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The Postcolonial Politics of Militarizing Rwandan Women

An Analysis of the Extremist Magazine *Kangura* and the Gendering of a Genocidal Nation-state

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Abstract: *Rwanda has been used by many feminist scholars of international relations as a case study to play out understandings of gender-based violence in war and "civil war." Few feminists have analyzed the mass rape of Rwandan women in the context of a carefully planned and prepared genocide. This article considers the ways in which, in the years leading up to April 1994, the Rwandan nation-state became increasingly militarized and masculinized. It examines the extremist propaganda magazine Kangura's use of cartoons to militarize Rwandan women—not just as wives, mothers and prostitutes—but as political subjects.*

Keywords: feminist international relations theory; genocide; genocidal rape; media; militarization; nation-state; propaganda; Rwanda

Introduction

Between April and July 1994, an estimated 250,000 Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutu women were raped, gang-raped, and mutilated during the Rwandan genocide, when nearly a million men, women and children were killed in one hundred days. Witnesses and survivors have repeatedly testified to the brutality of these rapes by the government army, militia groups, and men and boys from the women's own communities. Some testimonies report other Rwandan women's complicity in rape—by telling men where women were hiding, goading men to rape, even disabling victims so that they could not physically escape rape. Most of the work on the conflict in Rwanda by feminist scholars of international relations tends to discuss gender-based violence in the context of "civil war" rather than genocide. On those occasions when the term "genocide" occurs, it is often used interchangeably with war and rarely is space allocated to examine the relationship between the two, let alone to

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consider the politics of interpretation that surrounds them. Elsewhere, in sociology and international law, feminist scholars have examined the ways in which Rwandan extremist propaganda was gendered to gear a Hutu population to target Tutsi women with gender-based violence (Baines 2003; Taylor 1999; Chrètien 1995; Kabanda 2007). Much of this research, which hones in on women victims of male violence at the cost of sidelining women perpetrators of genocide, does not adequately examine the complex, gendered power relations that developed in Rwanda and the wider Great Lakes region in the four years leading up to the genocide. This research, like much feminist international relations theory, often presents confused readings of Tutsi women as victims of a blurred civil war or genocide while rendering other Rwandan women invisible.

Feminists have also considered how women's lives are integral to sustaining militarized societies and upholding military ideals both in times of peace and war (Enloe 2000; 2004), yet few have examined how women are militarized in specific ways in genocide. This is largely because many feminist readings take a global view of women's militarization that has, for the most part, glossed over the particulars of local politics in Rwanda. By ignoring the information war between the key actors in the Rwandan civil war and genocide both in the Great Lakes region and internationally (via the United Nations, its member states, and international NGOs), gender-sensitive analyses of the Hutu extremist propaganda may actually serve to uphold the extremist interpretation of "war" and "genocide": it was precisely the threat of civil war that the extremists used to mobilize a nation to commit genocide. This neglect of detail produces prescriptive accounts that time and again in feminist international relations theorizing negate genocide in the overarching story of "women and war."

In this article I focus on the operation of militaries and militarized cultures in genocide. I argue that simplified accounts of the Rwandan genocide camouflage the unique ways in which gendered depictions of conflict were central to the Hutu extremist propaganda. The paper focuses specifically on images featured in the propaganda magazine *Kangura*, a mouthpiece for the extremist party Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR), a Hutu extremist political party whose members included some of the most puissant architects of the genocide. The paper is divided into four parts. In the first part I briefly consider the definitions of ethnic war, genocide, gendercide, and genocidal rape before discussing the scholarly issues of interpreting the history of conflict in Rwanda. In the second I adopt Cynthia Enloe's theory of militarization to look at the development of Rwanda's genocidal nation-state. In the third I expose some of the inaccuracies of feminist international relations work on Rwanda and consider how these inaccuracies produce partial readings of gendered conflict in Rwanda. I conclude with an examination of *Kangura*'s militarization of Rwandan women. Here I expand on traditional readings of extremist propaganda to look at the ways in which *Kangura* also militarized Hutu Rwandan women. This article is based on archival research conducted at the educational Centre Iwacu Kabunsunzu in Kigali, Rwanda. A total of thirty-seven out of the fifty-four editions published between November 1991 and March 1994 were analyzed using discourse analysis. Given time constraints while in Kigali, it was difficult to gain access to a complete collection of *Kangura*, since many issues were destroyed immediately after the genocide by survivors and repatriated Rwandans. However, the editions I had access to, which spanned from numbers four to fifty-four, give some insight into the militarization of Rwandan women.

Part One: Ethnic War, Genocide, and Gendercide in Rwanda

Genocide scholars focus on the *intent* of perpetrators to differentiate between ethnic war and genocide. Ethnic war may include civil war and wars of liberation, and may also incorporate ethnic cleansing—defined as "rendering an area ethnically homogenous by issuing force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area" (Bassiouni Report, 1992 paragraph 55, cited in Allen 1996, 43). The legal definition of genocide, as coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1944, was the "intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group."[1] The term "genocide" has in genocide studies been distinguished from "war," although debates about the relationship between the two continue.[2] Adam Jones, who criticizes the UN's gender-blind definition of genocide, argues that a gendered lens can help us better understand cultural and societal differences *between* genocides (2004, vii). For Jones, genocide is "the actualization of the intent, however successfully carried out, to murder in whole or in substantial part, any national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, gender or economic group, as these groups are defined by the perpetrator, by whatever means" (20).

Discussion about rape within feminist theory is diverse. United States–based feminist Beverly Allen, who conducted ethnographic research with Bosnian-Herzegovinian rape and genocide survivors in the mid–1990s, coined the term "genocidal rape" to distinguish between rape in war and rape in genocide. For Allen, genocidal rape is "a military policy of rape for the purpose of genocide" (1996, 1). While "all rape is related in that it derives from a system of dominance and subjugation," genocidal rape is set apart from other forms of rape by Allen, who writes of the "horrible difference genocidal rape makes" in the "particular suffering it causes" (39). Methods include gang raping and repeat raping with the intent to kill, the insertion of blunt instruments into women with the intent to kill, and forced impregnation as a means to destroy an ethnic group—an act of genocide that Allen herself believes "makes sense only if you are ignorant about genetics" (87).

The definition employed by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) states that rape is "a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on one person under circumstances which are coercive" (United Nations 1998, 7 paragraphs 2–5). During the Akayesu case, the Trial Chamber concluded that rape and sexual violence in Rwanda in 1994 *did* constitute genocide because there was evidence of intent to destroy in whole or in part an ethnic group (United Nations 1998, 7 paragraphs 2–5). However, it was the ICTR's recognition that rape need not include "penetration or physical contact" that moved international legal understandings of rape forward, since the act of perpetrating rape is not specifically male-gendered: women can also be militarized perpetrators of sexual violence, even if they do not physically commit rape. For Allen, however, genocidal rape more adeptly fits definitions of biological warfare than current UN convention definitions. This is a particularly pertinent point in the case of Rwanda, where rape survivors recount that men raped to inflict women with AIDS—the intent to kill by means of a slow death, and signifying the longer-term destruction of the community, including the death of boys and men (Human Rights Watch 1996). While Allen refers to Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is important to note that the Serbian genocidal rape policy was remarkably similar to the Hutu extremist policy during the Rwandan genocide, despite occurring simultaneously and on different continents. One significant parallel is the raping of women by men of their own communities. As Allen

states, in Serb-controlled areas where men had fled or had been killed "women were then often raped in their own homes or taken from their homes to another location and raped, often by neighbours or people known to them" (1996, 74).

Conflicting Rwandan Histories

A small and densely populated country, Rwanda's landlocked inhabitants share a common language and comprise three visible ethnicities—the Hutu (the majority), Tutsi and Twa. *Invisible* ethnicities include those who, over time, immigrated to Rwanda from areas that are now Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo.[3] In precolonial times certain regions of contemporary Rwanda were ruled by the *mwami* (king) whose centuries-old feudal order operated through a series of administrative networks that radiated out from a core (Melvern 2000, 9). Other regions remained under the authority of wealthy lineages that could be either Tutsi or Hutu, operating through clan and patron-client systems (Newbury 1988; Newbury, 1998). It is said that there was little ethnic divisionism between Tutsi and Hutu groups—although anthropologist Christopher Taylor notes that there was in fact more racism toward the Twa than any other ethnicity, in spite of their exclusion from normative histories on Rwandan ethnicity (Taylor 1999, 69–70). The advent of German colonial rule in the 1920s, and later Belgian colonial rule in the 1930s, profoundly altered these lineage and patron-client systems. Tutsi chiefs and the royal court's supremacy over once-powerful lineages and clans were reinforced and justified by Belgian colonial rule that aimed to develop a class-based capitalist society.

As has been well-documented, the European Hamitic hypothesis and "great chain of being" hierarchy, developed from John Hanning Speke's theories of race evolution, categorized Rwandan "ethnicity" into two groups: the pastoralist Tutsi (who were recorded as being taller and leaner, with high brows and thinner noses and lips, of superior intellect) and the Hutu, shorter and stockier agriculturalists with flatter noses (see Eltringham 2004; Prunier 1997; Newbury 1998; Taylor 1999; Mamdani 2001). The history of Tutsi invasion and conquest was perpetuated during colonial times by Tutsi chiefs to justify their elite position within Rwandan society (Taylor 1999, 88). Yet the stereotypes were strongly based on the visibility of Rwandan men's and women's bodies as they were reconfigured and re-represented within the Belgian colonial sphere.

The revolution of 1959 grew out of dissatisfaction with Tutsi monarchist and elite rule but was compounded by increased poverty and loss of control over the means of production on the part of the Hutu. Many Tutsis who also suffered under the regime backed the revolution. In 1957 the Bahutu Manifesto emerged, which introduced "race" into the sociopolitical context for the first time and was used to fuel ethnic divisionism (Prunier 1997, 45). The 1959 revolution killed an estimated twenty thousand Tutsi and forced thousands into exile (African Rights 1996, 8). Independence in 1963 followed a political uprising of the oppressed Hutu majority that saw thousands of Tutsi massacred. In 1974 President Juvenal Habyarimana, who had taken power in a coup from his predecessor Grégoire Kayibanda in 1973, formed his own political party, Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le development (MRND). Habyarimana's regime rested on the ideology that democracy equated to ethnic majority (that is, Hutu) rule but in 1978 article 7 of the Rwandan Constitution claimed that "single-party rule was the basic value of the regime" (African Rights 1996, 8). After the regime's refusal to permit them to return, refugees in exile organized themselves

in the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which staged an attack against Rwanda in October 1990.

The 1990s saw the introduction of democracy following internal opposition and pressure from the international community, including public pressure from France's President Mitterand. Habyarimana introduced multiparty politics and drew up a new constitution in June 1991. In line with a shift in the priorities of the international community for Rwanda, from development to democracy as development, Habyarimana renamed his party as Mouvement Républicain Nationale pour le Démocratie et le Developpement (MRNDD). It is significant that the party retained the same acronym: it preached that all Hutus were automatically members of a "naturally" democratic party. In spite of this ideology, the number of opposition parties burgeoned, including the Hutu-majority party of the South, the Partie Libéral (PL). This reinforced a long-standing regional divide between the Hutus of the North (Habyarimana's stronghold) and the Hutus of the South (Melvern 2000, 22). In 1993 the new government entered into talks with the RPF, resulting in the signing of the Arusha Accords and the creation of the new post of prime minister—held on an interim basis by Agathe Uwilingiyimana. The early 1990s also saw the growth of NGOs, including women's organizations, which became increasingly vocal within the new civil society. With protests from women's activist groups, students, and opposition parties, Habyarimana's regime was increasingly threatened.

Interpreting War and Genocide

Rwanda's history and the events leading up to the 1994 Rwandan genocide are complex. While I have attempted to provide an overview of the key events that led to the civil war and genocide in Rwanda in April 1994, such an exercise gives rise to a series of contentions around the interpretation of history. Since independence and most notably since the RPF invasion of Rwanda in 1990, an information war has ensued between the RPF, the Hutu extremists, and their respective international supporters—wherein each "side" has interpreted the history of conflict in Rwanda in ways that justify their own stance. René Lemarchand asserts that different interpretations of the formation of ethnicity and histories of mass violence in the Great Lakes region have produced "basic disagreements" that "are traceable in part to the uncritical use of the term genocide to describe just about any type of ethnic violence" (1998, 3). This issue is made further problematic when we consider the "forgotten" genocide of Burundian Hutu by Burundian Tutsi in 1972 (Lemarchand 1998, 5).

Social anthropologist Johan Pottier contends that Rwanda's post-genocide government, through the help of Anglophone journalists and "naïve academics" (that is, academics who are "new" to the study of Rwanda), have manipulated the international community with "a simple, easy-to-grasp narrative" and "unproblematic representation" of both the genocide and events since 1994, in particular in relation to the Kibeho incident in 1996, where thousands of refugees—innocents and extremists—were massacred by the Rwandan government army (2002, 46). Yet Pottier's own observations are not value-free: his analysis of the post-genocide information war makes no reference to the continued extremist propaganda (as evinced in *Kangura*) generated in Europe—in particular in France, Belgium and Holland—and within the Great Lakes region, as well as Kenya and Nigeria. Circulating lecture halls, scholarly work, novels, plays, films, and pamphlets, the struggle over the interpretation of genocide and war in Rwanda has hit the international arena and features

highly within the Anglophone-Francophone tussle over ideological "ownership" of post-colonial Africa (Chaffer 2002). Propagated by the many exiled extremists and their sympathizers, this material is intended to destabilize post-conflict Rwanda and to keep Hutu power alive. The struggle over interpretation has stepped up in recent years, with the publication of the French-commissioned Bruguiere Report in November 2006 which focused on the unanswered question of "who shot down President Habyriamana's plane," an event said to be the "trigger" of the genocide. The Rwandan Mucyo Commission report on the role of the French during the genocide has since followed but, at the time of writing this article, is yet to be published. Such reports seek to pinpoint who exactly is accountable for genocide.

Whatever the outcome of these investigations, it is clear is that there were deep-seated structural *and* social factors that led to the genocide (Uvin, 2001, 85). Nevertheless mainstream interpretations of Rwandan history tend to be gender blind. With the exception of Malkki's excellent anthropological work on the construction of nationalist identity in Tanzanian refugee camps, Jefremovas's survey of Rwandan business women within Rwandan society, and some important observations made by Christopher Taylor on the position of women within Rwandan urban society in the 1980s and 1990s, there is very little historical insight into the militarization of Rwandan women (Malkki 1995; Jefremovas 2002; Taylor 1999).

These multilayered information wars, which give rise to partial stories and accusations of twisted truths, make for a challenging time for any feminist international relations theorist attempting to undertake a gender-aware analysis of genocide and civil war in Rwanda: in the hope of revealing hidden inaccuracies, she or he may be stand accused of supporting a particular "side." So while within this article I choose to focus specifically on *Kangura*'s militarized images of Rwandan women, I do not rule out the militarization of women by other actors. Indeed, in the four years prior to the genocide and in the months during the genocide, there were four key military institutions within which both men and women operated: the Hutu extremists supported by the Habyarimana regime; the Tutsi-led Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF); the UN peacekeeping force led by Romeo Dallaire; and the French troops who were first deployed in Rwanda to fight for Habyrimana's government forces during the 1990 civil war, and again toward the close of the genocide to support hundreds of thousands of refugees (and retreating extremist government supporters) as they fled into Zaire. These military institutions adopted different ideological representations of women to help ascertain the type of "war" for which they were fighting. The RPF, for example, were dependent on recruiting Rwandan women refugees in Uganda to support the plight of returnees, but its antimonarchist, republican movement which took hold in the early 1990s can in part be attributed to the campaigning efforts of the women who published and disseminated a particular African-socialist literature. The multicultural Ghanaian, Canadian, Belgian, and Bangladeshi UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda—UNAMIR) also adopted specific ideologies that were in part born out of their own cultural readings of woman, albeit pinned together by what Enloe terms the "international" processes of militarization (Enloe 2000, 101). In addition to this, it is important to consider the media environment within which *Kangura* was produced. Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro, director of the Rwandan Information Office (ORINFOR) in Kigali from 31 July 1993 to 6 April 1994, observes that RTLM (Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines) and *Kangura* were not the only media to revise history and make truth claims about the events unfolding in Rwanda in the early 1990s. The print publications of the RPF and political

opposition parties "looked very similar in format and presentation....They watched each other closely and tried to emulate or outsmart each other" (Higiro 2007, 79). Such was the political climate at the time that examples of "dehumanization could be found in many of these papers" (Higiro 2007, 79). Yet, as the ICTR media trial confirmed in 2003, evidence showed that there was a clear link between extremist propaganda, such as RTLM and *Kangura*, and the actions of perpetrators of genocide (Temple-Raston, 2005).

Part Two: *Kangura* and the Militarization of a Pure Hutu Nation State

International relations theorist Cynthia Enloe defines militarism as an ideology with "distinctively militaristic core beliefs" that serve to justify war (2004, 219). Within a patriarchy, militarism privileges certain types of masculinity. Militarization, like globalization, is a "many-layered [socio-political] process of transformation" (Enloe 2007, 2). In her extremely thought-provoking polemic *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*, Enloe considers how American patriarchal military policies that inform men's identities in wartime also inform the identities of women. Whether as wives, girlfriends, mothers, or prostitutes, women are conditioned to support war, privileging masculinity in the process. Women are supporters of war because their sons and husbands fight on the frontline or because, as prostitutes and mistresses, they are economically dependent on the military. For Enloe, the military uses its status to "define national security" and, in turn, social order. This "circular process" relies on "those gender definitions that ... bolster ideological militarism" where "racism and militarism become mutually supportive in such a national security state" (2000, 46). Since, as Enloe concedes, "[p]olicies about men are always made dependent on policies about women" and "[p]olicies about women are always built on policies about men," (2000, 216), I first turn to look at how militarized masculinities were central to sustaining the pure Hutu nation-state before analyzing the militarization of Rwandan women in *Kangura*.

Militarising Rwandan Men and the Pure Hutu State

It was the pressure to democratize, the rise of multiparty politics and the Arusha Peace Accord (which pushed for power sharing between the MRNDD, RPF, and other political parties) that led Hutu extremists to develop strategies to reunite the Hutus. The obvious solution was to develop the image of ethnic war between civilian Hutus and the "alien" Tutsi.[4] Focusing on the threat of an invasion by the Ugandan-based RPF, the MRNDD sought to provide evidence through extremist propaganda that *all* Tutsi were enemies of the state, including the Rwandan Tutsi who were portrayed as "the enemy within." As Gaspard Karamero, the editor of the independent journal *Imbago*, observed in 1995, "despite the talk of ethnic politics, the point was to eliminate political opposition from whatever quarter it came" (African Rights 1995, 30).

To sustain this public image of ethnic war, these extremists militarized individual Hutus, preparing them for "war," while at the same time upholding the ideal of a free, democratic subject. MRNDD (*Interahamwe*) rallies were loud celebrations, with dancing, whistle-blowing, and singing. Hutu citizens were encouraged to learn songs that confused

messages about democracy and freedom with those about war and, more subtly, genocide. At one such demonstration, a large group of MRNDD men and women were filmed chanting: "Nothing scares us, we create terror.... We are not attacked, we attack. Nothing can crush us, we are the ones who crush. Whenever required, we beat all our enemies. On the battlefield, we are the greatest. We are the Interahamwe movement that loves Peace, Unity and Development. We are ready! Our motto[:] We don't attack. We liberate" (Kabera 2004).

With the backing of the president, members of the *Interahamwe* and the extremist party CDR organized militia groups and the government army forces developed training camps to target unemployed Hutu youths (United Nations 1999, 5). As extremist confidence grew, so too did the public exhibitionism of guns and weaponry (Melvern 2006, 81). A key extremist leader, Colonel Théoneste Bagasora, who was instrumental in drawing up and implementing the genocide plan, demonstrated in his public rallies that the action of civilians carrying and using weapons was "ordinary" and even *natural*. During one oration a Rwandan journalist filmed him displaying his gun as he addressed a crowd of eager listeners. "The gun," he stated, "no longer belongs only to the soldier. When you see one, do not be afraid. It can not go off by itself. The gun needs to stop only being for the military. Everybody has a right to own one. So that when they come for you, you can shoot back. I always have one with me. Here it is ... here it is" (Bagasora in Kabera 2004). In this major move to transform Hutu consciousness, extremist propaganda infiltrated society at all levels, including community and civil society meetings and the media.[5] One of twenty extremist journals, *Kangura* was established in 1990 with the support of the threatened dictatorial regime led by President Habyarimana. It took an interactive approach, encouraging Hutus to write to the magazine with comments and suggestions, devising questionnaires for Hutus to complete and return, and writing letters to the president. Rather like Britain's *Private Eye*, *Kangura* was a monthly running commentary on party politics, and cartoons were one satirical device among many to poke fun at opposition politicians. *Kangura* was published in Kinyarwanda and French and disseminated throughout the Great Lakes region, most notably in Burundi and Kenya. *Kangura's* satirical genre was new to Rwandans and appealed to people in rural communities and cities alike. In a country of high illiteracy, particularly among women, cartoons became vital means of communicating political ideas.

Extremist Media: Simulating "Ethnic War"

Kangura was quick to play on stereotyped images in its attempt to redefine Hutu consciousness. In "The Fear of the Bahutu," written by Ndekezi Bonaparte-Gisuma and published in December 1990, Hutus are described as "naturally fearful, maladroit, indecisive, naïve, with a characteristic inferiority complex" (*Kangura* 1990 no. 5, 1). In another early article targeting "All the Hutu of the World!" *Kangura* calls for Hutus to "rediscover their ethnicity" in the face of a Tutsi determination to keep them down. The magazine then makes a distinction between the "artificial nation state" and "natural" ethnicity in an attempt to make the broad-based transitional government (BBTG) unpopular (*Kangura* 1990 no. 4, 19). The modern, postcolonial nation-state constructed under the Arusha Accords is first interpreted as a Tutsi plot to keep the Hutus in line (through an artificial democracy), then rendered fragile in opposition to a natural precolonial Hutu ethnicity. Having fragmented the postcolonial nation state, *Kangura* proceeds to construct in its articles a pure Hutu nation-state. We have briefly considered the masculinized ways in which *Kangura* militarized the Hutu

population. Before examining how Rwandan women were militarized, I turn to look at how feminist international relations theorizing has interpreted war and genocide in Rwanda.

Part Three: Feminists Theorizing International Relations and Rwanda

Despite Cynthia Enloe's early call for a feminist investigation of Rwanda, many feminist international relations theorists have failed to distinguish between civil war and genocide in that country (Tickner 2001; Byrne 1995; El Jack 2003; Goldstein 2001; Enloe 2004). This is largely because Rwanda appears as one example among many in the overarching story of women and war in feminist international relations theory. In 1995 Enloe began to unpack the militarizing processes that defined Hutu masculinities before the conflict, stating that "increasing numbers of Hutu women thereby became intensely woven into the state's ethnicized system as mothers and wives of regular soldiers" (26). Within her framework of understanding Rwanda as "ethnic conflict," Enloe touches on RPF refugee mothers' patriotic responsibilities for "keeping alive, among the next generation, thoughts of a far away home" (26). Either way, in both camps, "recruiting young men often requires militia organizers to persuade the mothers of potential recruits" (27). Later, in *Maneuvers*, Enloe spends some time discussing rape and the militarization of Rwandan women during what she terms the 1994 "civil war" (2000, 137). In an analysis that unintentionally describes the Hutu extremist *image* of a "threat of invasion and ethnic war," Enloe suggests that as a weapon of war, rape occurs "in the name of national security," when a "regime is preoccupied with 'national security,'" when "a majority of civilians believe that security is best understood as a military problem," when "the police and military security apparatuses are male-dominated," when "the definitions of *honour, loyalty,* and *treason* are derived from the institutional cultures of the police and the military," when "those prevailing institutional cultures are misogynous" and, finally, when "some local women are well enough organized in opposition to regime policies to become publicly visible" (124).

Enloe's recognition that "systematic rape" is "administered rape" and that "militarized rape" is a public act under the gaze of spectators is extremely important. Yet her discussion of rape in Rwanda is inaccurate because it does not consider the *difference of intent* between rape as a weapon of war and rape as a weapon to annihilate. There is a distinction between the rape committed by the extremist-led *genocidaires* during the genocide and rape in the civil war which was occurring in the north of Rwanda at the same time. Following the genocide there were some revenge rapes but these were not prolific and the RPF did not endorse the policy—whereas the *genocidaires* did. In reading the Rwandan genocide through the lens of "civil war," Enloe cannot unpack the very militarizing processes she argues *should* be unpacked. Enloe dismisses key tactics which the Hutu extremists employed to incite systematic rape—the image of a threat of ethnic war, the image of a threat to national security, the image of the loyal, militarized Hutu civilian, the image of the "alien" Tutsi woman. Rather she confuses these tactics with the factors that actually *enabled* Hutu extremists to incite mass rape: a militarized culture, patriarchy, misogyny, and, finally, the political mobilization of Rwandan women.

Where scholars have undertaken more detailed studies of the gendered impact of conflict in Rwanda, they have often continued this trend of ignoring Rwanda's genocide, seem-

ingly now entrenched in feminist theorizing of international relations. One example is the volume edited by Meredith Turshen and Clodilde Twagiramariya, entitled *What Women Do in Wartime: Gender and Conflict in Africa* (1998). While they are right to assert that there exist in Africa new forms of war that differ from the conventional Clausewitzean model of interstate war, Turshen and Twagiramariya appear to imply that these "new forms of war" are simply variations of "civil wars and wars of liberation" (2). Consequently, their reading of Rwanda in the years leading up to 1994 is, to an extent, lacking in nuance: conflict in Rwanda occurred because of Rwanda's "weak state" status (that is, its politically weak and ineffectual governance arrangements). It is perhaps surprising that Turshen and Twagiriamariya, despite recognizing that states deliberately become *more* militarized to retain power, do not allude to Rwanda's genocide. In their chapter on rape in Rwanda they depict a simple history of the country, focusing on the 1959 Revolution, but arguing that the uprising occurred against colonials, not elite Tutsis and monarchists, before confusing the genocide with civil war. They write: "All Rwandans without exception suffered and are still suffering from the atrocities of the civil war that started in October 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded from Uganda.... A group of extremists in the country turned the power struggle between the government, its opposition, and the RPF, which was on the verge of resolution following the signing of the Arusha Accords in 1993, into a vicious and bloody ethnic war" (103). That all Rwandan women (particularly those from mixed marriages) suffer from the different types of mass violence to have occurred in Rwanda since 1990 is at the core of their polemic. Arguing that "Hutus" are not the only perpetrators of rape, Turshen and Twagiriamariya outline the mass rape committed by the RPF since June 1994, suggesting that some Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) soldiers raped Hutu women "in a never-ending cycle of revenge" (103). In this "civil war" (but not planned extermination of civilians, including those politically active or extremist-opposing Hutu) "levels of distrust were very high," they state, and so the "war brought out the worst in people and a sense of neighbourliness was lost" (9).

Turshen and Twagiriamariya's refusal to acknowledge genocide means that their work presents only a partial reading of the conflict in Rwanda. First, by writing within the framework of civil and ethnic war, Turshen and Twagiriamariya reinforce the Hutu extremist propaganda of the "threat of ethnic war." Second, there is no distinction between different types of rape, including the extremist militarized policy of genocidal rape—a policy supported and at times perpetrated by women. So while they are right to criticize the simplistic "rendering of 'evil Hutu' versus 'good Tutsi,'" and to emphasize that *all* Rwandan women have suffered and continue to suffer in one way or another, they suggest that rape is a crime committed *only* by men and that, as a male preserve, women's role in rape is only that of the "victim." For Turshen and Twagiriamariya this has implications for Hutu women following the genocide, who are today categorized as "guilty" and "made to pay for what Hutu men have done" (4). It would be fair to say that the majority of Hutu women were not implicated in rape and indeed there are many Hutu women who suffered gender-based violence in spite of their citizenship rights as Hutu.[6] *However*, in understanding sexual violence against women in genocide, it is also essential to comprehend the role of women within the communities that are committing sexual violence, including rape.

Let us consider women's supporter and spectator roles during genocidal rape. In her paper "The Political Economy of Rape" published in 2001, Turshen presents a more involved gender-aware analysis to propose a new thesis: that "systematic rape and sexual abuse are

among the strategies men use to wrest personal assets from women." If women "owned property" then militias would claim them as their wives "to legitimate the seizure of land" (Turshen 2001, 63). Here Turshen describes mass violence in April–June 1994 as "genocide"—although no space is afforded to describe what genocide (or gendercide) means. Turshen makes no reference to the role of women in perpetrating and endorsing sexual violence in order to seize property and belongings, despite the countless reports of women robbing dead women or condoning bogus marriage (see Human Rights Watch 1996; African Rights 1995). We have seen how, within feminist theorizing of international relations, genocide and genocidal rape in Rwanda are depicted in the context of civil war. I now look specifically at how Rwandan women were militarized within the pages of *Kangura* to demonstrate the nuanced ways in which Rwandan women were militarized in genocide—not just as victims but as perpetrators. I argue that greater attention should be paid to the way in which Rwandan women were politically mobilized.

Part Four: Citizen versus Partial- and Non-citizen Rwandan Women in *Kangura*

In this final part of the paper I examine how *Kangura* imaged Rwandan women not just according to their ethnicity but by their citizenship status. I define three groups: non-citizen Rwandan women, full-citizen Rwandan women, and partial-citizen Rwandan women, each of which was militarized in specific ways.

Non-Citizen Rwandan Women

Imaged as stereotyped Tutsi women, "non-citizen" Rwandan women were enemies of the state and secret accomplices in ethnic war. In December 1990 *Kangura* published the Hutu Ten Commandments, four of which concerned Rwandan women. One stated that all Tutsi women worked "only for the interest of [their] Tutsi ethnic group" and all Hutus were ordered to be distrustful not only of Tutsi women but also of Hutu men who had relations with them. Another called for the Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) to be "exclusively Hutu" following the RPF invasion of 1990 (*Kangura* in Human Rights Watch 1996, 11). Two commandments specifically referred to Hutu women. I suggest that these commandments lead to a direct comparison between Hutu and Tutsi women, first by claiming that Hutu women were more loyal and better wives and mothers; then, through manipulating the colonial obsession with stereotyped physical appearances, by crushing the ego of the supposedly less attractive—that is, less sexually desirable—Hutu woman. Instead Hutu women are called upon to be "vigilant and try to bring [their] husbands, brothers and sons back to reason" in the face of deceitful, seductive Tutsi women (*Kangura* in Human Rights Watch 1996, 11).

In *Kangura* these Tutsi women spies and accomplices are presented as sexualized military operators. In issue 35 of the magazine, which appeared in May 1992, an article entitled "The Dresses of Beauties Smell for the Hutus" is accompanied by a cartoon wherein a beautiful woman, who appears to fit the colonial stereotype of the tall, slender Tutsi woman, wears a strapless, floral-print mini-dress, large hoop earrings, and bangles. She is in an erotic pose, her left hand lifting up the corner of her dress to reveal more thigh to the stereo-

typically shorter, thicker-set Hutu man standing beside her. Loyal to the Hutu Ten Commandments and thus loyal to the pure Hutu state, he covers his nose with one hand, keeping the other in his pocket. *Kangura*'s intimation that this Tutsi woman smells posits her as hypersexual prostitute. Yet thinking out loud, she appears more concerned that her true identity has been uncovered: "They have known our plot. I think the war can stop now for our mission has failed" (*Kangura* 1992 no. 35, 9). This image operates on many levels. First, it confirms the extremist Hutu theory that Tutsi women "work only in the interest of their ethnic group." Second, it confirms that Rwanda is threatened by a Tutsi-led ethnic war. Third, it provides a reason for Hutu women to condemn sexually attractive Tutsi women, who may themselves be angered at the artist's depiction of the colonial stereotype.

At a more intrinsic level the cartoon aims to show how Tutsi women, in using their beauty and taking advantage of Hutu men's supposed weakness, infiltrate the Rwandan state. Having represented the Tutsi woman's sexualized body as a weapon of war, *Kangura* proceeds to depict the enemy's plot as a preordained failure, thus raising the morale of militarized Hutu men and women. In February 1994, just before the genocide began, the stereotyped Tutsi woman is again portrayed as a hypersexual prostitute in cahoots with both the RPF and United Nations (though this time in a way that makes fun of the UN's *own* militarization of women). UN force commander Gen. Roméo Dallaire sits with his arms around two RPF women. Both have their hands on his knee and one is kissing his forehead. Both women are wearing miniskirts, jewelry, and lacy bras. The woman to Dallaire's right has "I [heart] RPF" tattooed on her arm. A UN peacekeeper stands guard to the left, his gun poised. The caption reads: "Tutsi women: responsible for rallying Whites to the RPF" (*Kangura* 1994, 15). Representation of the stereotyped Tutsi woman prostitute and a public ridiculing of the UN peace force occurs again in the Hutu extremist journal *Power* in December 1993. This time a graphic sex scene depicts an orgy between two Tutsi women and three UN peacekeepers. Demilitarizing the UN, positing the international institution solely within a simulated private sphere, the caption simply states: "The Force of Sex and the Belgian Paras" (*Power* in Chrétien 1995). Here it should be pointed out that the actions of the Belgian paratroopers did not help to dispel rumors about their liaisons with Rwandan women. In January 1994 they had been spotted "running after women and causing fights in local bars and discos" (Dallaire 2003, 163).

Full-Citizen Rwandan Women

The silent majority in most analyses of extremist propaganda, militarized Hutu women loyal to Hutu power, were imaged as full citizens. In the four years leading up to the genocide *Kangura* was quick to present Hutu women who conformed to the genocide ideology and ideal of the pure Hutu state as equal, democratic citizens. In an early article published in 1992, there is a portrait photograph of a stereotypically beautiful Hutu woman (she personifies the physical image of a "good," upper-class Hutu woman). Underneath the image reads a statement by Mukarkibibi Zayinabo, allegedly made in June 1989: "In these times we are in, a Rwandan woman should never be denied her rights. Men must know that there is nothing he has that is better than a woman. All of us, we have equal rights in front of the law and democracy belongs to us all" (*Kangura* 1992, back cover).

It should be noted that *Kangura*'s representation of *both* Hutu and Tutsi women depended on their increased visibility within Rwanda's political sphere. Women represented

a large percentage of the population that had recently been politically mobilized with the opening up to democracy and the growth of the civil society. From the late 1980s to 1994, thirteen women's groups and NGOs were operating under the umbrella organization PROFEMMES. Members would travel the country educating women and lobbying the government on women's rights, including land and inheritance rights (which women did not have at this time). But the extremist network operated to quash these movements. In 1993 the MRNDD created its own women's group with the intent to dispel opposition women's lobbyist groups (Nyiramatama 2006). So while women were actively pushing to be visible in their own terms within the public sphere, *Kangura* rendered their bodies visible only in specific gendered terms that sustained the patriarchal dictatorship. Hutu women, then, were militarized, not just as mothers, wives and daughters, but as political subjects. In *Kangura* these women often appear next to men in images of political rallying (*Kangura* 1993 no. 44, 73) or in local, community-based public protest (*Kangura* 1992, 35 and 1993 no. 44, 17). They are imaged as ordinary, non-militarized citizens confounded by the antics of the opposition parties and advocators of the Arusha Accords peace process (*Kangura*, 1993 no. 49, 15).

Full-citizen Rwandan women were also depicted as victims of war. In a cartoon published in October 1991, the founder of Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) and key architect of the genocide Ferdinand Nahimana stands tall, holding the radio station above his head. Behind him, crowds of men, women, and children are grouped together but appear half the size of Nahimana himself—indicating the strength and importance of Nahimana, as well as RTLM. The caption states that Nahimana founded a radio station in a community where people had been killed (*Kangura* 1991 no. 23, 14). Since genocide mobilizes an entire population to annihilate an ethnic group or groups, the war which the extremists tried to depict was not Clausewitzean by convention: there was no front line, no home front, and no interstate battle. Rather the extremists depicted the threat of war with the RPF as the type of conflict which has since been termed *new war*—based on the RPF movement to "mobilize around ethnic [or] racial identity for the purpose of claiming the state" and a deliberate blurring of the public and private spheres (Kaldor 2001, 76). Perhaps one of the most graphic and shockingly violent images to be published appeared in a parallel journal *Kamarampaka* on 7 April 1993. Its intent to blur the boundaries between the "home front" and the "front line" is clear. In the cartoon, the RPF (identified by their arm bands) have pillaged a Rwandan village (a hut is on fire in the distance). A member of the MRNDD is stripped to his underwear and tied to a tree. Beside him lies the dismembered trunk of a Hutu man. Two naked women are on the ground to the left of the tree. The woman who belongs to the Hutu Mouveément Démocratique Républicain is tied up, her hands behind her back, a stake wedged through her chest. The second woman is a member of the extremist Hutu party, the CDR. Her hands are being held up by an RPF soldier while his comrade rapes her. Underneath, the caption reads: "Blood and sex: the horrors of war attributed to the RPF" (*Kamarampaka* in Chrètian 1995, 364).

This simulation of rape, which demonized all Tutsi men, including civilian Tutsi men, is also evident in the extremist-led government army's military strategies as a means to instill fear of rape among the Hutu community. In November 1993, the United Nations heard that thirty-five people had been massacred in the Rhugenheri region, in five locations concurrently. The UN officer, Maj. Brent Beardsley, who was dispatched to survey one of the massacre sites, noted that children had been murdered and that all the girls had been raped.

Despite inconclusive evidence, the United Nations believed that the massacre had been staged by the Rwandan government forces. As Beardsley recalls in the 2001 Canadian documentary *Rwanda: The Genocide Fax*:

> Very conveniently there was an RPF glove left [lying] on the ground. The RPF—I never saw them wear any gloves and if they did wear gloves, why would they leave it [lying] on the ground? In addition, the government commanders who [were] waiting for us at the bottom of the hill [each wore] a red sash cord, a red rope; [all had these] around their waists, tied, and they [each carried] a very large knife with a big hilt on it. And it appeared to me more when I looked at these children's necks [that these cords] had been used to strangle them and [that] commandos went through extensive training on how to kill people silently with them [Clarke 2001].

Women Genocidaires

While *Kangura* militarized women conversely as civilians and victims of war, in reality many of these politically engaged "free and democratic" women were militarized spectators and supporters of genocide and genocidal rape. In a special report on Rwanda's women killers, the BBC's *Newsnight* interviewed a man who witnessed two women in Kigali—Odette and Mama Aline—using a stick to rape a woman on the side of the road, in broad daylight (Hilsum 1995). And there are plenty of other examples of politically corrupt women who took advantage of the personal gains afforded to them as perpetrators of genocide. The only woman to be tried at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, the minister of women and family affairs at the time of the genocide, is one of the most famous examples. Witnesses claim that despite her remit to consider the welfare of all Rwandan women, Nyiramasuhuko played an important role in preparing for genocide in the Butare region of southern Rwanda. Zaina Nyiramatama, founder of the Association for the Defense of Women and Children's Rights (HAGURUKA), was in Rwanda until January 1994. Nyiramatama suggests that Pauline Nyiramasuhuko did not have "gender politics," rather a "very patriarchal way of thinking ... she was not fighting to get anything out of the government because she was part of the system" (Nyiramatama 2006).

Nyiramasuhuko stands accused of planning systematic rape and imprisoning women and girls. One witness recounted to African Rights that "the daughters of Buhira, a Tutsi businessman from Butare, were kept at her house for [her son] Chalômoe to rape (African Rights 1995, 92). In the same *Newsnight* special on women killers, British journalist Lindsey Hilsum spoke with Pauline Nyiramasuhuko after she had fled to the refugee camp in Zaire. Despite her high profile role during the genocide, Nyiramasuhuko continued to play on the stereotype of the respectable, caring woman. Here, we also see evidence of Nyiramasuhuko manipulating "international community" perceptions of women in conflict. It is worth citing the interview at some length:

> Hilsum: She was working in the social services section, drawing up plans to look after orphans and abandoned children. She said in April and May last year [1994], she'd organized what she called pacification meetings. Her accusers, she says, are targeting all educated Hutus. The former minister only agreed to be interviewed with her back to the camera, as she put it, "for security reasons." I asked her to respond to the allegations that she had killed.
>
> Nyiramasuhuko (translated from Kinyarwanda): I'm ready to talk to the person who said I could have killed. It's not possible. I couldn't even kill a chicken.... I don't know. If there is a person who says a woman, a mother could have killed, I'll tell you truly then I am ready to confront that person [Hilsum 1995].

Partial-Citizen Rwandan Women

By "partial-citizen" Rwandan women, I am referring to the Hutu women who were citizens by ethnic rights but could not be fully accepted into the pure Hutu state as a result of their own political actions. These women attempted to exercise their *true* democratic rights by campaigning for equality for women.[7] Many of them opposed Hutu extremism and firmly believed the Arusha Accords would lead to an end to ethnic divisionism. It goes without saying that these politically moderate Hutu (and Tutsi) women posed a major threat to the dictatorship and no one embodied this threat more than the then–prime minister of the interim government, Madame Agathe Uwilingiyimana. Since *Kangura* was primarily a tool to ridicule opposition parties as much as it was a tool to distill genocide propaganda, the magazine's foremost attack on Uwilingiyimana centered on the fact that she was a woman.

After she was appointed minister for education by Habyarimana in 1992, Uwilingiyimana fought to end the quota system in schools which had sustained a Hutu majority. She was an active member of the women's civil society movement across Africa and was a founder of Rwanda's Seruka ("Show Me") which aimed to include women in the country's development and played an enormous role in the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE). Described in Kinywanda as an *ingare* (rebel), Uwilingiyimana used her political influence and determination to "combat ethnic and sexual discrimination" (FAWE 2000, 4). She believed that "true democracy" would include the liberation of women and girls from poverty and forced labor. A Hutu of the South, Uwilingiyimana would frequently speak out against the president's policies and often came under fire from Hutu extremist politicians and the Interahamwe. Melvern observes that on 8 May 1993 Uwilingiyimana was fiercely attacked in her home by militia, a violent act that resulted in a very public protest by her supporters, including a march led by some 3,000 women (Melvern 2006, 46). On 12 March 1994, Uwilingiyimana was appointed to the post of interim prime minister by President Habyarimana, although she only held this office for thirty-seven days. As Melvern states, it is believed that Habyarimana "thought she could be easily manipulated," although he discovered very quickly that this was not the case. The second woman to become a prime minister in Africa, Uwilingiyimana remained defiant and on a number of occasions highlighted the dangers of supplying weapons to the population (Melvern 2000, 104). Uwilingiyimana is said to have spoken out against ethnic business and identity cards at one protest march led by women's organizations in 1993. In an interview with the author of this article, Zaina Nyiramatama recalled Uwilingiyimana saying: "We shouldn't value ourselves according to our ethnic group, but rather what we are able to do to build our country" (Nyiramatama 2006).

In analyzing the images of Madame Agathe Uwilingiyimana in *Kangura*, one can trace her transgression from full citizen to partial citizen and then to noncitizen, and it is significant that the number of published cartoons depicting Uwilingiyimana picked up pace in the final months before the genocide. *Kangura* took a male chauvinist and sexist approach to Uwilingiyimana to "reveal" that she used her body to further her political career and to expose her inappropriate gendered politics. She first appeared on the front page in May 1992, naked and perched on a pile of books, a sign that *Kangura* had little respect for Uwilingiyimana in her role as minister of education. Later *Kangura* focused on her sexuality and made claims that she was having an affair with Faustin Twagiramungu, a fellow moderate Hutu politician, president of the MDR (Mouvement démocratique républicain) and a mem-

ber of the interim government. Frequently depicted in bed with Twagiramungu, her political discussion is reduced to domestic post-intercourse chat, suggesting that the interim government ruled Rwanda from a very private sphere in contrast to Habyarimana's public, and thus democratic, sphere.

In January 1994, *Kangura* likened Uwilingiyimana to the stereotyped Tutsi prostitutes—the noncitizens. She appeared on the front page of issue 55 naked in bed, wearing earrings and sporting a short haircut reminiscent of the prostitutes in the previous month's portrayal of UN peacekeepers' liaisons with women by *Power*. Sitting on the edge of the bed looking sexually aroused, Twagiramungu asks Uwilingiyimana, "Baby, why are you crying?" (*Kangura* 1994 no. 55, 4). In a ploy to destabilize the peace process, *Kangura* depicts Uwilingiyimana as a self-interested woman who cares little for democracy and the needs of the Rwandan people. Uwilingiyimana responds by reminding Twagiramungu that he must make her "the Prime Minister in the Transition Government." In a second bedroom scene, published in March 1994, Uwilingiyimana and Twagiramungu discuss the need to send her husband abroad on an assignment so that they can spend more time with each other (*Kangura* 1994 no. 57, 5). In another move to further derail Uwilingiyimana's political credibility, *Kangura* depicts her as pregnant, a claim that the journal portends to be against the will of God. In March 1994 a religious figure separates a crying, naked, and heavily pregnant Uwilingiyimana from a naked Twagiramungu, while shouting "I curse you, sinners!"(*Kangura* 1994 no.58, 12).

In May 1993 military strategy and media voyeurism converged when *Kangura*, in response to the public outcry, published a cartoon depicting the moment when Uwiligimana was attacked in her home. Uwilingiyimana is pictured lying half-naked on the floor, staring out toward the reader in yet another provocative pose. Five men (journalists) appear to have just burst in through the doors. Uwilingiyimana says, "Forgive me, I will give you everything that you need." The cartoon is accompanied by an article in which *Kangura* addresses Uwilingiyimana directly with a series of questions aimed at discrediting her claim to have been attacked. In depicting her as a "mother" and exposing her supposed "lying about her leg," [8] *Kangura* bolsters its own media credibility by imaging itself as loyal to the government: "Because of the respect media journalists have to give politicians, they packed their machines and announced to the country that the Prime Minister was beaten badly by thieves." Once more the focus is on Uwilingiyimana's gender. When criticizing Uwilingiyimana for standing up to President Habyarimana's extremist policies, *Kangura* argues that she is "known for abusing and disrespecting the President," claiming that her "stubbornness" is (as expressed in Kinyarwanda) the trait of a woman who is "either crazy or brings a curse." In this article, she is "shaming" her parents and makes a mockery of her husband, whom *Kangura* portrays as weak in the face of her strength:

"Where was your husband when you were having this misfortune? Doesn't a man have a word in his own home, if it's really his?" (*Kangura* 1993 no. 15, 4). Criticizing Uwilingiyimana's silence on the questions they pose, *Kangura* demands "explanations" or they will have to rebuild the reputation of the (extremist) "national forces" that they accuse Uwilingiyimana of destroying when she "said they refused to come and rescue [her]" (*Kangura*, 1993 no. 15, 4).

Continually imaged in the very private sphere of the home or bedroom, stripped naked, exposed, and likened to the hypersexual Tutsi women and "prostitutes," Uwilingiyimana is militarized by *Kangura* as the accomplice to the enemy within. Yet women enemies and their

accomplices are presented by the magazine as highly feminized, domestic and lacking in military clout. Just as the body of the Tutsi woman is imaged as a weapon of war, so too is Uwilingiyimana's, only this time for selfish political gain that contravenes Hutu extremist definitions of democracy and gender equality. In the penultimate issue of *Kangura,* the extent to which Uwilingiyimana is perceived as a "non-citizen" is clear when she is imaged as a rat that is eating money—a Hutu man is depicted as being on the verge of killing her and Twagiramungu (also imaged as a rat) with a club (*Kangura* 1994 no. 56, 6). In the same edition, Uwilingiyimana and Twagiramungu are portrayed as dancing chickens (*Kangura* 1994 no. 56, 3). These depictions are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda about Jews and other ethnic minorities.

Agathe Uwilingiyimana was one of the first politicians to be assassinated on 7 April 1994. She was shot by presidential guards in the early hours of the morning (Melvern 2006, 162–63). At the time, the prime minister's murder was underreported in the British press, appearing instead as an appendage to the deaths that day of the ten Belgian peacekeepers who had been assigned to protect her. In spite of *Kangura*'s attempts to slander her, Uwilingiyimana's strength, courage, and defiance in the face of extremist politicians remains something quite remarkable. In what is possibly the last interview she gave to an international journalist—with Francois Ryckmans in Kigali on 15 March 1994—Uwilingiyimana, in exercising her true democratic rights, observed the "confusion" the extremists were deliberately creating in playing "the ethnic card." She argued that there was "bad will and irresponsibility on the behalf of some people," that Habyarimana was "trying to control the political parties," and that ultimately ordinary Rwandans were suffering: "Almost every day, people are dying, assassinated. The poor peasants, as usual, are not responsible for the political situation. There's starvation all over the country. People die of hunger everyday, dysentery and malaria. We haven't got the institutions capable of negotiating with our funders" (Uwilingiyimana 1994).

Conclusion

In this article I have argued that feminist international relations theory often presents confused readings of Tutsi women as victims of a blurred civil war and genocide that renders other Rwandan women invisible. I have attempted to reveal the ways in which extremist magazine *Kangura* militarized Rwandan women as political subjects and in doing so have distinguished the ways in which women were militarized differently as noncitizens, full citizens, and partial citizens. This distinction exposes the disparity between the images of full citizens (who did not speak out or otherwise oppose the Hutu nation state) and partial citizens—Hutu and Tutsi women who, in fighting for women's equality, were fighting for true democracy. In exposing this political militarization I hope to further our understanding of the militarized roles of women in genocide as well as genocidal rape.

In this article I have also considered the information war that continues to circulate internationally in any recounting of conflict in Rwanda and, in light of this ideological struggle, have suggested that feminists theorizing international relations should be more cautious of the impact of negating the Rwandan genocide—and the complex, gendered power relations that led to genocide—as they embed "Rwanda" in the overarching international story of "women and war." In producing partial readings of conflict in Rwanda, many

feminist international relations readings obscure some of the complexities that women currently face in post-genocide Rwanda since blanket coverage of "Rwandan women as victims" masks the challenged relationships *between* women—as well as between men and women—within Rwandan communities today. Indeed, more work needs to be done to examine the militarization of refugees, returnees, and survivors, as well as post-genocide Rwandan society more generally, where security remains tight and where the community-based legal process, Gacaca, may perpetuate masculinized and militarized readings of conflict in Rwanda. I do not in any way wish to render all Hutu people as extremist: there are many cases in which Hutu men and women protected fellow Tutsi and Hutu men and women. Above all this article does not reflect the enormous amount of work that women in Rwanda have done—and are continuing to do—in rebuilding their lives, and their country.

Notes

1. United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) cited in Shaw 2003, 34.

2. See Martin Shaw (2003) on war and genocide operating on a continuum, and Paul Bartrop (2002) for the argument that genocide does not always occur in the context of war.

3. Newbury (1988) states that there were high levels of migration into Rwanda as people sought to escape famine, disease, and war in other Sub-Saharan regions.

4. For a comprehensive discussion on the politicization of "civilian" and "alien" identities in Rwanda, see Mamdani 2001.

5. For a detailed account of extremist attempts to change Hutu consciousness, see Mamdani 2001.

6. Umutesi (2000) reveals the sexual insecurities that Hutu women fleeing Rwanda endured, particularly if they were mistaken as Tutsi.

7. Cynthia Enloe (2004) observes that a "successful democracy incorporates sexual equality" (138).

8. A photograph taken of Uwilingimana at the time shows that one of her legs had been wounded in the attack (Chrétien, 1995).

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