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OUTGOING CODED CABLE

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TO : ANNAN/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM : BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE : 18 APRIL, 1994

NUMBER : MIR-784

SUBJECT : POLITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN RWANDA

1. There is currently a vacuum in the political leadership in the country . The appointment of an interim government following the death of President Habyarimana on April 6th in a plane crash, has not produced credible political leaders who could take decisions representative of the government. Most of the ministers of the so called interim government have either left Kigali or are in hiding in the city and are not available to the public.

2. In a radio interview on 15th of April, the Minister of Defence assured the public that the military was representing the interim government in negotiations with the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) and that the government ministers were in control of the country but had retreated to the countryside for strategic reasons. The accuracy of this assertion is doubtful because of reports that some of the ministers have sought asylum or are living in neighbouring countries. What is equally baffling is the complete disappearance of the leaders of the political parties. Presumably, they too have left city or are in hiding in the city. The question then arises as to who speaks and acts on behalf of the government. Obviously in the present environment, there are only two forces that are visible and represent the realities of the current situation. These are the Rwandese Government Forces (RGF) and the RPF.

3. On the government side, senior officers of the RGF constituted themselves into a committee that acts like a cabinet and takes decisions for and on behalf of the government. This committee has twice changed the leadership of the RGF and established itself as the de facto interim administration. It is still not clear as to the extent of their influence within the armed forces or their effective control of the levers of power in the government. It is also not clear if they are being manipulated by politicians who are still in hiding and have decided to stay in the background.

4. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the evident fact is that they are the only identifiable force in the city that seems to carry the mantle of government and thus the only party that can take decisions and ensure their implementation for the government side.

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The RPF on the other hand has remained essentially monolithic and pursued its political objectives with military aggressiveness following what they perceived as the failure of peace efforts to implement the Arusha Peace Agreement. Its political and military leadership has remained unaltered and its determination to achieve equilibrium in power sharing as envisaged in the Arusha Peace Agreement is relentless.

5. Now the two parties are at war and the militias of militant political parties have gone on a rampage massacring mostly members of the minority ethnic group. RGF has called for an unconditional cease fire but RPF has counter proposed preconditions before cease fire talks. As the only neutral and credible force on the scene, UNAMIR has initiated, with the concurrence of both parties, measures aimed at first securing a ceasefire to be followed by the resumption of the peace process. On the 15th of April, UNAMIR convened a meeting between representatives of the two parties to explore the possibility of a ceasefire. Since then it has been in constant discussion with both parties separately trying to narrow their differences and re-instate ceasefire talks.

6. In my view, the RGF side has demonstrated a clear readiness to immediately put into effect a ceasefire. They have indicated their willingness to fulfill some conditions imposed by the RPF but stressed that other conditions can only be implemented by the Broad Based Transitional Government. I have communicated to the RPF their letter conveying their readiness to the RPF preconditions to the RPF (copies attached). Thus far RPF remains intransigent in its insistence that RGF must first stop the massacres of innocent civilians before the parties enter into talks for a ceasefire. It has even gone further in its letter of today's date (copy attached) by adding a new element of discouraging our efforts in promoting indirect negotiations. It has also told us orally that their preconditions are non-negotiable.

7. RPF's reluctance to immediately enter into a ceasefire seems to indicate that it intends to achieve still undeclared military objectives. I have however stressed to the parties that the Security Council does not have long to wait before it decides on the future of UNAMIR, which is likely to be full withdrawal if there is no ceasefire within the next 48 - 72 hours. I have drawn their attention to the grave humanitarian situation which could only be ameliorated if a ceasefire is in place.

8. I am encouraged by the fact that the intensity of the fighting is substantially scaled down to occasional fire exchanges that last for a very short duration. I am not in a position to indicate what this signifies. We are however continuing our efforts to secure as a first step, a ceasefire even if it is for a limited period, while the negotiation continue. This should be followed by a resumption of the peace process leading to the prompt installation of the transitional institutions.

9. I am convinced that our role as an interlocutor has had a

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positive effect on the violence, hence the armed confrontation has not degenerated into a full scale war throughout the country. I am however concerned that if UNAMIR withdraws without a ceasefire in place, the violence and massacres that will be unleashed will be in horrendous proportions for which the international community may not be able to absolve itself from part of the blame.

10. Please find attached a draft agreement which I have submitted to both parties today for consideration. Initial reaction to the draft agreement from the RPF is negative but the RGF has acknowledged that it contains many positive elements. Should RPF formally reject the concept of an immediate ceasefire, even for a limited period while negotiations continue, I will conclude that the RPF has for now decided on the logic of armed confrontation. This will of course render our presence in Rwanda untenable and our mandate unattainable.

11. I will submit to you, within the next 48 hours, my final evaluation of the situation and my recommendations relating to UNAMIR and its mandate.

Regards.

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**THE CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT
FORCES AND THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT**

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We the representative of the Rwandese Government Forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Front;

Considering the fact that if the present fighting and hostilities continue any further, the devastation in terms of human and material loss to this country and nation will be so great that it will become unrecoverable;

Mindful of the fact that the cease fire would facilitate restoration of peace and public order and there by create a congenial atmosphere for negotiations and understanding to implement the Arusha Peace Agreement;

Reaffirming that a cease fire is the first pre requisite for any peaceful settlement;

Have on thisth day of April 1994, agreed on and accepted the following provisions with respect to the cease fire:

ARTICLE 1: All forces of the Rwandese Government Forces(RGF) and the Rwandese Patriotic Front(RPF) will stop fighting and stop all hostilities with effect from hours on April 1994.

Both RGF and RPF will hold ground where ever their present positions are and there will be no movement of troops and weapons except evacuation of sick and wounded. The troops may, however, be relieved with prior notice and under supervision of UNAMIR.

Logistic movement will be allowed to pass through areas held by the other force under supervision and escort of UNAMIR but then the logistic echelon will return to from where they came.

ARTICLE 2: All RGF and RPF fighting echelons will be organised, if disorganisation has taken place, and integrated into unified command at various levels of command so as to make them accountable for their actions and also to ensure that no free lance action is under taken by them. In order to ensure any such free lance action, all firing mechanisms of anti tank weapons and mortar and artillery guns will be stripped off the weapon system and kept in the custody of the battalion company/battery commander.

No forces or deployed troops will try to fortify their positions.

Both forces will pacify, persuade and disarm, if possible, the youth fronts of political parties and other self styled civilian forces.

Law and order of Kigali City will be maintained by both parties.

Each party will make sincere effort to ensure that clandestine killings of people is eradicated.

ARTICLE 3:

All UNAMIR military observers(MILOB) will have free access to any location of any of the forces for inspection. All forces will assist in free movement of UNAMIR troops and also assist in their job.

All locations of the deployed troops and deployed and undeployed weapons will be given to the MILOBS.

Violations of cease fire will immediately be reported to UNAMIR through the LOs and will be resolved through negotiations. Commanders at all levels will try to persuade under command troops not to open up at all fronts on a single violation of cease fire.

Both the parties will reposition their forces so as to ensure safety of UNAMIR establishments as following:

- a. Deployed Troops: 100 metres.
- b. Direct Fire Heavy Weapons: 500 metres
- c. Artillery/Mortars: 1000 metres

Kigali International Airport will be recognised by both parties as an UNAMIR Neutral Territory facility and forces deployed there will be withdrawn. A safe distance of 500 metres from the perimeter fence of the airfield is essential.

ARTICLE 4:

The leadership crisis in the RGF to be resolved as soon as possible so that the people, the RPF and the UNAMIR know the persons responsible for the RGF affairs and who should be approached should a crisis come up.

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ARTICLE 5:

Each side will ensure security so that the residents can come back to their homes and resume normal life.

Each side will try and restart/activate all government, semi government offices/facility, commercial and business facilities and public utility departments.

The RGF will arrange burial of all the dead bodies and restore health and hygiene facilities to prevent out break of epidemics. All out effort should be taken to treat the wounded.

Personnel of the International Red Cross and other UN and non UN humanitarian agencies will have free access to move around the whole country so that they can help alleviate the suffering of the needy people.

ARTICLE 6:

No provocative psychological warfare will be launched against the other party either through radio/TV or through the press media. Only the government radio be made operational and the private radio station be withheld for some time. The RPF will also be given two hours of the total transmitted time to broadcast programmes of their own choice per day.

ARTICLE 7:

While the cease fire holds and efforts are taken bring back normalcy in daily life, both parties should try to resolve their differences and try to form the Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) in accordance with the Arusha Peace Agreement. Both parties will remain determined to form the BBTG within 30 days of the signing of this accord.

ARTICLE 8:

All disputes arising out of the subjects not covered in this agreement will be resolve by UNAMIR negotiations.

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Done at Kigali under the mediation of UNAMIR on ...April
1994.

For the Rwandese Government
Forces

For the Rwandese Patriotic
Front

Mr.....

Mr.