiah, 18:1–2) is positive and skin colour is *never* mentioned in descriptions of individual Kushites (Goldenberg, 2005, pp. 29–40). It appears that, ‘Ethnicity and colour were apparently not relevant in determining the image of these people’ (p. 46). Similarly, although the colour black was used as a metaphor for evil in late-antiquity, there is no indication that this translated to antipathy toward black Africans (p. 196).

How did this view of black Africans in Biblical and, to an extent, post-Biblical writings, become transformed in to a perspective in which (1) not Canaan, but Ham was cursed; and (2) not only was Ham cursed with slavery, but with being black? As regards the second question, Goldenberg (2005, p. 149) demonstrates that, contrary to a persistent assumption, the Hebrew name Ham is not related to a Hebrew or Semitic word meaning ‘dark’, ‘black’, or ‘heat’. This confusion emerged from the loss of a graphical distinction when Hebrew was put in to written form (p. 156). And yet, no link between skin colour *and* slavery is made in Jewish sources of antiquity and late-antiquity, nor in early Christian sources (p. 168).

To make such a link would not only be contrary to Genesis 9:18–27, but to the fact that of Ham's four sons, Kush, Mizraim (Egypt), Put and Canaan (Genesis, 10:6), the first three sons are considered by the Hebrew Bible as the ancestors of various African peoples, whereas Canaan is the ancestor of *non-black* Canaanites. The only way to reconcile the erroneous assumption of Ham's 'blackness' with servitude was to push the curse of slavery back onto Ham, the biblical ancestor of the Kushites (Goldenberg, 2005, pp. 101, 169). In Near Eastern texts from the seventh century C.E. onwards, it is, therefore, Ham who replaces Canaan as the recipient of Noah's curse (p. 164). The fact that this shift occurred in a Near Eastern context in which black Africans were becoming increasingly identified as slaves was decisive (pp. 164–67, 131–38). As the black slave trade moved to England and then North America, the 'Curse of Ham' also moved, its clear contradiction of scripture resolved by the 'fact that Blacks were enslaved' (p. 177; see Speke, 1863, p. 1).

The Hamitic 'Myth'/'Hypothesis'

Sanders (1969, p. 525) notes that the archaeologists and other 'scientists' who arrived in the wake of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 concluded that 'the Egyptians were Negroids . . . originators of the oldest civilization of the West'. A debate ensued regarding whether the Ancient Egyptians were black (see Foster, 1974). One response was to 'recall' that Egyptians were, according to the Bible, descendents of Mizraim, son of Ham and that the curse of servitude/'blackness' had, *after all*, only been placed on Canaan. Thus, 'the Egyptians emerged as Hamites, Caucasoid, uncursed and capable of high civilisation' (Sanders, 1969, p. 527).

In *Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile*, John Hanning Speke concludes, regarding the 'Wahuma[Bahima]—otherwise Gallas or Abyssinians' that,

It appears impossible to believe, judging from the physical appearance of the Wahuma they can be of any other race than the semi-Shem-Hamitic of Ethiopia. (1863, p. 123)

Thus, 'the government is in the hands of foreigners, who had invaded and taken possession of them, leaving the agricultural aborigines to till the ground'. Speke also talks of the

Watusi, who are emigrants from Karague of the same stock [who tend] their cattle all over Unyamuezi under the protection of the native negro chiefs. (1863, p. 125)

At this point, the two notions of 'Egyptian Hamites' and 'Ethiopian Hima/Tutsi' remained discrete. It was to be Charles Seligman, in an article in 1913, who would conjoin the two by 'locating' a *common* basis: *the* Hamite.

Seligman (1913, p. 593) writes that 'buried beneath the present day cultures of North-Eastern and Eastern Africa' there were the

remains of [a culture] which presents such substantial affinities with that of ancient Egypt that there can be no legitimate objection to speaking of it as Hamitic.

For Seligman, 'Egyptian civilisation was only a special development' of a 'Hamitic influence [that] was leavening dark Africa, perhaps for thousands of years before Egypt herself emerged' (comments on Johnston, 1913, p. 420). By pushing the ancestry of ancient Egyptians back on to his *explicitly* 'non-Negro' 'Hamites', Seligman circumvented the debate concerning the 'colour' of the Egyptians *and* provided a common 'non-Negro', 'explanation' for 'incongruous civilisation' throughout Central/Eastern Africa.

A revised version of the 1913 article appears as a chapter ('Eastern Hamites') in *Races of Africa* (four editions 1930; 1939; 1957; 1966). Seligman (1939, p. 99) begins his discussion of the 'Eastern Hamites' with what he terms 'pre-dynastic' or 'proto-Egyptians' (before 3,200 B.C.E), who were 'without the slightest suspicion of any Negro characteristics' (Seligman, 1913, p. 607). Relying principally on cranial measurements, Seligman concludes that the Beja are the 'present-day representatives of the proto-Egyptian stock' (p. 610). Thus, the

Eastern Hamites comprise the ancient and modern Egyptians . . . the Beja, the Berberines (Barbara or Nubians), the Galla, the Somali and Danakil, and, though mixed with Semites and Negroes, most Abyssinians (Seligman, 1939, p. 97)

Seligman tries to recover 'the social customs and religious beliefs of the early Hamites' by comparing the customs and beliefs of the Beja, Ancient Egyptians and

the barbarous tribes and peoples of Africa [who] sprung from the mixture of the Hamite and Negro or [who were] affected culturally by Hamitic influence. (1913, pp. 648–49)

Of these latter, Seligman talks of the 'Half-Hamites' (1913, p. 595) and 'hamaticized Nilotes'. He concludes that, the

ideas and customs which are common to Hamites, half-Hamites and Nilotes . . . show such a substantial agreement [that these peoples] either represent the descendents of that stock which gave rise to the proto-Egyptians or have been permeated by its influence. (p. 682)

The 'either/or' allows Seligman to talk of Central/East-African Bantu-speaking tribes 'in whose veins runs much Hamitic blood' *or* 'who are ruled by a foreign (Hamitic) aristocracy' (1913, p. 657) and thus, following Speke, the 'Bahima of Ankole who form the Hamitic aristocracy of a Bantu state' (*ibid.*, p. 659). Seligman (1966, p. 31) states, therefore, that 'Almost everywhere [the] Negro carries in his veins a greater or lesser proportion of Hamitic blood and has been influenced by Hamitic culture'.

In *Races of Africa*, Seligman fuses race and superiority: 'The Hamites were . . . the great civilising force of black Africa' (1966, p. 8), 'quicker witted than the dark agricultural Negroes' (p. 100). Similarly:

the Nilotes show no inconsiderable admixture with that foreign (Hamitic) blood which ran pure or almost pure in the veins of the predynastic Egyptians. . . . If the actual socio-political conditions of the Nilotes be examined we find that development has taken place upon the same lines as [in Egypt, but that] Everywhere dulled by Negro blood this progress has reached different stages among the tribes . . . the 'drag' imposed by the large amount of Negro blood in the mixed Negro-Hamitic populations. (Seligman, 1913, p. 681)

Likewise: 'the Nilote owes his comelier features and better developed brain to invading Hamitic influence' (Seligman's comments on Johnston, 1913, p. 419).

Seligman (1913, p. 595) acknowledges that 'Eastern Hamites' is drawn from Giuseppe Sergi (1897; 1901). For Sergi (1901, p. v), the 'primitive populations of Europe' originated in Africa and from this 'great African stock' were formed the three branches of '*Eurafrican*': '*African*', '*Mediterranean*' and '*Nordic*'. For Sergi, this 'stock' emerged from '*The Hamites*' whose origin is not only Africa (p. 40) but, probably, 'the great lakes' (p. 43). For Sergi, the 'Hamites' are going in the opposite direction. While Seligman is content to reproduce Sergi's 'Eastern/Northern Hamite' configuration, and even mention Sergi's suggestion of an African origin (1913, p. 595), Seligman concludes that 'the cradle-land of the Hamites, though generally considered to be Arabia, is unknown'.

Of more significance, is Sergi's, and therefore Seligman's, dependence on Joseph Deniker (see Drake, 1959, p. 217). Deniker's (1889) classification of races is 'based only on physical characteristics' (p. 322), race and 'culture' are not coextensive. Rather, he introduces the phrase, 'ethnic group',¹ to denote entities constituted by the combination of 'language . . . religion, and especially, social institutions'. He insists that *race* (as physical characteristics) and 'ethnic groups' are distinct (p. 324). In *Races of Man* (1900), Deniker states that 'Ethnic groups' are distinguishable 'by their language, their mode of life, and their manners', but that their formation involves the 'blending of several distinct somatological units, which are "theoretic types" formed of an aggregation of physical characteristics' (1900, pp. 8, 3).

Defining the study of 'somatological characteristics of the genus *Homo*' as '*anthropology*' and the study of 'ethnic characteristics' as '*ethnography*' (p. 9), Deniker, despite the book's title, states

The object of this book being the description of ethnical groups . . . and of the races which compose them, the title of 'Ethnography' might fitly be given to it. (p. 10)

Deniker's description of 'Somatic/Morphological/Physiological Characters' (1900, pp. 12–122) is descriptive not evaluative, while 'Ethnic Characters: Linguistic/Sociological' (pp. 123–279) is applied non-judgementally to *all* 'peoples' (see Mosse, 1978, p. 89).²

Deniker (1889, pp. 326, 331) locates the 'Kushite-Hamites' through the following regression:

Frizzy hair → black skin, large depressed nose → rather brown skin, prominent nose → [*Race:*] Ethiopian ('which corresponds in part to the "Kushites" and "Hamites" of some authors')—tall height, straight or aquiline nose [*Type:*] Beja [and that] '*beja* is the synonym for the *Nubian, Ethiopian, Bisharin* . . . to be found fairly pure among nomadic populations (Ababda, Hadendoa, Hamran, Djalín etc.) of the Nile valley, beyond the tropic of Cancer, as well as further south, among the Gallas.

This definition is virtually replicated by Seligman (1939, pp. 101–3) with the crucial addition of 'civilising superiority' *absent* in Deniker.

Furthermore, in his 1900 book, Deniker modifies this definition. The 'race' remains the same: 'The *Ethiopian* race . . . preserved fairly pure among the Bejas' (p. 288), but, he locates "'ethnic groups" or sociological units', according to a mixed geographic-linguistic classification (p. 294) and thus 'The peoples speaking *Semitic* or *Hamitic* languages [include] the *Ethiopians* (Gallas, Bejas, Abyssinians)' (p. 296). Here, *Hamitic* is only a linguistic feature of 'ethnic groups', it is not a 'race'.

Deniker (1900, p. 428) does, however, say of 'Africa' that, 'The primitive substratum of the population is formed of Negroes' and that on this was deposited the

so-called Hamitic element of European or Asiatic origin [which] perhaps has been transformed by interminglings with the Negroes, into a new race, analogous to the Ethiopian, with which we must probably connect the ancient Egyptians.

At first sight this seems identical to Seligman. However, not only is Deniker speculative, but Seligman's pure *non-Negro* 'Hamitic Bejas' are, for Deniker, examples of the *Ethiopian* race, a 'new race' born of a 'so-called Hamitic element' and 'Negroes'. 'So-called', because 'Hamitic', for Deniker, is only a linguistic feature of 'ethnic groups' and not a 'race'. More importantly, and in direct contrast to Seligman's 1913 article, Deniker states that 'similarity of manners and customs . . . do not yet give us the right to infer an affinity of race or language, and still less common origin' (1900, p. 295).

Most striking, Seligman's notion of 'Hamitic superiority' is entirely absent from Deniker, for the simple fact that Deniker (1900, p. 9) does not associate intellectual/ 'cultural' superiority with any of his 'races' (based *only* on 'somatological characteristics') which

are the differences in outer form [of] individuals [in contrast to] differences between ethnical groups [which] are the product of evolutions subject to other laws than those of biology [manifest in] linguistic, or social characteristics. The study of them is based on the grouping of individuals in societies.

Deniker remains an 'evolutionist' and talks of 'Savage', 'Semi-civilised' and 'Civilised' peoples (1900, p. 127). This division is not, however, made according to race. Rather, 'ethnic groups' differ 'by the *degree* of culture' they possess (p. 124), but unlike Edward Tylor (1871, p. 1), Deniker's sole criteria is writing (1900, p. 125). In terms of normative judgments:

It remains to speak of psychological characters . . . of temperament and the different manifestations of mind . . . it is almost impossible to treat these in the face of many contradictory facts . . . Each traveller, each observer tends to judge in his own way a given people according to the nature of relations (pacifist, hostile, etc.) which he has had with it. We are unable to affirm anything when we have once made up our minds to escape from the commonplace generalities that savages are wanting in foresight and general ideas, that they are cruel [etc.]. (Deniker, 1900, p. 121)

As noted, Seligman's dependence in *Races of Africa* on Deniker's 1889 article (via Sergi) is clear, although Deniker is not acknowledged. It is important to note that Deniker makes no claims to 'civilising diffusion', because he associates no 'intellectual' or 'cultural' characteristics with 'race'. In contrast, for Seligman, 'culture' implies the influence of an intellectually *superior* 'race'. Seligman's perspective was, therefore, according to our contemporary normative registers regarding the *notion* of race, a regression from Deniker.

Finally, although Seligman is constantly associated with the 'Hamitic Hypothesis' in Rwanda, it must be noted that while Sergi (1901, p. 41) placed the 'Wahima and Watusi [*sic*]' in his 'Eastern Hamitic Branch', in *Races of Africa*, Seligman (1939, p. 209) mentions Rwanda only once, when he states 'other "Lacustrian" tribes are the Waruanda [and the] Warundi', although he adds, 'it seems that all these tribes have a Hamitic (presumably Galla) element, brought in by the Bahima'.

The 'Hamitic Hypothesis' and Rwanda

Colonial Discourses

Colonial authorities in Rwanda (German 1897–1916 and Belgian 1916 onwards) encountering the unrepresentative Rwandan central court, erroneously (see C. Newbury, 1988) assumed that the kingdom was systematically divided into 'self-evident' categories of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. Given that that *some* Tutsi (a minority) ruled over a majority, they 'must' possess *incongruous* martial skill and intelligence, which, when combined with the observation that the Tutsi *at the central court*, possessed a different physiology to that of Hutu, was taken to indicate Tutsi provenance *outside* Rwanda. Colonial writings are replete with such notions, although they are by no means verbatim reproductions of Sergi or Seligman, but variations on a theme of *superiority/exteriority*. For example:

1895 '[Tutsi are] Hamitic Pastoralists [from] Ethiopia [who have subjugated a] tribe of Negro Bantus' (Count von Götzen, German Governor, quoted in Chrétien, 1985, p. 135)

1902 'Their intelligent and delicate appearance, their love of money, their capacity to adapt to any situation seem to indicate a semitic-origin' (Monsignor Le Roy quoted in Prunier, 1995, p. 8)

- 1902 'The Batutsi . . . are superb men, with fine and regular features, with something of the Aryan and the Semite' (Léon Classe, Vicar Apostolic from 1927, quoted in Chrétien, 1985, p. 137)
- 1903 'We can see Caucasian skulls and beautiful Greek profiles side-by-side with Semitic and even Jewish features' (Joannes van den Burgt; quoted in Prunier, 1995, p. 7)
- 1917 '[The Tutsi is] closer to the White man than the Negro . . . he is a European under a black skin' (François Menard, Roman Catholic missionary, quoted in Gahama, 1983, p. 275)
- 1931 'The Batutsi were destined to reign . . . over the inferior races that surround them (Pierre Ryckmans, Belgian Governor General, quoted in Chrétien, 1985, p. 138)

Stable, written histories were required by the Belgian authorities (and Roman Catholic Church) if the distorted image of Rwanda as a 'healthy hierarchy of races' (Chrétien, 1985, p. 142) was to be internalised. Such a project also suited 'elite Tutsi' as a means to (re)legitimate within the accentuated stratification of colonial rule (Linden, 1977, p. 4). Thus, the Tutsi historian, Aléxis Kagame (1959) maintained 'the Tutsi' had Ethiopian/Hamitic origins (see Taylor, 1999, p. 76) a perspective then repeated by Kagame's *protégé* Jacques Maquet (1961, p. 12), who prefers 'Ethiopians' to 'Hamites', because the former is 'not burdened with linguistic connotations'.

The coalescence of European and 'elite Tutsi' perspectives was facilitated by existing origin myths³ (see Chrétien, 1999). Although appearing in various forms, the story concerns Kigwa and his companions, the *Bimanuka*, who 'descend from the sky', bringing various aspects of 'civilisation' with them. The *Bimanuka*, which include a potter *Mutwa/Gatwa*, bring all the domesticated animals and four skills (ironwork, woodwork, tannery and hunting). Among the *Bimanuka* are Kigwa's half-brother Mututsi, who from his marriage to his niece, Kigwa's daughter, founds the *Bega*, *Baha* and *Bakono*, the three clans from which the 'queen mother' was drawn. Kigwa (or according to alternative myths, his descendent *Kazi*) marries a daughter/descendent of *Kabeja*, king of the *Bazigaba* (an 'autochthonous' clan). The result of this union is *Gihanga*, the ancestor of nearly every dynasty in the region and who, through his son *Kanyarwanda*, founds the royal *Banyiginya* dynasty from whom the Rwandan *Mwami* (king) was drawn (see Vansina, 2004).

These 'royal origin myths' emerged in the late seventeenth century under the *Nyiginya* dynasty and explicate aspects of the politico-religious imaginary of 'classical Rwandan society' (see Chrétien, 1999, pp. 289–96). Their concern is clan and royal authority, not 'ethnic' division, and imply an 'ancient' continuity of space and power, thereby obfuscating past (and continuing) expansion of the kingdom, while *simultaneously* providing a single origin for those *becoming* 'Banyarwanda'.

And yet, the myths contain ‘a wondrous landscape on which human civilisation confronts the backwardness of a savage wilderness’ (Chrétien, 1999, p. 287). The origin myths were, therefore, easily re-interpreted, like the Bachwezi myth in Uganda (see Chrétien, 2003, pp. 95–136; Seligman, 1939, p. 209) as an encoded allegory of a ‘Hamitic invasion’ with *Kigwa* and *Gihanga* as civilising ‘Tutsis’ and the *Bazigaba* as ‘Hutu’.

Discourses at Independence

This notion of ‘conquering Hamitic Tutsi’ was articulated by *both* Hutu and Tutsi nationalists in the latter half of the 1950s. On 24 March 1957, nine Hutu published the Bahutu Manifesto (*Notes on the Social Aspect of the Racial Native Problem in Rwanda*). A truncated version demonstrates the centrality of the ‘Hamite’:

What does the indigenous racial problem consist of? . . . it is a problem of a political monopoly of one race, the mututsi . . . We must abandon the belief that Rwandan élites can only be found among the ranks of the hamites . . . a system systematically favouring the political and economic progress of the hamite . . . action [should be taken] for the economic and political emancipation of the Muhutu from the traditional tow [of the] hamite. (Nkundabagenzi, 1961, p. 24–29)

A document written *in reponse* to the manifesto (at Nyanza on 17 May 1958) and signed by ‘12 *bagaragu b’ibwami bakuru*’ (‘Great Servants of the Royal Court’), retold the *Kigwa* story in a form that demonstrated their adherence to the ‘Hamitic Hypothesis’:

The ancestor of Banyiginya is Kigwa. . . . The relations between the subjects of Kabeja [the *Bazigaba*] and the Kigwa family were so strong that the latter abandoned their first master [Kabeja] and became servants of *Kigwa* [Therefore] how can the Bahutu now claim their right to share the common inheritance . . . the relations between us (Batutsi) and them (Bahutu) have always been until now based on serfdom; therefore between them and us there is no basis of fraternity . . . Kigwa found the Bahutu in Rwanda . . . History says that [our] kings killed the Bahinzi [‘Bahutu kinglets’] and have conquered the Bahutu lands of which the Bahinzi were kings. . . . Since our kings conquered the countries of the Bahutu and killed their kinglets, how can they now claim to be our brothers. (Nkundabagenzi, 1961, pp. 35–36)

This shared discourse was not the only political position, but it was to be the imaginary of the *Bahutu Manifesto* that would be actualised with the ‘Social Revolution’ of November 1959 and the ousting of the *Mwami* (‘Tutsi’ king) (see Eltringham, 2004, pp. 34–35).

The binary division of Bahutu/Hamite (Tutsi) did not correspond with socio-economic reality. By the end of the 1950s, the average family income of Hutu and ‘*petits* Tutsi’ was virtually the same (Linden, 1977, p. 226) with only c.10,000 ‘*élite* Tutsi’ (out of c.300,000 of those designated ‘Tutsi’) being associated with the political

class (Harroy, 1984, p. 234). This raises the question of the dual-location of 'the Tutsi', who in one field were a part of a supposed 'Hutu/Tutsi' dichotomy, but were simultaneously an *intermediary* in a European/African dichotomy.

How does the 'Hamitic Hypothesis', therefore, as applied to Rwanda by the Belgians, co-opted by the Tutsi *élite* and inverted by an emergent Hutu *élite*, relate to the construction of alterity by means of the colonial dialectic? The construction of alterity through the colonial imaginary consists of 'two moments that are dialectically related' (Hardt & Negri, 2001, p. 127). First, difference is 'pushed to the extreme', the colonial 'Other' becomes the 'absolute negation' of the European 'subject'. Second, this absolute 'difference of the Other' is inverted as the foundation of the 'European Self'. It is 'the evil, barbarity, and licentiousness' deposited in the image of the colonized 'Other' that 'make possible the goodness, civility, and propriety of the European Self'. How should one interpret the image of the 'Hamite', which is not *negation* in itself, but is *simultaneously* the 'construction of relative affinity' and a further negation of the 'colonial other' proper?

On one hand, the duplex position that the 'Hamitic Tutsi' occupied can be seen in the notion of 'double colonialism'. The Bahutu Manifesto, states:

At the heart of the problem is double colonialism: the Muhutu must suffer the domination of the hamite and the European... [And if only] white-black colonialism is ended, this would leave in place the even worse colonialism of hamite over the Muhutu. (Nkundabagenzi, 1961, pp. 22–28)

The image of the Hamite as 'superior civiliser' was easily switched to 'foreign interloper'.

Given the earlier dual-location of the Tutsi, there is a temptation to suggest that the Colonial Dialectic did not operate in colonial Rwanda, but could only be expressed with independence, *internally* constructing 'the Tutsi' as *proxy* colonists, that with the exit of the 'real colonist', the Dialectic did not, paradoxically, cease to operate, but was finally able to operate, unencumbered.

It is this position that is taken by Mahmood Mamdani (2001, pp. 13–14) who explains the 1994 genocide as 'native' vs 'settler' violence, with the Tutsi becoming *proxy* colonists—*proxy* victims of Sartre's 'age of the boomerang' (Sartre, 2004, p. liv). Mamdani (2001, p. 14) argues that 'The dialectic of the settler and the native did not end with colonialism and political independence', rather the Tutsi were 'constructed as a privileged alien settler presence'. Thus, 'For the Hutu who killed, the Tutsi was a settler, not a neighbour [but] a foreigner'.

The argument that the 1994 genocide can be reduced to a playing out of the colonial dialectic ignores the fact that violence, from 1959 onwards, involved different configurations of, external involvement (Belgian 1959, French 1990–94); intra-Hutu rivalry (northern vs south/central in 1973 and 1990–94); the manipulation of external threats (*inyenzi* 1961–68; Rwandan Patriotic Front 1990–94); events in Burundi (1972 and 1993). Also, we have virtually no evidence about how the 'Hutu who killed' at these earlier moments perceived their Tutsi neighbours. We are,

however, gradually coming to know more about such perceptions in 1994 (see Hatzfeld, 2005). As Charles Mironko (2004, p. 212) states, 'The ordinary Rwandans I spoke to in prisons did not kill Tutsi only, or even principally, because they were Tutsi'. Rather, they gave a number of reasons, including economic incentives and personal rivalries, although the threat of immediate injury to themselves and their families through 'threats, rebukes and sheer force' was predominant (p. 192). Mironko warns, however, that such accounts may

serve less as a representation of the social realities of 1994... and more as a representation of the ideological processes at work in prison communities after the fact. (p. 193)

Either way, if Mamdani's reduction of the genocide to 'native's violence' appears not to be substantiated at a grassroots level, was it *the* key feature of genocidal propaganda?

The 'Hamitic Hypothesis' and the extraneous provenance of the Tutsi did feature in genocidal propaganda (see Eltringham, 2004, pp. 21–22). For example, the January/February 1992 edition of *Kangura Magazine* claimed that a genocide of the 'Bantu' had been planned and 'consciously orchestrated by the Hamites, thirsty for blood' (Chrétien *et al.*, 1995, p. 169). Among the 'enemies' identified in a memorandum of 21 September 1992, issued by Colonel Déogratias Nsabimana (Chief of Staff of the Forces Armées Rwandaises) were the 'Nilo-Hamitic people of the region' (HRW & FIDH, 1999, p. 63). The January 1994 edition of *Kangura*, denounced the Tutsi as 'invaders' who had 'stolen the country' (Chrétien *et al.*, 1995, p. 118).

Ultimately, although the 'Hamitic Hypothesis' featured in genocidal propaganda, the notions of racial alterity found in genocidal propaganda cannot be reduced to the logic of 'native/settler', nor the notion of exterior provenance. A key article, '*Appel à la conscience des Bahutu*' (*Kangura*, December 1990), makes no mention of 'Hamites'. Although it quotes the 17 May 1958 declaration by the '12 *bagaragu b'ibwami bakuru*' (see above) it is the 'lack of fraternity', not the 'Hamitic' subtext that is mentioned.

The article is concerned with the 'gains of the Social Revolution of 1959'; the control of the state by an *ethnic* 'demographic/democratic' majority; republicanism rather than monarchism. Thus, the 'permanent dream of the Batutsi is to reverse the republican institutions the legitimacy of which they refuse to recognise and reinstall the minority and feudal power of the Batutsi' (Chrétien, 1991, p. 117). The 'ideology of the Bahutu', therefore, 'jealously defends the gains of [the] revolution and those of the referendum of 25 September 1961 [*Kamarampaka*, in which 80 per cent of voters supported the abolition of what was considered the 'Tutsi monarchy']'. Consequently, 'Our political life must be based on democratic principles, on the administration of the state by the electoral majority [the] Bahutu' (p. 118). The article ends with the 'Hutu Ten Commandments', *none of which is concerned with Tutsi provenance*. Four commandments are concerned with the 'character' of the 'Tutsi', that they try to break the 'cohesion of the Bahutu' by means of money/commerce (commandment 4)

and women (commandments 1–3). Miscegenation is ‘treacherous’ because it is one of the ‘diabolical manoeuvres of the Batutsi’ (pp. 119; 118; see Malkki, 1995, pp. 82–87).

Propaganda from 1990 onwards may have deployed aspects of the ‘Hamitic Hypothesis’, but it took on a more generic character related to *racial* alterity than a modification of the Colonial Dialectic.

The homogenising concept of race (ascribed in the Bahutu Manifesto, self-ascribed in the declaration of the ‘12 *bagaragu b’ibwami bakuru*’) effaced comparative wealth or political authority. Post-independence Rwanda, therefore, inherited the ‘conceptual Tutsi’ firmly separated from Tutsi women and men. Like Zygmunt Bauman’s (1991, pp. 38–39) ‘conceptual Jew’, the ‘conceptual Tutsi’, could be ‘set apart from the context of daily life [and] made immune against the test of daily experience’. The ‘Tutsi’ were ‘simultaneously concrete objects of daily intercourse and exemplars of a category defined independently of such intercourse’ which could be ‘deployed as a resource in actions only loosely, if at all, related to the practices of quotidianity’.

Such alterity is not given, but must be constantly *re*-produced. What was, in the past ‘given *naturally*’ (Bauman, 1991, pp. 56–57), because of the visibility of a minority of Tutsi in power, now had to be artificially demonstrated, a ‘naturalness [had] to be laboriously constructed’. The purported homogeneity of ‘the Tutsi’, a legacy of independence, was reiterated:

The Tutsi do not need to be the same colour, to have the same origin, the same rank in order to be united and agree with one another. Everywhere they are one. (*Kangura Magazine*, March–April 1992; Chrétien *et al.*, 1995, p. 251)

Homogeneity then implied *immutability*:

Specialists in human genetics tell us that the small population of Tutsi [in Rwanda] is due to the fact that they only marry one another . . . a cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly. A cockroach gives birth to another cockroach. (*Kangura*, March 1993, p. 155)

Once constructed as homogeneous and immutable, the ‘conceptual Tutsi’ was imbued with an ‘ineradicable vice, with an immanent flaw which [could not] be separated from [all] its carriers’ (Bauman, 1991, p. 72). This indelible predisposition ‘cannot be wished away, tampered with, or neglected’ (pp. 59–60). Thus,

Tutsi inside or outside the country, extremist and nostalgic for power, who have never and will never recognise the realities of the 1959 social revolution. (*communiqué* from Col. Déogratias Nsabimana, see above)

This malignancy was hidden and indelible. As regards *abaguze ubwoko* (those who had ‘illegally’ changed their identity):

I do not hate the Tutsi, but I hate those who refuse to call themselves Tutsi . . . Tutsi, don’t try to hide yourselves. (*Kangura*, March 1991; Chrétien *et al.*, 1995, p. 97)

As regards *Ibiymanyi* (those of mixed parentage), *Kangura-Magazine* (February 1992) asked ‘How many children of mixed marriages hide their true Tutsi identity . . . for strategic reasons?’ (p. 251). Irrespective of official (patrilineally inherited) identity, *Ibiymanyi* were described as ‘wolves dressed in a Rwandan skin’ who were joining the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (*Kangura*, December 1990, pp. 159, 219). They were vessels of *defiant* ‘nonconformity, heterodoxy, anomaly and aberration’ (Bauman, 1991, p. 39; see Taylor, 1999, p. 177).

The RPF were ‘counting on . . . the complicity the Batutsi of the interior’, the *ibiyitso* collaborators (*Appel à la conscience des Bahutu*). All Tutsi, therefore, shared an ‘ineradicable vice’, a ‘thirst for blood and power’. There was a need to unmask an obscured “‘essence of things” hidden behind phenomena that apparently contradicted it’ (Bauman, 1991, p. 57; see Eltringham, 2004, pp. 23–26), for ‘The enemy is always there, among us, and waits only for the right moment to try and liquidate us’ (*Appel à la conscience des Bahutu*); ‘The enemy is able to cleverly conceal and infiltrate himself’ (*Kangura*, February 1992; Chrétien *et al.*, 1995, p. 154); and

In our language a Tutsi is called a cockroach because he takes advantage of the night, he conceals himself in order to achieve his objectives. (*Kangura*, March 1993, p. 156)

Such racial alterity is as much about the *inexpressable*, the *implied* and *hidden*, as descriptions of specific characteristics and is certainly not reducible to simple notions of *extraneous provenance*. Such characteristics are used as if they *grasp* for indelible malignance, that cannot be captured in its entirety, its true essence is hidden, parameters cannot be accurately delineated. Malignancy may be indelible, but it is not static. It is this unpredictable *dynamism* that makes the ‘manoeuvres of the Tutsi’ diabolical (*Appel à la conscience des Bahutu*), this infinite capacity for transmutation, this viscous *opacity* that ‘endowed [the conceptual Tutsi] with a powerful and sinister fascination’ (Bauman, 1991, pp. 38–39).

Contemporary Resonance

Analogy with the Holocaust

Although he was not Anti-Semitic, Arthur de Gobineau had a marked influence on Nazi Race Theory. For Gobineau ‘the white race were Aryans, “innately” superior’ to the ‘black’ and ‘yellow’ races (Mosse, 1978, p. 53). Gobineau believed that the ‘yellow’ race had been the original inhabitants of Europe and that the ‘Aryans were subsequently imposed upon this population and eventually began to mix with it. It was this miscegenation that was destroying the white race’ (pp. 54–55). While the ‘superiority of the Aryans’ was maintained in *fin de siècle* Germany, Gobineau’s ‘black’ and ‘yellow’ races were discarded, their ‘degenerative effects’ directed towards the Jews (pp. 56, 94–112).

Although one can see an affinity with Seligman in Gobineau's (1967, pp. 25, 121) assertion that 'The basic organisation and character of all civilisations are equal to the traits and spirit of the dominant race', and that 'racial mixing' was inevitable, a more profound genealogical connection can be traced. In his chief work *The Foundation of the Twentieth Century* Alfred Rosenberg, who drafted the 1935 Nuremberg Race Law, uses 'Nordic' as a synonym for 'Aryan'. Rosenberg was influenced by Mason Grant's *The Passing of the Great Race* (1916) who, in turn, had adopted the term 'Nordic Race' (at the head of the 'Aryan race') from William Z. Ripley's *The Races of Europe* (1900) (see Boas, 1966b). Ripley, it appears, had adopted 'Nordic/Nordique' from Deniker's 1889 article (1889, pp. 332–33). Just as Deniker's original conception of a 'Nordic' race, distinct from either 'culture', 'nation' or any notion of sanguine superiority can be traced, in a modified form, to the architect of Nazi 'racial hygiene', so Deniker's 'Ethiopian' race (1889, p. 331) was, via Sergi,⁴ to become Seligman's 'Hamite', 'quicker witted' (1966, p. 100), the 'civilising force of black Africa' (p. 8).

This is not to disregard the multifarious contributions to, and complex formation of, Nazi racial thinking (see Mosse, 1978). It does, however, complement Hannah Arendt's (1968, p. 185) thesis that two notions forged in Africa were intimately linked to the Holocaust: 'race as a principle of the body politic [and] bureaucracy as a principle for foreign domination' (see Zimmerer, 2004). Benjamin Madley (2005) demonstrates that concepts and practices deployed in the genocide of up to 70,000 Herero in German South West Africa (Namibia) in 1904 were adopted by the Nazis. The anthropologist Eugen Fischer's 'research' in German South West Africa in 1908 lead to his conclusion that the offspring of 'interracial unions' were of 'lesser racial quality', that 'every European people that has absorbed the blood of the inferior races [Negro and Hottentots] have paid for this absorption of inferior elements by intellectual and cultural decline' (quoted in Madley, 2005, p. 454). One cannot fail to recall Seligman's (1913, p. 681) statement that

Everywhere dulled by Negro blood this progress has reached different stages among the tribes . . . the 'drag' imposed by the large amount of Negro blood in the mixed Negro-Hamitic populations.

Fischer's work not only directly influenced Hitler, but as director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity, and Eugenics (based in Berlin) he, and the institute, produced 'scholarship' intended to support Nazi racial policy, often depending on 'research' at Auschwitz (Madley, 2005, p. 456).

These direct links between the Holocaust and German colonialism can be placed in the broader practice of colonial (racial) rule, the 'institutional procedures for systematically objectifying and normalising the colonised terrain' (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 19; see Anderson, 1991, pp. 163–85) resulting in a 'legibility effect', the creation of 'theoretical and empirical tools that classify, serialise, and regulate collectivities' (Trouillot, 2003, p. 81), reducing complex phenomena into 'a more manageable, schematised form' (Hinton, 2002, p. 12). Such practices combined 'strategies of architecture and gardening with that of medicine [to construct an] artificial social

order (Bauman, 1991, p. 65). These 'abridged maps [which] when allied with state power, would enable much of the reality that they depicted to be remade' (Scott, 1999, p. 3), also create

a certain category of people endemically and hopelessly resistant to control and immune to all efforts at amelioration [who] can be 'improved' only by being destroyed. (Bauman, 1991, p. 65)

How does this relate to contemporary analogies between the Rwandan genocide and the Holocaust? Should the 1994 genocide be seen as the *importation* of the Holocaust to Africa or a *return*? As I have discussed in detail (Eltringham, 2004, pp. 51–68), although the two episodes share many analogous characteristics, comparison is propelled by the need to refute the international media's portrayal of the 1994 genocide as an 'incomprehensible frenzy' and communicate its premeditated nature. William Miles (2000, p. 107) notes the 'problematic side of an otherwise ethically compelling comparison', that, 'Judaizing the Tutsi' *de-historicizes* the genocide. He notes the ambivalence of 'chosenness' in this context given that,

Far from rejecting a European . . . reinterpretation of their own origins, Tutsi nobility embraced outside confirmation of their supposed cultural superiority. (p. 110)

He continues (p. 112):

Once the racial element is added—the colonial view (internalised by the nobility) that the Tutsis were a 'superior race'—then the respective role play of Jews, Tutsis, Germans and Hutus becomes all the more muddled. Who then, in the moral universe of Holocaust parallelism, are the Tutsis? Are they 'the Jews', victims of intended extermination? Or are they 'the Nazis', putative embodiment of a superior race?

Clearly, this question should only be answered sequentially, but Miles is warning that once the process of parallelism begins, claims of simultaneity may serve to downplay the suffering of Tutsi. To overstate the shared victimhood of Jew and Tutsi, by suggesting that the latter were victims of the Holocaust mimicked in Africa, obscures the prior emergence in Africa of the racial thinking that facilitated the Nazi Holocaust. More importantly, to suggest that the suffering of Tutsi must be understood through the Holocaust may not liberate 'the Tutsi' from the 'Hamitic Myth', but inadvertently, strengthen a sense of exteriority. If the suffering of Tutsi *rescapés* (survivors) is primarily made visible and acknowledged through external analogy, 'outside' Rwandan history, then this may, inadvertently, strengthen a sense of the extraneous quality of 'the Tutsi'. As Bauman (1991, p. 35) notes, 'The permanent and irremediable homelessness of the Jews' was a central aspect of Nazi anti-Semitism whereby Jews were anomalies in the 'international order of things' (Malkki, 1994, p. 42). Overplaying the comparison, may evoke the 'nationless' quality of European

Jewry, and result in a view of ‘the Tutsi’ similar to the Nazi portrayal of Jews ‘as insidious outsiders who have implanted themselves in territory where they do not belong’ (Miles, 2000, p. 110). Contemporary positions that reject a colonial perspective—one that could only explain the ‘incongruous’ through external explanation—while simultaneously deploying an external analogy (the Holocaust) as the principle means to interpret the 1994 genocide, may inadvertently accentuate the notion of Tutsi *exteriority*.

The Havila Institute

The diasporic ‘Havila Institute’ (based in Belgium) describes itself as

an intellectual, political and biblical, movement that has assigned itself the mission of safeguarding the ancestral heritage, as well as the cultural and political identity of the Hebraic peoples of Africa around the sources of the White Nil (Pishon), according to the terms of the Book of Genesis [2:10]. (Bwejeri, 2000)

The President of the Institute, Burundian Professor Yochanan Bwejeri, describes the institute’s work as focusing on the Hebraic ‘remnants of pre-talmudic tribes of Israel isolated on the “other side of the rivers of Ethiopia”’, as found in Zephaniah, 3:10, Amos, 9:7, Jeremiah, 44:1. According to Bwejeri, the Prophets are referring to the land of ‘Havila’ (see Genesis, 2:10–14) which is ‘South of Ethiopia . . . particularly *Burundi, Rwanda, Kivu, Masisi, Shaba*’ and that ‘One of the Hebraic tribes isolated in the sacred land of *Havila* is called *Tutsi* or *Batutsi*’ (Bwejeri, n.d.; emphasis in original). Given the ‘Kushtic and Hebraic identity of the Batutsi’ (2001b, p. 19), Bwejeri ‘claims that he is a Jew by birth’ and that his ‘ancestors and the ancestors of all Tutsi were all Jews by birth and not by conversion’ (Berg, 2003).

Bwejeri rejects the ‘Hamitic Hypothesis’, because it falsified the ‘chronological and geographical limits of Tutsi civilisation’ (Bwejeri, 2001b, p. 5; 2001a, p. 9). ‘Chronologically’, because the Batutsi are first mentioned as living in the biblical land of ‘Havila’ in Genesis (Genesis, 2:11) (2001b, p. 12) and referred to in Jeremiah 44:1 as ‘living in the south-kushtic land which is theirs’ (2001a, p. 11); ‘geographically’, because the names, laws, customs etc. of the Batutsi ‘exhibits the true nature of the Hamitic identity or more precisely Kushtic and therefore Pharaonic and Ethiopian’ (2001b, p. 33). According to Bwejeri, Speke simply recognised a reality (pp. 7–9).

Elsewhere, Bwejeri, like Seligman (1913) conjoins discrete notions of ‘Hamitic Egyptians’ with ‘Hamitic Ethiopians’ by stating that the Tutsi, like the Jews, are remnants of monotheistic Atenism that emerged under Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten in Egypt in the fourteenth century B.C.E. For Bwejeri, Batutsi are remnants of a post-Akhenaten exodus *towards the South* simultaneous with the Biblical exodus towards Sinai (Bwejeri, 2001b, pp. 21, n.4, 22; Berg, 2003). Thus, ‘The Tutsi people originated in Ethiopia when it was known as Kush and was a Jewish kingdom’ (Berg, 2003). When the Ethiopian ‘Jewish kingdom’ (*Zagwe* dynasty) fell in 1270 C.E., ‘several

clans' moved to 'Havila' and 'reconstituted the South Kushitic Empire'. Thus, 'the Batutsi kingdoms' are the 'Kush Kingdom: 4000–250 BC until the post-Zagwe Kingdoms: 1270–1960' (Bwejeri, n.d.). For Bwejeri, Tutsi kings 'perpetuated the Salomonic Kingdom of Zagwe in the land of Havila [Burundi, Rwanda, Kivu, Masisi, Shaba]'. The 'Hebraic Tutsi people', therefore, possess 'the inherited legitimacy of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba of which the Batutsi of the Great Lakes are the descendents' (Bwejeri, 2001b, p. 43, n.113). Thus, the 'multi-millennial destiny of the Batutsi' is inseparable from the 'Salomonic and Sabbatic History of Ethiopia' (Bwejeri, 2001b, p. 26).

As a consequence, the 'cultural and religious references of Batutsi' (Bwejeri, n.d) are encoded versions of Atenist monotheism *or* Mosaic prescriptions (see Bwejeri, 2001b, pp. 4, 5, n.14; 2001a, p. 5)—'The Batutsi system of law' is an exact copy of the Deuteronomic Code (Bwejeri, n.d.). Similarly, the sacrifice of the 'Red Oxen' in the 'Temple of Akhenaton', as prescribed in Numbers, 19:1–22 and as enacted in the Temple of Jerusalem, is reflected in the reverence accorded to cattle by the 'Batutsi of Havila' (Bwejeri, 2001a, p. 4); it is no coincidence that the *Nyiginya* origin stories (see above) are full of 'proto-pharonic and biblical symbolism' (Bwejeri, 2001b, p. 7); the royal drums of Burundi and Rwanda are the 'Drums of Solomon' of the 'Hebrew Tutsi', transferred by the last dynasty of Zagwe, and which confer 'Solomonic legitimacy' on the Tutsi (Bwejeri, 2001a, p. 9; 2001b, pp. 5, n.14, 26–27); the *Umuganuro* (the annual sorghum festival in Burundi at which the royal drum was exhibited) is an encoded version of the Jewish festival of the Feast of Tabernacles (Berg, 2003).

According to Bwejeri, the Catholic Church recognised Batutsi affinity with Judaism and conducted an 'Inquisition' of the 'Hebraic Tutsi' who refused to convert (Bwejeri, 2001b, pp. 26–30), that for forty years 'the Batutsi have been exterminated, and till now they are being exterminated, because of their Hebraic identity and their Salomonic legacy' (Bwejeri, n.d.), and that this reflects the experience of 'another people with which the Batutsi have been identified for millennia . . . the Jewish people of Europe!' (Bwejeri, 2001b, p. 53).

Bwejeri's claims can be seen as benign (see Parfitt, 2002, p. 210). There are, however, aspects of his discourse that resonate with the racial alterity discussed above.

For example, Bwejeri (2001b, p. 9) vehemently rejects what he describes as the 'strange theory' of internal social differentiation, that the 'Batutsi are none other than the Bahutus who have become rich'. Such theories, for him, are attempts at 'the denial of difference, which one nevertheless sees 'blatant' before one's eyes' (p. 10). Bwejeri uses quotes from Lisa Malkki (1995, p. 71) and the declaration of the '12 *bagaragu b'ibwami bakuru*' ('between them and us there is no basis of fraternity', see above) to argue that the two groups *consider themselves* separate (Bwejeri, 2001b, p. 10). Given that 'The Batutsi system of law is the exact copy of the Deuteronomic [*sic*] Code' (Bwejeri, n.d.), he is reported as stating that 'the prohibition of intermarriage with non-Hebraic peoples' is a cultural feature that 'Tutsi share with Jews' (Deuteronomy, 7:3–4). In addition, 'the Tutsi [have] never intermarried with the Bantu peoples

around them', but because 'Tutsi women are "unusually graceful"' they are 'much desired by them [Bantu]' (Berg, 2003). The denial of inter-marriage and the 'desirability' of Tutsi women replicates a central feature of the *Appel à la conscience des Bahutu* (see Taylor, 1999, pp. 151–80).

The principal theme of Bwejeri's writings is to establish the 'Solomonic and Shebatic legitimacy' of the Batutsi. For example, the 'Batutsi of Burundi [have kept, until now] the three attributes of the Pharonic, Sabbatic and Solomonic legitimacy: name, power, land' (Bwejeri, 2001b, p. 30). The thrust of this argument is made explicit in the context of 'ethnic percentages':

In Burundi, where the Batutsi are the guardians of sacred Shebatic power for millennia, that statistical statement [15% of the population is 'Tutsi'] is a legal and political act of delegitimation. It is a means of establishing a new 'Majority/Minority' paradigm in place of the ancient paradigm based on Solomonic legitimacy: by this linguistic subterfuge, only the ethnic majority is authorised to exercise State power. (Bwejeri, 2001b, p. 44)

This speaks directly to, and rejects, the *Appel à la conscience des Bahutu* (see above), that 'Our political life must be based on democratic principles, on the administration of the state by the electoral majority [the] Bahutu' (Chrétien, 1991, p. 118). For Bwejeri, not only are 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' utterly distinct, but any notion of democracy (which he, like *Kangura*, can only conceive of ethnically) attacks an ancient (divinely ordained) authority.

Bwejeri describes 'Havila' as 'Burundi, Rwanda, Kivu, Masisi, Shaba', all areas with Tutsi populations who have suffered either persecution or been victims of genocide in recent times. But, including 'Kivu, Masisi, Shaba' also justifies Rwandan and Burundian military/extractive operations in, and occupation of, these areas from 1996 onwards (see D. Newbury, 1997). Indeed, Bwejeri (2001b, p. 52, n.130) states that the name 'Banyumelenge' (see Eltringham, 2004, pp. 122–24) is a coded reference to Menelik I, son of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. By making claims to a divinely ordained Batutsi hegemony throughout the region, Bwejeri, whether intentionally or not, substantiates the alleged 'Hima-Tutsi' plan articulated in genocidal propaganda in Rwanda, that the Tutsi were to colonise Central Africa with the support of Uganda and Burundi (Chrétien *et al.*, 1995, pp. 167–75). For example, *Appel à la conscience des Bahutu* refers to a 'letter' 'found' in August 1962 (although undoubtedly forged), which outlined a 'Machiavellian plan' the 'Plan of the Tutsi Colonisation of Kivu and the Region of Central Africa' (Chrétien, 1991, p. 117). In *Appel à la conscience des Bahutu*, the 'Hutu Ten Commandments' are presented as a counter to the nineteen 'Commandments of the Tutsi' (how 'they' would take over the region) allegedly contained in this letter. It seems probable that this conspiratorial idiom was inspired by the *Protocole des Sages de Sion*, which claimed there was a global Jewish conspiracy (see Cohn, 1980). Bwejeri does not simply draw an (albeit legitimate) analogy between the suffering of Jews and Tutsis, but makes the Tutsi *into*

Jews (with the associated dangers noted above) while simultaneously, if inadvertently, substantiating the claims of a conspiratorial device inspired by Anti-Semitism.

Bwejeri's writings receive substantial coverage from the US-based organisation *Kulanu* ('dedicated to finding and assisting lost and dispersed remnants of the Jewish people'). Stephen Jackson (2002, p. 11) quotes a web article written by the co-founder of *Kulanu*, in which he talks of 'tall, muscular, highly intelligent, and arrogant warriors [who] claim to be remnants of Israel . . . known as the Watutsi, Tutsi, and Banyamulenge'. He finishes,

I sometimes joke with my Tutsi friends that they must be from the House of Israel, because they're so 'arrogant/royal', so highly talented, and 'boy' do they suffer. (quoted in Jackson, 2002, p. 11)

Conclusion

One can detect a *disposition* that links otherwise disparate observations concerning European encounters with Africa (up to the present); political 'legitimacy' in the colonial and colonial state; and racial extermination in Africa *and* Europe. Incongruity is produced by the expectation of the observer, whereby the *apparently* incongruous does not fit the observer's, pre-formed, 'cognitive, moral or aesthetic map of the world' (Bauman, 1997, p. 46). Unable to re-absorb the *apparently* incongruous *in situ*, it is externalised, pushed to what is, in reality, a synchronic *elsewhere/non-place*, but the actual location of which is made to look concrete through, often tautological, 'sedimentary reconstruction'. When externalisation becomes impossible, the *apparently* incongruous is intentionally made to retain its *disharmonic* quality. Its disturbance of 'visions of order' is 'immune to all efforts at amelioration' (Bauman, 1991, p. 65) and must be destroyed if a 'harmonious, rational order' (1997, p. 47.) is to be built. The manageable schema upon which genocide depends cannot abhor, on any level, those who appear to be 'neither-nors . . . the cognitively ambivalent'. And yet, at different times, *incongruity*, the 'exceptional', can be either a means by which victims seek to explain otherwise inexplicable suffering *or* by which others justify oppression. Sometimes, a single actor articulates both positions simultaneously.

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Notes

- [1] Ashley Montagu (1962, pp. 921–22) notes that it was probably from Deniker that Julian Huxley and Alfred Cort Haddon (who had been accompanied by Seligman on the Cambridge expedition to the Torres Straits in 1898–99 (see Stocking, 1966, p. 5)) adopted ‘ethnic group’ in their anti-Nazi *We Europeans: A Survey of ‘Racial’ Problems* (1935).
- [2] Although beyond the scope of this article, there is a need to consider Deniker’s place in the shift from a humanist/evolutionist notion of ‘culture’ to the anthropological form found in the work of Franz Boas (1894, 1966a; see Stocking, 1966).
- [3] It should be noted that an alternative set of myths concerning the testing of ‘Gatutsi, Gahutu and Gatwa’, the three ‘children’ of, depending on the version, *Gihanga, Kazi* or *Imana* (the omnipresent deity) are not concerned with the extraneous provenance of ‘the Tutsi’ (see Chrétien, 1999, pp. 305–11).
- [4] It should be noted that, in the *Preface* to *The Mediterranean Race*, Sergi vehemently rejects the conflation of his ‘Nordic’ group with the ‘so-called Aryan races’ (1901, pp. vi–vii).

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