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BoohBooh

Jacques-Roger

UNAMIR

Code Cable from Booh-Booh to Annan
Re: An update on the current situation in Rwanda and
Military aspects of the mission, 8 April, 1994

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING, UNATIONS,
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INFO: KITTANI

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FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR,
KIGALI

SUBJECT: AN UPDATE ON THE
CURRENT SITUATION IN
RWANDA AND MILITARY
ASPECTS OF THE MISSION

DATE: 8 APRIL 1994

1. The security situation in Kigali is worsening as the fighting between the Presidential Guards and the RPF intensifies. However, the rest of the country remains calm, although tense.
2. Following the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi in the night of the 6th of April, elements of the Presidential Guards attacked the residences of several political figures and abducted the Prime Minister, the Presiding Judge of the Constitutional Court, the Ministers of Information, Labour and Social Affairs and Agriculture. We have subsequently received unconfirmed reports that these leaders have been killed by their abductors. The Presidential Guards are also reported to have attacked several other residences and murdered several persons suspected to be RPF sympathizers.
3. A company-size of RPF military personnel left the CND complex on 7 April at 16 hours local time and moved into areas where Presidential Guards are located and engaged the Guards in a fierce exchange of fire. UNAMIR observed several armed RPF foot-patrols in areas dominated by government supporters adjacent to UNAMIR headquarters and the Bangladesh Battalion.
4. Meanwhile, a group of Senior Officers of the Rwandese Armed Forces have constituted themselves into a "crisis committee" in an attempt to stabilise the security situation. They have requested UNAMIR to arrange a cease-fire between the RPF and the Presidential Guards. They have also called on the political parties which constitute the current transitional government to meet and establish legal authority as well as accelerate the establishment of the transitional institutions called for in the Arusha Peace Agreement. UNAMIR is actively supporting these efforts and participates as an observer in the "crisis committee". Please find attached a copy issued by the said "crisis committee".

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5. We have arranged a meeting between members of the "crisis committee" and the RPF scheduled at 14.00 hours local time today at UNAMIR HQ. We have also established contacts with the RPF and the Presidential Guards in an effort to arrange a cease-fire. The negotiations with the parties are continuing.
6. The death of the President of the Republic, and the still unconfirmed death of the Prime Minister and the Presiding Judge of the Constitutional Court as well as a number of ministers have created a power-vacuum which could pose new problems to the peace process. The Prime Minister-Designate was evacuated by UNAMIR to our Headquarters where he has sought refuge and we are providing him protection within UNAMIR premises.
7. - At twelve (12) noon today local time, we received the following message from General KAGAME which he directed must be delivered to the "crisis committee":
 - 1.- that he was ready to attend a meeting in Kigali to further the peace process;
 - 2.- he was dispatching a battalion to Kigali to assist government forces in keeping renegade forces from killing innocent people;
 - 3.- the "crisis committee" could prove its seriousness by not firing at its advancing RPF battalion.
 - 4.- effective immediately, RPF will not allow landing of any aircraft at Kayibanda International Airport, Kigali.
8. Our immediate reaction to the message was to advise General KAGAME that the introduction of new forces in Kigali at this time will be counter-productive and may impede ongoing efforts to arrange a cease-fire between the Presidential Guards and the RPF. We expressed our appreciation to him for his willingness to attend a meeting in Kigali to further the peace process and transmitted his message to the "crisis committee" in accordance with his request.
9. I am continuing my efforts with all the political forces to establish security in Kigali so as to create the necessary environment for the resumption of efforts to set up the transitional institutions. In this connection, I have received and exchanged views with the leadership of the newly-formed "crisis committee".
8. In the name of the Secretary-General and all members of UNAMIR, I have made a national appeal for the restoration of law and order and peaceful coexistence amongst all the forces in the country. I have also circulated the statement

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132

made by the President of the Security Council condemning the deaths and appealing for calm.

9. I regret to confirm the death of ten (10) military personnel from the Belgian contingent who were seized and detained by elements of the Presidential Guard.

10. Following is a military assessment of the current situation and an update on the military aspects of the Mission.

11. MANDATE AND TASKS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 872 OF 5 OCT 93 AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON RWANDA DATED 24 SEP 93 WE REVIEWED OUR CURRENT SITUATION AND PROVIDE YOU WITH THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT.

12. OUTSIDE YES. REPORTS FROM OUR UNMO TEAMS IN THE RGF, SOUTHERN AND DNE SECTORS ALL REPORT A GENERAL CALM SITUATION EXCEPT SOME STRONG NEGATIVE REACTIONS TO THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH IN GISENYI. IN THE RPF SECTOR EXTENSIVE PREPARATIONS ARE BEING MADE FOR AN IMMINENT OFFENSIVE OPERATION. OUR UNDP CONTACTS ALSO CONFIRM THIS GENERAL SITUATION.

13. INSIDE THE KNSA. THE APPEARANCE OF A VERY WELL PLANNED, ORGANIZED, DELIBERATE AND CONDUCTED CAMPAIGN OF TERROR INITIATED PRINCIPALLY BY THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD SINCE THE MORNING AFTER THE DEATH OF THE HEAD OF STATE HAS COMPLETELY REORIENTED THE SITUATION IN KIGALI. AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN NOT ONLY AGAINST THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP BUT AGAINST THE RPF (BY FIRING AT THE CND), AGAINST PARTICULAR ETHNIC GROUPS (MASSACRE OF TUTSI IN REMERA), AGAINST THE GENERAL CIVILIAN POPULATION (BANDITRY) AND AGAINST UNAMIR (DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE ON ON INSTALLATIONS, VEHICLES, PERSONNEL AND AFFILIATED AGENCIES (IE UNOP) WHICH HAS RESULTED IN FATAL AND NON-FATAL CASUALTIES. THE PARTICULARLY BARBAROUS MURDER OF THE 10 CAPTURED BELGIAN SOLDIERS EMPHASIZES THIS SITUATION. IS THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR STILL VALID?

14. THE TASKS OF THE KNSA AND THE PRESENT SITUATION AND HOW IT RELATES TO THE MANDATE ARE REVIEWED BELOW:

A. SECURE THE WEAPONS OF THE PARTIES. THIS OBVIOUSLY IS NOT BEING DONE AS THE PARTIES HAVE REMOVED THEIR WEAPONS AND HAVE OPENED FULL HOSTILITIES. OUR MONITORS HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN AND THIS TASK CANNOT BE DONE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION.

B. SECURE KIGALI. KIGALI WAS SECURED BY TWO SMALL INFANTRY BATTALION BUT NOW THIS BATTALION IS SEPARATED INTO CONFINED CAMPS WHICH ARE ISOLATED BY FIGHTING, FIRING AND ROADBLOCKS AND THE BATTALIONS ELEMENTS ARE FOCUSED ON SELF-DEFENCE. IN ADDITION THESE ELEMENTS ARE SEPARATED FROM THEIR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IE WATER AND FOOD SOURCES (EXCEPT EMERGENCY RATIONS) AND NO RESUPPLY OF POWER, WASHING WATER, GASOLINE, SANITATION, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, GIVEN THE THREAT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION THEIR SUPPORTING FIELD HOSPITAL. KIGALI IS NOT BEING MONITORED, PATROLLED OR SECURED

GIVEN THIS PRESENT SITUATION. THIS IS A DEFENSIVE SURVIVAL EXERCISE FOR UNAMIR.

- C. SECURE THE RPF BN AREA IN THE CND. THIS IS NOT BEING DONE SINCE THE RPF HAS BROKEN OUT OF THEIR COMPOUND AND ARE CONDUCTING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KIGALI. THE UNAMIR RPF BN AREA GD HAS WITHDRAWN TO ITS CAMP AND HAS ADOPTED A DEFENSIVE POSTURE. THEREFORE THE RPF ARE NOT BEING MONITORED OR SECURED IN KIGALI.
- D. ARMS RECOVERY. OBVIOUSLY NOT POSSIBLE AS THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS AND RPF ARE ENGAGED IN FULL AND OPEN HOSTILITIES AGAINST EACH OTHER AND THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD FREQUENTLY AGAINST UNAMIR. THIS TASK IS NOT BEING CONDUCTED NOR IS IT POSSIBLE OR VIABLE GIVEN THE PRESENT SITUATION.
- E. APCS EMPLOYMENT. THE APCS ARE BEING USED FOR EMERGENCY OPERATIONS LIKE RESCUE AND CASEVAC INSTEAD OF THEIR ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF DETERRENT.
- F. SURVEILLANCE AND VERIFICATION. GIVEN THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE EVENTS OF THE LAST 48 HOURS IT IS UNACCEPTABLY RISKY TO CONDUCT THESE OPERATIONS WITH UNARMED UHMs OR EVEN LIGHTLY ARMED TROOPS. IN ADDITION THERE IS A NEW ARMY IN THE COUNTRY. ELEMENTS OF THE OLD ARMY HAVE VOICED A LOYALTY TO THE YET TO BE FORMED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD AND THE OLD GUARD ARMY. WHERE THIS ARMY WILL STAND IN RELATION TO THE RPF INITIATING HOSTILITIES HAS YET TO BE CONFIRMED. THEREFORE KIGALI IS NOT BEING OBSERVED (EXCEPT IN AND NEAR OUR BASE CAMP AREAS), MONITORED OR VERIFIED.
- G. SECURITY OF INDIVIDUALS. THIS HAS BECOME THE MAJOR TASK OF UNAMIR. UNFORTUNATELY DUE TO THE SITUATION IT MAY NOT HAVE SAVED THE PM AGATHE AND OTHER ABDUCTED MINISTERS, BUT IT IS WORKING WITH OTHER CRITICAL VIPS. THIS TASK, AS UNAMIR ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE A CEASE-FIRE WILL INVOLVE ESCORTS, GUARDS AND GENERAL PROTECTION. IT WILL BE BASED ON THE EVENTS OF THE LAST 24 HOURS INVOLVE RISKING THE LIVES OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL. THIS MUST BE BALANCED WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF SAVING THE LAST MEANS OF INSTITUTING THE BBTG AND SAVING THE PEACE PROCESS. THIS RISK WILL BE ACCEPTED.
- H. SECURITY OF THE AIRPORT. A SUB-UNIT OF COMPANY STRENGTH IS AT THE AIRPORT BUT SO ALSO IS A FORCE OF PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS AND ANOTHER LARGER FORCE OF UNCERTAIN GOVERNMENT TROOPS. THE AIRPORT CAN BE MONITORED BUT IS NOT SECURED. GIVEN THE SIZE OF THE AREA OF INTEREST OF THE AIRPORT THE PRESENT FORCE

CANNOT ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. INDEED THE RUNWAY IS BLOCKED BY PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS.

I. PROTECTION OF UN AND EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY. THE COMMUNITY UNTIL NOW HAS BEEN SAFE IN ITS HOMES OR LOCATIONS (EXCEPT FOR UNDP). HOWEVER AS WATER AND FOOD RUN OUT UNAMIR MAY HAVE TO EVACUATE THESE PERSONS TO A CENTRAL OR SEVERAL LOCATIONS. GIVEN THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE STREETS THIS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE OR MAY BE RETARDED AND VERY DANGEROUS. AN EVACUATION PLAN HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND COORDINATED, BUT IT IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION OF UNAMIR BEING PERMITTED BY THE PARTIES TO EXECUTE THE PLAN WITH A SECURE AND FUNCTIONAL AIRPORT AND IMMUNITY FROM ATTACK. THIS TASK MAY BE POSSIBLE GIVEN CERTAIN PRECONDITIONS.

15. SUPPORT. THE MISSION IS DESPERATELY SHORT OF LIFE AND OPERATIONAL SUSTAINING SUPPORT. THE RESERVES REQUIRED BY THE UN FOR THIS MISSION WERE EITHER NOT BROUGHT BY TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES OR HAVE NOT BEEN PROVIDED TO THIS MISSION. IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CITY OF KIGALI IS IN A STATE OF WAR. THE LOCAL ECONOMY IS NOT FUNCTIONING. STORES, GAS STATIONS, SUPPLIERS, ETC ARE CLOSED AND THEIR OWNERS AND WORKERS ARE IN HIDING. AT PRESENT THE MISSION IS EVALUATING ITS LOGISTICS RESERVES. UNFORTUNATELY THE LOGISTICS COMPANY AND MAJOR RESERVE SUPPLY DEPOT ARE ISOLATED AND THE LOGISTICS STAFF AT THE FORCE HQ ARE ISOLATED AT THE MERIDIEN HOTEL EVEN THOUGH ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO BRING THEM TO FORCE HQ TO ASSIST IN THIS PROCESS AS THE MAJORITY OF THE FIGHTING IS ALONG THE ROUTE. IT IS LIBERALLY ESTIMATED THAT UNAMIR HAS THE FOLLOWING RESERVES:

- A. DRINKING WATER. 20 LITRES PER MAN. THIS WATER UNFORTUNATELY IS IN A RESERVE LOCATION WHICH IS NOT ACCESSIBLE TO MOST OF THE FORCE. MOST UNIT LOCATIONS HAVE BETWEEN 1 OR 2 DAYS OF DRINKING WATER. WATER RATIONING HAS BEEN INITIATED.
- B. GENERAL PURPOSE WATER. TOILETS AND SHOWERS IN MOST LOCATIONS HAVE CEASED TO FUNCTION. GENERAL PURPOSE WATER WILL BE BOILED FOR DRINKING PURPOSES WITH A MINIMAL AMOUNT FOR SANITATION. FOR THE SHORT TERM THIS IS ACCEPTABLE BUT OVER THE LONG TERM WILL RESULT IN HEALTH HAZARDS.
- C. RATIONS. UNITS VARY FROM NIL AT THE FORCE HQ TO 2 DAYS AT RUTBAT. RATIONING HAS BEEN INITIATED. A FORCE RESERVE OF 3 DAYS PER MAN AND A RESERVE AT GREAT LOGISTICS COMPANY OF 10 DAYS PER MAN. UNFORTUNATELY THESE RESERVES ARE AT ISOLATED LOCATIONS FOR MOST UNITS. GIVEN ACCESS TO THESE LOCATIONS UNAMIR CAN SURVIVE ON FOOD FOR LESS THAN TWO WEEKS.
- D. FUEL. FUEL WILL BE OUR BIGGEST DIFFICULTY. A FORCE RESERVE OF 20,000 L OF GASOLINE AND 40,000 L OF DIESEL IS LOCATED AT THE LOGISTICS COMPANY. THIS LOCATION IS ISOLATED FOR MOST UNITS. MOST UNITS FEEL THEY HAVE A TWO TO THREE DAY RESERVE. GIVEN THAT LOCAL HYDRO IS

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OUT, GENERATORS CONSUMING FUELED ARE CRITICAL TO POWER LIMITED LIGHTING, RADIOS, PUMPS. EVEN WITH RATIONING FUEL WILL BE DEPLETED IN UNDER ONE WEEK.

- B. AMMUNITION. THIS CRITICAL ITEM GIVEN OUR PRESENT SITUATION AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE IS OUR LARGEST SINGLE DEFICIENCY. A COMPLETE STOCKTAKING IS BEING CONDUCTED AND FIGURES ARE NOT YET AVAILABLE. AS THIS WAS ESTABLISHED AS A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION ONLY SMALL ARMS AND VERY LIMITED AMOUNTS OF SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION ARE AVAILABLE. UNAMIR CAN DEFEND ITSELF FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME.
- F. DEFENSIVE STORES. THESE STORES HAVE NOT YET BEEN PROVIDED BY THE UN SUPPORT SYSTEM. UNIT RESERVES HAVE BEEN DEPLETED. UNAMIR CAN USE ADHOC AND TEMPORARY MEASURES BUT CANNOT SUSTAIN A LONG TERM DEFENCE.
- G. MEDICAL SUPPLIES. ALREADY DEPLETED BY HEARTS AND MINDS SUPPORT PROGRAM TO THE CIVIL POPULATION, THE USE OF UNIT RESERVES FOR THE PRE-6 APRIL TREATMENT OF OUR OWN PERSONNEL AND THE NON-COMMENCEMENT OF UN MEDICAL RESUPPLY THESE ITEMS ARE IN CRITICAL CONDITION, IF WE TAKE HEAVY CASUALTIES. AS A CONSERVATION METHOD WE HAVE CEASED PROVIDING EMERGENCY TREATMENT TO THE CIVIL POPULATION AND ARE TRANSFERRING THEM TO KIGALI HOSPITAL.
- H. COMMUNICATIONS. THE LOCAL TELEPHONE SYSTEM IS NOT FUNCTIONING. UNAMIR HAS AN INMARSAT WITH FAX AT FORCE HQ AND KIBAT ALSO HAS ONE. THESE ARE OUR ONLY LINKS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD AND THEY ARE BEING PROTECTED AND SUSTAINED AS CRITICAL MISSION STORES.
- I. TRANSPORT. PRIOR TO HOSTILITIES UNAMIR SUFFERED FROM A SHORTAGE OF VEHICLES. THIS SITUATION HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED BY VEHICLE CASUALTIES, ANTICIPATED FUEL SHORTAGES AND THE NON-AVAILABILITY DUE TO THE CONFLICT OF LOCAL SOURCES. UNAMIR CANNOT LIFT ITSELF, LET ALONE ANY ADDITIONAL PERSONS IN ONE LIFT. WE DO HAVE SUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO SHUTTLE MOVEMENT IF FUEL SUPPLIES ARE AVAILABLE.
16. UNAMIR WAS DESIGNED, ESTABLISHED AND DEVELOPED LOGISTICALLY AS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. IT THEREFORE DOES NOT HAVE THE RESERVES OF CRITICAL ITEMS FOR A LONG CONFLICT SCENARIO. IN ADDITION, MUCH OF THE RESERVES ARE ISOLATED FROM OUTER UNIT LOCATIONS BECAUSE OF THE ACCOMODATION DIFFICULTIES IN KIGALI. THE POSITIVE SIDE OF THE LOGISTICS SITUATION IS THAT APPROXIMATELY ONE HALF THE FORCE IS OUTSIDE KIGALI AND CAN IF NECESSARY SUPPORT THEMSELVES FROM THE LOCAL ECONOMY WHICH IS STILL FUNCTIONING IN RELATIVE CALM. UNAMIR WILL DEVOTE MUCH STAFF EFFORT AND RESOURCES TO IMPROVING OUR SUSTAINMENT CAPABILITY BUT IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT WE FACE CRITICAL SHORTAGES THAT WILL REDUCE THE ABILITIES OF AND ENDANGER THE FORCE WITHIN A MATTER OF DAYS.
17. THE RGF LEADERS HAVE ASKED THE RPF (THROUGH UNAMIR) TO CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAW (DISENGAGE) TO THE END AS THEY STATE THEY

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ARE TRYING TO DO THE SAME WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD. WE HAVE PASSED THIS MESSAGE TO THE RPF AND THEY STATED THAT THEY ARE READY TO DO THE SAME IF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS CEASE-FIRES. NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN HAMPERED BY THE COLLAPSE OF THE LOCAL TELEPHONE SYSTEM. CONSIDERABLE FIREFIGHTS ARE ON-GOING THUS BLOCKING ROUTES FOR COMMUNICATIONS, ROADBLOCKS DENY ACCESS AND MOVEMENT WITHIN THE CITY, STRAY BULLETS AND SHELLS, RICOCHETS AND OCCASIONALLY DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE FORCES DEFENSIVE MEASURES AND RETARDS ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY MOVEMENT BY FOOT OR UNPROTECTED VEHICLE. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO SECURE THE FORCE HQ AND AMAXORO STADIUM AREA AS A SECURE CORE FOR OUR OPERATIONS, BUT ON-GOING BATTLES BETWEEN THE RPF AND PRESIDENTIAL GUARD IN THIS AREA HAVE PREVENTED THE CONCLUSION OF THIS OPERATION. THIS OPERATION WILL CONTINUE AS IT IS AND WE ARE IN AN EVACUATION PLAN OR FOR ANY EXPANSION PLAN. OTHER LOCATIONS IN KIGALI ARE IN A CAMP SELF-DEFENCE MODE WITH MINIMUM AND ONLY CRITICAL LIFE SAVING OR PEACE SAVING ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE.

18. THE FC OF UNAMIR NEEDS TO KNOW WHAT THE MAJOR COUNTRIES ARE PLANNING TO DO IN THE AREA OF POSSIBLE EVACUATION, ESPECIALLY OF THE EXPATRIATES AND UN OR UNAMIR. WE HAVE A LIGHT COMPANY (-) AT THE AIRPORT BUT WE DO NOT CONTROL OR HAVE SECURED THE ROUTES TO THE AIRPORT. NEITHER IS THE AIRPORT SECURE FOR LANDING AS WE ARE NOT SURE OF THE OPPOSING FORCES INSTRUCTIONS OR LOYALTIES.

19. FC UNAMIR ATTENDED A MEETING OF THE MILITARY "CRISIS COMMITTEE" LATE MORNING AND THIS SAME AFTERNOON, TO CONSULT OPERATIONS OFFICERS, TO CONSOLIDATE THE PLAN AND ISSUE ORDERS TO STYMIE THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD OPPOSING FORCES. WE DO NOT HAVE THE DETAILS OF THAT PLAN NOR ITS PRESENT IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE.

20. UNAMIR REMAINS COMMITTED TO ITS MANDATE EVEN THOUGH THE PRESENT SITUATION IS NOT ENABLING THIS MISSION TO FULFIL OUR ASSIGNED AND DESIGNED FOR TASKS. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT KIGALI WOULD HAVE BEEN IN A WORSE SITUATION WITHOUT UNAMIR. ALL PRESENT EFFORTS ARE AIMED AT SELF-PROTECTION, SUSTAINMENT, SECURITY OF KEY PEACE PROCESS INDIVIDUALS, LIMITED HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT AND EMPLOYING EVERY SKILL WE POSSESS TO GET THE PARTIES TO A CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATE BACK TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

21. We shall keep you apprised of the situation as it evolves.

22. Best regards.

Committee late night and prep to 7 min

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